UTE Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation v. Utah

• Decision Date: 16 June 2015
• Docket Number: Nos. 14–4028,14–4031,14–4034.,s. 14–4028
• Citation: 790 F.3d 1000
• Parties: UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH AND OURAY RESERVATION, Plaintiff–Counterclaim Defendant–Appellant/Cross–Appellee, v. State of UTAH; Duchesne County, a political subdivision of the State of Utah, Defendants–Counterclaimants–Appellees in No. 14–4028 and Defendants–Counterclaimants in No. 14–4031, Uintah County, a political subdivision of the State of Utah, Defendant–Counterclaimant–Third–Party Plaintiff–Appellee/Cross–Appellant, Roosevelt City, a municipal corporation; Duchesne City, a municipal corporation; Myton, a municipal corporation, Defendants, Bruce Ignacio, Chairman of the Ute Tribal Business Committee, in his official capacity, Defendant–Third–Party Defendant, and Business Committee for the Ute Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation; Gordon Howell, Chairman of the Business Committee; Ronald J. Wopsock, Vice Chairman of the Ute Tribal Business Committee, in his official capacity; Stewart Pike, member of the Ute Tribal Business Committee, in his official capacity; Tony Small, member of the Ute Tribal Business Committee, in his official capacity; Philip Chimburas, member of the Ute Tribal Business Committee, in his official capacity; Paul Tsosie, Chief Judge of the Ute Tribal Court, in his official capacity; William Reynolds, Judge of the Ute Tribal Court, in his official capacity, Third–Party Defendants. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, Utah, a federally recognized Indian Tribe, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. State of Utah; Wasatch County, a political subdivision of the State of Utah; Gary Herbert, in his capacity as Governor of Utah; Sean D. Reyes, in his capacity Attorney General of Utah; Scott Sweat, in his capacity as County Attorney for Wasatch County, Utah ; Tyler J. Berg, in his capacity Assistant County Attorney for Wasatch County, Utah, Defendants–Appellees. Uintah County, Amicus Curiae.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

790 F.3d 1000

UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH AND OURAY RESERVATION, Plaintiff–Counterclaim Defendant–Appellant/Cross–Appellee

v.State of UTAH;

Duchesne County, a political subdivision of the State of Utah, Defendants–Counterclaimants–Appellees in No. 14–4028 and Defendants–Counterclaimants in No. 14–4031

Uintah County, a political subdivision of the State of Utah, Defendant–Counterclaimant–Third–Party Plaintiff–Appellee/Cross–Appellant

Roosevelt City, a municipal corporation;

Duchesne City, a municipal corporation;

Myton, a municipal corporation, Defendants

Bruce Ignacio, Chairman of the Ute Tribal Business Committee, in his official capacity, Defendant–Third–Party Defendant

and

Business Committee for the Ute Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation;

Gordon Howell, Chairman of the Business Committee;

Ronald J. Wopsock, Vice Chairman of the Ute Tribal Business Committee, in his official capacity;

Stewart Pike, member of the Ute Tribal Business Committee, in his official capacity;

Tony Small, member of the Ute Tribal Business Committee, in his official capacity;

Philip Chimburas, member of the Ute Tribal Business Committee, in his official capacity;

Paul Tsosie, Chief Judge of the Ute Tribal Court, in his official capacity;

William Reynolds, Judge of the Ute Tribal Court, in his official capacity, Third–Party Defendants.

Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, Utah, a federally recognized Indian Tribe, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.State of Utah;

Wasatch County, a political subdivision of the State of Utah;

Gary Herbert, in his capacity as Governor of Utah;

Sean D. Reyes, in his capacity Attorney General of Utah;

Scott Sweat, in his capacity as County Attorney for Wasatch County, Utah ;

Tyler J. Berg, in his capacity Assistant County Attorney for Wasatch County, Utah, Defendants–Appellees.

Uintah County, Amicus Curiae.

Nos. 14–4028

14–4031

14–4034.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

June 16, 2015.

Frances C. Bassett and Jeffrey S. Rasmussen (Sandra L. Denton, Thomas W. Fredericks, Todd K. Gravelle, Matthew J. Kelly, and Jeremy J. Patterson with them on the briefs) of Fredericks Peebles & Morgan LLP, Louisville, CO, for the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation.

Parker Douglas, Utah Federal Solicitor (Randy S. Hunter and Katharine H. Kinsman, Assistant Utah Attorneys General, and Bridget Romano, Utah Solicitor General, with him on the briefs), Salt Lake City, UT, for the State of Utah, Gary Herbert, and Sean D. Reyes.

Jesse C. Trentadue (Britton R. Butterfield, Carl F. Huefner, and Noah M. Hoagland, with him on the briefs) of Suitter Axland, PLLC, Salt Lake City, UT, for Duchesne County, Wasatch County, Scott Sweat, and Tyler J. Berg.

E. Blaine Rawson of Ray Quinney & Nebeker P.C., Salt Lake City, UT (Greggory J. Savage, Matthew M. Cannon, and Calvin R. Winder of Ray Quinney & Nebeker, Salt Lake City, UT, and G. Mark Thomas, Uintah County Attorney, and Jonathan A. Stearmer, Chief Deputy Uintah County Attorney–Civil, Vernal, UT, with him on the briefs), for Uintah County.

Before HARTZ, GORSUCH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

GORSUCH, Circuit Judge.

In our layered system of trial and appellate courts everyone's assured at least two chances to air a grievance. Add to this the possibility that a lawsuit might bounce back to the trial court on remand or even rebound its way to appeal yet again—or the possibility that an issue might win interlocutory review—and the opportunities to press a complaint grow abundantly. No doubt our complex and consuming litigation wringer has assumed the shape it has so courts might squeeze as much truth as possible out of the parties' competing narratives. But sooner or later every case must come to an end. After all, that's why people bring their disputes to court in the first place: because the legal system promises to resolve their differences without resort to violence and supply “peace and repose” at the end of it all. S. Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 49, 18 S.Ct. 18, 42 L.Ed. 355 (1897). For a legal system to meet this promise, of course, both sides must accept—or, if need be, they must be made to respect—the judgments it generates. Most people know and readily assent to all this. So it's pretty surprising when a State and several of its counties need a reminder. But that's what this appeal is all about.

*

Nearly forty years ago the Ute Tribe filed a lawsuit alleging that Utah and several local governments were unlawfully trying to displace tribal authority on tribal lands. After a decade of wrangling in the district court and on appeal, this court agreed to hear the case en banc. In the decision that followed, what the parties refer to as Ute III , the court ruled for the Tribe and rejected Utah's claim that congressional action had diminished three constituent parts of Ute tribal lands—the Uncompahgre Reservation, the Uintah Valley Reservation, and certain national forest areas. See Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 F.2d 1087, 1093 (10th Cir.1985) (en banc). When the Supreme Court then denied certiorari, that “should have been the end of the matter.” United States' Mem. in Supp. of Ute Indian Tribe's Mot. for Injunctive Relief 3, Supplemental App. 8 (Nov. 23, 1992).

It wasn't. Instead, state officials chose “to disregard the binding effect of the Tenth Circuit decision in order to attempt to relitigate the boundary dispute in a friendlier forum.” Id. As a vehicle for their effort, they decided to prosecute tribal members in state court for conduct occurring within the tribal boundaries recognized by Ute III . This, of course, the State had no business doing. Ute III held the land in question to be “Indian country.” See 773 F.2d at 1093 ; 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (defining “Indian country”). And within Indian country, generally only the federal government or an Indian tribe may prosecute Indians for criminal offenses. See DeCoteau v. Dist. County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 & n. 2, 95 S.Ct. 1082, 43 L.Ed.2d 300 (1975) ; Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 465 n. 2, 104 S.Ct. 1161, 79 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984). True, states sometimes may prosecute “crimes by non-Indians against non-Indians and victimless crimes by non-Indians.”

Bartlett, 465 U.S. at 465 n. 2, 104 S.Ct. 1161 (citation omitted). But unless Congress provides an exception to the rule—and it hasn't here—states possess “no authority” to prosecute Indians for offenses in Indian country. Cheyenne–Arapaho Tribes v. Oklahoma, 618 F.2d 665, 668 (10th Cir.1980) ; 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (allowing certain states but not Utah to exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians in Indian country).

Disregarding all of this, state officials proceeded with their prosecutions anyway and soon one wended its way to the Utah Supreme Court. Declining to acknowledge or abide “traditional ... principles of comity, ... res judicata and collateral estoppel,” the State argued that the very same congressional actions Ute III said did not diminish tribal territory did diminish at least a part of the Uintah Valley Reservation. United States' Mem., supra, at 4, Supplemental App. 9. And with this much at least the Utah Supreme Court eventually agreed. See State v. Perank, 858 P.2d 927 (Utah 1992) ; State v. Hagen, 858 P.2d 925 (Utah 1992). Then the United States Supreme Court—despite having denied review in Ute III and despite the fact the mandate in that case had long since issued—granted certiorari and agreed too. See Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 421–22, 114 S.Ct. 958, 127 L.Ed.2d 252 (1994).

This strange turn of events raised the question: what to do with the mandate of Ute III? Keeping it in place could leave the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hagen to control only cases arising from Utah state courts and not federal district courts, a pretty unsavory possibility by anyone's reckoning. So in a decision the parties call Ute V , this court elected to recall and modify Ute III's mandate. See Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 114 F.3d 1513, 1527–28 (10th Cir.1997). Because Hagen addressed the Uintah Valley Reservation, Ute V deemed that particular portion of Ute tribal lands diminished—and diminished according to the terms Hagen dictated. So much relief was warranted, this court found, to “reconcile two inconsistent boundary determinations and to provide a uniform allocation of jurisdiction among separate sovereigns.” Id. at 1523.

Naturally, the State wanted more. It asked this court to extend Hagen's reasoning to the national forest and Uncompahgre lands and hold them diminished too. But Ute V rejected this request. Upsetting a final decision by recalling and modifying a mandate is and ought to be a rare and disfavored thing in a legal system that values finality. Id. at 1527. Though such extraordinary relief might have been warranted to give meaning to Hagen's holding, Ute V explained, it wasn't warranted to extend Hagen's reasoning to new terrain—even if doing so might happen to achieve a “more accurate” overall result. Id. at 1523. After all, by this point the parties' litigation was so old it had come of age and Ute III itself had been settled for years. “If relitigation were permitted whenever it might result in a more accurate determination, in the name of ‘justice,’ the very values served by preclusion would be quickly destroyed.” Id. (quoting 18 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4426, at 265 (1981) ). Following this court's decision in Ute V , the Supreme Court again denied certiorari and, really, that should have been the end of it.

But as you might have guessed by now, the State and its counties are back at it. Just as they did in the 1990s, they are again prosecuting tribal members in state court for offenses occurring on tribal lands—indeed, on the very lands Ute V said remain Indian country even after Hagen . Seeking to avoid a replay of the “jurisdictional chaos” the State invited the last time around, United States' Mem., supra, at 4, Supplemental App. 9, this time the Tribe filed suit in federal...