People Of The State Of Mich. v. Jackson
| Decision Date | 07 September 2010 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 138988. |
| Citation | 487 Mich. 783,790 N.W.2d 340 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Leonard Leppel JACKSON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, B. Eric Restuccia, Solicitor General, Kym L. Worthy, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, and Julie A. Powell, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by Kim McGinnis) for the defendant.
We heard oral argument on whether to grant defendant's application for leave to appeal. At issue is whether defendant is entitled to resentencing for an armed-robbery conviction when the Court of Appeals vacated his concurrent convictions for felonious assault that had been used as a factor in calculating his sentence for armed robbery. Court of Appeals remands for resentencing are governed by MCL 769.34, which requires that cases be remanded when the sentence is based on inaccurate information. We conclude that defendant is entitled to resentencing because defendant's sentence is now based on inaccurate information. We further conclude that because defendant requested a remand for resentencing as part of his appeal to vacate the felonious-assault convictions, he complied with the requirement of MCL 769.34(10), which mandates that a request for remand be made in a proper motion filed in the Court of Appeals.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred by failing to remand for resentencing. In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the portion of the Court of Appeals' decision that concluded that the Court could not remand for resentencing. We therefore vacate defendant's sentence and remand for resentencing.
On the evening of January 12, 2007, Sherry Taylor was leaving a store with her two young children. As she was helping her children into her car, she noticed a man, who was later identified as defendant, running toward her. Taylor claimed that defendant approached her, pointed a gun at her children, and threatened to shoot them unless Taylor gave him all her money. Taylor gave defendant $120 and some other items, and then defendant ran away. He was apprehended several months later when Taylor happened to recognize him in public and called the police. The gun that Taylor claimed to have seen was never recovered.
Defendant was charged with armed robbery, 1 two counts of felonious assault, 2 felon in possession of a firearm, 3 and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. 4 At a bench trial, defendant was acquitted of the charges of felon in possession of a firearm and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony after the court determined that the prosecution had failed to prove defendant actually had a gun when he demanded Taylor's money. Defendant was convicted of armed robbery. Additionally, despite the lack of proof that defendant had a weapon, defendant was also convicted of two counts of felonious assault.
During the calculation of defendant's recommended minimum sentence range for armed robbery under the sentencing guidelines, defendant was assessed 20 points under prior record variable 7 (PRV 7) as a result of the two felonious-assault convictions. 5 Consequently, his minimum sentence range was 108 to 270 months. Had defendant not been assessed 20 points under PRV 7, his minimum sentence range would have been 81 to 202 months. 6 The trial court stated its intention to sentence defendant at the lower end of the guidelines range and sentenced defendant as a third-offense habitual offender 7 to concurrent prison terms of 108 to 240 months for armed robbery and 24 to 96 months for each felonious-assault conviction.
Defendant appealed in the Court of Appeals and argued that the trial court erred by convicting him of two counts of felonious assault while simultaneously finding that he did not have a gun during the commission of the armed robbery. Defendant argued that felonious assault requires the prosecution prove that a dangerous weapon was used in the commission of the crime as an element of the crime, thus making the convictions inconsistent with the trial court's factual findings. As part of his appeal, defendant also requested that his case be remanded for resentencing on his armed-robbery conviction because of this error.
The Court of Appeals agreed that it was error to convict defendant of felonious assault when defendant did not have a dangerous weapon at the time of the crime. The Court opined that while an armed robbery can be committed without the use of a dangerous weapon, a felonious assault cannot. 8 In light of this error, the Court vacated defendant's felonious-assault convictions. However, the Court rejected defendant's request for resentencing on the armed-robbery conviction, concluding that it was required by MCL 769.34(10) to affirm defendant's sentence because the sentence remained “within the appropriate guidelines range” and defendant had not raised the issue “ ‘at sentencing, in a proper motion for resentencing, or in a proper motion to remand’....” 9
Defendant applied for leave to appeal in this Court, and we heard oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other preemptory action. At issue is whether defendant was entitled to resentencing under these circumstances. 10
The issues in this case involve the proper interpretation and application of the statutory sentencing guidelines, which are both legal issues that this Court reviews de novo. 11
At issue in this case is whether defendant is entitled to resentencing for his armed-robbery conviction when the Court of Appeals vacated his concurrent convictions for felonious assault that were used as a factor in calculating the sentence for armed robbery. The Court of Appeals vacated defendant's felonious-assault convictions; however, the Court refused to remand the case for resentencing, concluding:
Although we conclude that these variables [PRV 7, OV 1, and OV 2] were improperly scored, as discussed below, we must affirm defendant's sentence because it “is within the appropriate guidelines sentence range” and defendant failed to raise this issue “at sentencing, in a proper motion for resentencing, or in a proper motion to remand” filed with this Court.[ 12 ]
The Court of Appeals focused on two specific provisions within MCL 769.34(10): whether the sentence was “within the appropriate guidelines” range and whether defendant raised the issue “at sentencing, in a proper motion for resentencing, or in a proper motion to remand....” Thus, the proper interpretation of MCL 769.34(10) governs the result in this case. 13
In interpreting statutes, we follow established rules of statutory construction. Assuming that the Legislature has acted within its constitutional authority, the purpose of statutory construction is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. 14 Accordingly, the Court must interpret the language of a statute in a manner that is consistent with the legislative intent. 15 In determining the legislative intent, we must first look to the actual language of the statute. 16 As far as possible, effect should be given to every phrase, clause, and word in the statute. 17 Moreover, the statutory language must be read and understood in its grammatical context. 18 When considering the correct interpretation, the statute must be read as a whole. 19 Individual words and phrases, while important, should be read in the context of the entire legislative scheme. 20 In defining particular words within a statute, we must consider both the plain meaning of the critical word or phrase and its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme. 21
MCL 769.34(10) specifically governs remands for resentencing. This subsection provides:
If a minimum sentence is within the appropriate guidelines sentence range, the court of appeals shall affirm that sentence and shall not remand for resentencing absent an error in scoring the sentencing guidelines or inaccurate information relied upon in determining the defendant's sentence. A party shall not raise on appeal an issue challenging the scoring of the sentencing guidelines or challenging the accuracy of information relied upon in determining a sentence that is within the appropriate guidelines sentence range unless the party has raised the issue at sentencing, in a proper motion for resentencing, or in a proper motion to remand filed in the court of appeals.
[Emphasis added.]
We first review whether a remand for resentencing was barred because defendant's minimum sentence was within the appropriate guidelines range. The first sentence of MCL 769.34(10) governs when the Court shall or shall not remand for resentencing: “If a minimum sentence is within the appropriate guidelines sentence range, the court of appeals shall affirm that sentence and shall not remand for resentencing absent an error in scoring the sentencing guidelines or inaccurate information relied upon in determining the defendant's sentence.” (Emphasis added.) The clear meaning of this sentence is that the Court shall not remand for resentencing unless there was either an error in scoring or defendant's sentence was based on inaccurate information. 22 Conversely, this means that the Court is required to remand whenever one of these two circumstances is present. 23 Thus, the Court may not ignore the two criteria for when a case should be remanded merely because the sentence is within the appropriate guidelines range. When the defendant's sentence is based on an error in scoring or based on inaccurate information, a remand for resentencing is required. 24
In this case, the trial court had assessed points for convictions that were vacated on appeal. Before the felonious-assault convictions were vacated, defendant was assessed 20 points under PRV 7 for his...
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