Meier v. City of St. Louis

• Decision Date: 09 March 1904
• Parties: MEIER v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, Appellant, et al
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

79 S.W. 955

180 Mo. 391

MEIER v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, Appellant, et al

Supreme Court of Missouri

March 9, 1904

Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court. -- Hon. Jesse A. McDonald Judge.

Affirmed.

Chas W. Bates and Benj. H. Charles for appellants.

(1) Special assessments for local improvements are made under the taxing power. Garrett v. St. Louis, 25 Mo. 508; Heman v. Allen, 156 Mo. 543; S. C., 181 U.S. 402; Heman v. Schulte, 166 Mo. 409, 189 U.S. 507; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. French, 158 Mo. 545 (same case as French v. B. A. P. Co., 181 U.S. 324); Moberly v. Hogan, 131 Mo. 23; Wright v Davidson, 181 U.S. 379; Fallbrook, etc., Co. v Bradley, 164 U.S. 176; Pittsburg v. Sterrett Subdistrict School, 204 Penn. 636, 61 L. R. A. 183. Special assessment is a tax on the benefit rather than on the property. Newby v. Platte County, 25 Mo. 272; Garrett v. St. Louis, 25 Mo. 513. (2) It is a universal rule that the determination by the Legislature of questions resting, under the Constitution, in the judgment of the Legislature, is final and conclusive. This is emphatically true with respect to such questions so determined by special assessment as well as other taxation statutes. St. Charles ex rel. v. Deemar, 174 Mo. 122; Bridge Co. v. Henderson, 173 U.S. 614; Webster v. Fargo, 181 U.S. 394. The constitutionality and conclusiveness of the action of the legislative department can no longer be questioned in its determination: First: That the cost of local improvements, such as the construction of streets, sidewalks, alleys, sewers, drains, ditches, levees and the like, shall be paid in whole or in part by special assessments. Pryor v. Construction Co., 170 Mo. 448; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. French, supra; Heman v. Allen, 156 Mo. 543 (same case as Shumate v. Heman, 181 U.S. 402;) Chadwick v. Kelley, 187 U.S. 540. Second: In defining the taxing district, and in determining what portion of the property that is or may be benefited by the improvement shall be charged with the costs thereof. Pryor v. Construction Co., 170 Mo. 448; Chadwick v. Kelley, 187 U.S. 540; Heman v. Schulte, 166 Mo. 409 (affirmed without opinion, 189 U.S. 507); French v. Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U.S. 324 (affirming same case in 158 Mo. 534, and other cases immediately following the French case in 181 U. S. to page 404); Heman v. Allen, 156 Mo. supra. It may be that the power of the Legislature to define the taxing district is limited by a prohibition against including in such district property which cannot as a matter of law be benefited by the improvement. But if property may be benefited, the determination of the Legislature that it is benefited is final. Including property in the taxing district is such a determination. Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U.S. 353; Pryor v. Construction Co., 170 Mo. 448; French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U.S. 337; Chadwick v. Kelley, 187 U.S. 540. Or the Legislature may leave to commissioners the determination of the lots to be assessed. Wright v. Davidson, 181 U.S. 379; St. Louis v. Rankin, 96 Mo. 497. Third: Of the apportionment of the assessment in the taxing district according to: (a) The front foot rule. City of St. Charles ex rel. v. Deemar, supra; Heman v. Gilliam, 171 Mo. 264; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. French, supra; Webster v. Fargo, 181 U.S. 394; Chadwick v. Kelley, 187 U.S. 140; Schaefer v. Werling, 188 U.S. 516. (b) The area rule. Pryor v. Construction Co., 170 Mo. 448; Heman v. Schulte, supra. (c) The assessed valuation of the property to be determined by officers or commissioners. Lockwood v. St. Louis, 24 Mo. 22; Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 176. (d) The specifically ascertained benefit to be determined by officers or commissioners. Wright v. Davidson, supra; St. Louis v. Rankin, supra. (e) Specific amount per area or frontage. Egyptian Levee Co. v. Hardin, 27 Mo. 495; Parsons v. District of Columbia, 170 U.S. 45; Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U.S. 345. Fourth: That the property in the district is benefited to the amount of the assessment chargeable against it, under the apportionment provided for. Pryor v. Construction Co., supra; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. French, supra; Heman v. Allen, supra; Smith v. Worcester, 182 Mass. 232, 59 L. R. A. 730. (3) The provisions of article 10 of the Constitution of Missouri in regard to taxation are only applicable to taxation in the ordinary acceptation of the term, and are wholly inapplicable to special assessments. Farrar v. St. Louis, 80 Mo. 386. So held as to section 3, providing for uniformity of taxation upon the same class of subjects. St. Joseph to use v. Owen, 110 Mo. 455; Farrar v. St. Louis, 80 Mo. 386; Adams v. Lindell, 5 Mo.App. 210 (affirmed 72 Mo. 198). So held as to section 4, providing that all property shall be taxed in proportion to value. St. Joseph to use v. Owen, supra; Farrar v. St. Louis, supra; Adams v. Lindell, supra; Egyptian Levee Co. v. Hardin, supra; Newby v. Platte County, 25 Mo. 270; Garrett v. St. Louis, 25 Mo. 509. So held as to section 11, fixing the rate of taxation. Farrar v. St. Louis, supra; Adams v. Lindell, supra. (4) (a) No notice is required by constitutional provision or otherwise to be given the property owners respecting those matters which the Legislature itself determines. Spencer v. Merchant, supra; Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U.S. 311; St. Louis v. Rankin, 96 Mo. 497. (b) Publication of notice to the property owners and opportunity to be heard before the tribunal upon whom is devolved the duty of ascertaining facts, and acting thereon, in the special assessment procedure, satisfies the constitutional requirements and due process of law as to those matters to be passed upon by such tribunal. Eyssell v. St. Louis, 168 Mo. 616; Springfield to use v. Weaver, 137 Mo. 672; St. Louis v. Rankin, 96 Mo. 506; Goodrich v. Detroit, 184 U.S. 432; King v. Portland, 184 U.S. 61. Section 14 of article 6 of the charter of St. Louis complies with this requirement. (c) It is only with respect to the questions of fact which are to be passed upon by such tribunal that the property owner is entitled to notice. Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 175; St. Louis v. Rankin, 96 Mo. 497. (5) (a) Special assessment legislation which keeps within the legislative sphere as indicated in point 2, and provides for notice to the property owners in the manner pointed out in point 4, does not violate constitutional provisions, whether of the State or of the United States, guaranteeing to every person equal protection of the laws, prohibiting the enactment of special laws or class legislation, prohibiting the depriving of any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law (if such prohibition means more than to require notice as above mentioned), when its provisions are general and operate impartially, equally, uniformly and alike on all persons and property in similar circumstances or similarly situated or under the same circumstances and conditions, or coming within a class to which the law applies, such class including all similarly situated, and when the classification is based upon conditions and circumstances of natural differences in the relation of the property affected to the subject-matter and object of the law. Cases under point 2, supra; also Elting v. Hickman, 172 Mo. 257 (poll-tax case); State ex inf. v. Ins. Co., 150 Mo. 113 (excepting certain insurance companies from anti-trust act of March 24, 1897); State v. Whitaker, 160 Mo. 59 (screens on electric street cars); Magoun v. Bank, 170 U.S. 283 (Illinois inheritance tax); Clark v. Titusville, 184 U.S. 329 (occupation tax regulated by amount of sales made); Orr v. Gilman, 183 U.S. 278 (New York transfer tax); Jenkins v. Neff, 186 U.S. 230 (National Bank & Trust Co. taxation). (b) But in the matter of designating the property among all which may be benefited by the improvement, and which might therefore be included in the taxing district, that which shall bear the cost of the improvement, constitutional provisions and principles do not require the Legislature to base its rule of inclusion in and exclusion from the taxing district upon the elaborately reasonable classification as above set forth, but it may lawfully draw the boundary line arbitrarily within what it might lawfully constitute the taxing district, provided the rule of inclusion and exclusion is general and operates alike, impartially and uniformly on all similarly situated, with respect to the improvement. This proposition necessarily follows from the rules of law stated and authorities cited under point 2. But express authority for it can be found in numberless cases besides the two here cited: Farrar v. St. Louis, 80 Mo. 394; Cass Farm Co. v. Detroit, 181 U.S. 398. (c) Objections on the ground of individual hardship, inequalities and the like, do not show the law to be unconstitutional or invalid, nor authorize judicial interference. French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U.S. 335; Mattingly v. Dist. Columbia, 97 U.S. 692; Heman v. Schulte, 166 Mo. 415; Heman v. Allen, 156 Mo. 543; Farrar v. St. Louis, 80 Mo. 394; Chadwick v. Kelley, 187 U.S. 544; Garrett v. St. Louis, 25 Mo. 513; Egyptian Levee Co. v. Hardin, 27 Mo. 498. (6) (a) It follows from point 2 that, when the taxing district has been fixed by valid legislation, and when the apportionment of the cost of the improvement upon the property in the district has been so fixed, the owner of the property in the district can not be heard to contend in the courts that his property was not in fact benefited, or that it was not benefited to the amount assessed in accordance with such apportionment. Pryor v. Construction Co., 170 Mo. 451. (b) And it also follows that where the taxing districts and amount of assessments are determined by a commission or tribunal...