790 F.3d 289 (1st Cir. 2015), 14-1463, Carter's of New Bedford, Inc. v. Nike, Inc.
|Citation:||790 F.3d 289|
|Opinion Judge:||TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.|
|Party Name:||CARTER'S OF NEW BEDFORD, INC., d/b/a CARTER'S CLOTHING AND FOOTWEAR, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. NIKE, INC., and NIKE USA, INC., Defendants, Appellees|
|Attorney:||Philip N. Beauregard, with whom Law Offices of Beauregard, Burke & Franco, was on brief, for appellant. Nicholas D. Stellakis, with whom Martin F. Gaynor III and Manion Gaynor & Manning LLP, were on brief, for appellees.|
|Judge Panel:||Before Lynch, Torruella, and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.|
|Case Date:||June 24, 2015|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the First Circuit|
Appellant, a family-owned retail clothing and footwear business with two stores in Massachusetts, had sold Nike footwear for approximately twenty-eight years before Nike notified Appellant that it was terminating the parties’ business relationship. Appellant sued Nike in Massachusetts state court, alleging contractual claims and a claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. Nike removed the suit to... (see full summary)
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS. Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge.
This case arises out of a contract dispute between Plaintiff-Appellant Carter's of New Bedford, Inc. (" Carter's" ), a family-owned retail clothing and footwear business with two stores in Massachusetts, and Defendant-Appellee Nike, Inc. (" Nike" ). In an attempt to stop Nike from terminating the parties' business relationship, Carter's filed suit in Massachusetts state court, bringing a host of contractual claims as well as a claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § § 2 and 11 (" Chapter 93A" ). Nike removed the suit to federal court and then moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). According to Nike, its invoices (the " Agreement" ) included a forum selection clause that regulated the relationship between it and Carter's and required the latter to bring any claim in Oregon, not Massachusetts. The district court agreed with Nike and dismissed Carter's claims. We now affirm that decision.
Carter's has sold Nike footwear for approximately twenty-eight years. Over that period, Nike products have accounted for a substantial portion of Carter's revenue. In March 2013, Nike notified Carter's that it was terminating the parties' business relationship. Carter's theorizes that Nike did so as part of a new marketing strategy that favors large national retailers over small locally-owned businesses. In an attempt to forestall Nike's termination, Carter's sued Nike in Bristol Superior Court alleging that Nike: (1) breached its Agreement with Carter's; (2) breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) violated Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 106, § 2-309 (enacting the Uniform Commercial Code (" U.C.C." ) in Massachusetts), which provides a default " reasonable time" requirement for terminating agreements of successive performance with indefinite duration; and (4) violated Chapter 93A, which broadly prohibits " unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade."
Carter's recognized in its Complaint that the parties' business relationship was at least " partially defined" by Nike's invoices and appended a copy of one of these invoices, entitled " Terms and Conditions of Sale," to said Complaint. The document defines itself as " the Agreement" and establishes that " [e]ach Order, together with these Terms and Conditions and, if applicable Customer's credit application and account agreement, may be referred to collectively as the 'Agreement.'" Carter's pleaded " always hav[ing] performed its obligations under such Agreement." While the Agreement includes a clause that states that it " contains the entire agreement and understanding between the parties . . . and supersedes prior and contemporaneous oral and written agreements, commitments and understandings," Carter's Complaint did not explain whether there are any unwritten portions (prior, contemporaneous, or post-Agreement) of the parties' understandings or how exactly Nike breached those. Carter's did claim, however, that the business relationship was governed by various instructional materials and guidelines on product advertising, as well as " other customs and procedures . . . that reflect the expectations and arrangements between Nike and Carter's in conducting their business together." In addition to that, Carter's asserted that it had become a " de facto franchise" of Nike.
Therefore, Carter's argued that terminating the relationship was a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and that such conduct was in violation of Massachusetts law.
Once removed to federal court, Nike moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). According to Nike, a forum selection clause in the Agreement required Carter's to file its claims in Oregon.1 Carter's opposed the motion, arguing that the Agreement was unconscionable and an unenforceable contract of adhesion. In support of that assertion, Carter's claimed that it did not have the opportunity to bargain, and that the Agreement unfairly...
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