Caldwell v. Miller

• Decision Date: 16 June 1986
• Docket Number: No. 84-2522,84-2522
• Parties: Lawrence D. CALDWELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Harold G. MILLER, Warden, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 589

790 F.2d 589

Lawrence D. CALDWELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Harold G. MILLER, Warden, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 84-2522.

United States Court of Appeals,

Seventh Circuit.

Argued Jan. 7, 1986.

Decided May 8, 1986.

As Amended June 3, 1986.

Rehearing Denied June 16, 1986.

Randall F. Kender, Jenner & Block, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant.

Richard H. Lloyd, Asst. U.S. Atty., Frederick J. Hess, U.S. Atty., East St. Louis, Ill., for defendant-appellee.

Before WOOD and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges, and ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge.

ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge.

The plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary at Marion, Illinois, brought this suit in federal district court challenging restrictions imposed by, and conditions of confinement resulting from, a "lockdown" of that facility instituted on October 28, 1983. The primary questions presented in this appeal are whether the lockdown restrictions impermissibly burden his right to free exercise of religion, resulted in conditions of confinement that constitute cruel and unusual punishment,

violate his right of access to the courts, whether the prolonged imposition of the lockdown without an opportunity for him to challenge it violated his right to due process of law, and whether his personal legal and religious books were confiscated without due process. The district court granted the respondent prison official's motion for summary judgment as to all claims. For the reasons stated below, we will affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I

The plaintiff, Lawrence D. Caldwell, is an inmate at the United States Penitentiary at Marion, Illinois ("Marion"). In late October of 1983, inmate violence at Marion resulted in the death of one prisoner and two guards. Caldwell was not involved in these incidents. On October 28, 1983, Harold G. Miller, ¹ then the warden at Marion, declared a state of emergency and "locked down" the institution, essentially suspending all inmate activities. Those restrictions included the limitation of exercise privileges, the suspension of contact visitation, ² the confinement of inmates in their cells for twenty-four hours a day, a total ban on group religious services, and a prohibition against direct access to the main law library at Marion. On October 31, 1983, a Bureau of Prisons ("Bureau") task force began an evaluation of security and operational procedures at Marion. It recommended that Marion continue as a level-six institution, ³ and that physical-plant and operational changes be made, although it is not clear from the record exactly what those recommendations were. ⁴

Shortly after the lockdown restrictions were imposed, prison officials at Marion confiscated all hardbound books in the possession of inmates, including Caldwell's personal legal and religious volumes. Caldwell was told he could either have his books sent home, have them donated to an agency outside Marion, or have them destroyed. Having no family and not wishing his books be destroyed, Caldwell donated them to organizations outside Marion. Approximately two months later, Miller again allowed inmates to have hardbound books in their cells.

On March 13, 1984, Caldwell, acting pro se, ⁵ filed a complaint challenging the lockdown restrictions on a number of constitutional grounds. In particular he alleged (1) that the complete ban on congregational religious services violates his right to free exercise under the First Amendment, (2) that the restrictions on exercise and the ban on contact visitation constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth By consent of the parties, the case was submitted to a magistrate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 636(c). ⁶ Following oral argument on Miller's motion, ⁷ the district court granted summary judgment against Caldwell on all except the library access and free-exercise claims. As to these latter claims, the court granted Caldwell leave to submit affidavits on the nature of religious services then available at Marion, and granted Miller leave to submit affidavits on the issue of whether Caldwell had access to District of Columbia caselaw. ⁸ After submission of affidavits on these matters, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Miller on the remaining claims. Caldwell appeals from the grant of summary judgment as to all claims.

Amendment, (3) that the prolonged imposition of the lockdown without a hearing or opportunity for him to challenge it before prison officials violated his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment, (4) that the confiscation of his legal and religious books likewise denied him due process, and (5) that the law library use restrictions impermissibly burden his right of access to the courts.

II

Before turning to the substantive issues raised by Caldwell on appeal, we must address a procedural matter. Caldwell filed his complaint under the federal mandamus acts, 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1361 and 1651. The district court construed Caldwell's complaint as one seeking either a writ of habeas corpus or a writ of mandamus under these statutes. The court held that neither the mandamus statutes nor the habeas statute provided a statutory basis for federal jurisdiction over Caldwell's complaint. ⁹ The district court, however, after It is well settled that pro se litigants are not held to the stringent standards applied to formally trained members of the legal profession, and that, accordingly, we construe pro se complaints liberally. See, e.g., Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10, 101 S.Ct. 173, 175-76, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595-96, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); Bates v. Jean, 745 F.2d 1146, 1150 (7th Cir.1984); Childs v. Duckworth, 705 F.2d 915, 922 (7th Cir.1983). It is also well settled that Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1) does not require a plaintiff to set forth the statutory basis for the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction in order for the court to assume jurisdiction, so long as he alleges facts sufficient to bring the case within the court's jurisdiction. Jensen v. State Board of Tax Commissioners, 763 F.2d 272, 278 (7th Cir.1985); Rohler v. TRW, Inc., 576 F.2d 1260, 1264 (7th Cir.1978); see also Loss v. Blankenship, 673 F.2d 942, 950 (7th Cir.1982) ("Imperfections in pleading style will not divest a federal court of jurisdiction where the complaint as a whole reveals a proper basis for jurisdiction.").

concluding that it had no jurisdiction, decided the merits of Caldwell's claims by granting summary judgment for Miller. On appeal, Caldwell argues that the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331.

It is clear from the face of Caldwell's complaint that he has alleged a number of constitutional violations, arising out of the lockdown at Marion, sufficient to give the district court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684, 66 S.Ct. 773, 777, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946); Garza v. Miller, 688 F.2d 480, 482 (7th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150, 103 S.Ct. 796, 74 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1983). Hence, we shall review the disposition of Caldwell's complaint below, not as a dismissal for want of jurisdiction, but as an adjudication of the merits.

A. BAN ON GROUP RELIGIOUS SERVICES.

Caldwell claims that the ban on group religious services at Marion unconstitutionally infringes upon his ability to worship. Caldwell is a Roman Catholic. Neither he nor any other inmate at Marion may participate in Mass, or other group religious functions. Rather, all religious services and instruction are conducted on an individual basis by Marion's two chaplains. The chaplains may not enter an inmate's cell. Instead, they "walk" each cell unit at least once weekly, and attend to the religious needs of inmates so desiring. The chaplains are available for emergencies, and private conferences may be scheduled. The district court found the ban on group religious services to be reasonable in light of the security needs at Marion, and granted summary judgment in favor of Miller.

Caldwell argues that the district court's grant of summary judgment was improper for three reasons: (1) the evidence of security needs at Marion offered in support of the ban was insufficient; (2) the court did not consider whether conditions at Marion warranted continuing the ban at the time summary judgment was entered, approximately nine months after the lockdown; ¹⁰ and (3) the court did not require that Miller adopt the least restrictive alternative in meeting the security concerns that might be implicated by congregational services. We agree with Caldwell that the district court did not consider, nor was there evidence before it, whether a total ban on group religious activities was supported by conditions existing at the time summary judgment was granted. We do not agree, however, that the district court erred by declining to consider whether a total ban was the least restrictive measure Miller could have adopted.

Lawful incarceration necessarily brings with it the restriction of many privileges and rights. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, ----, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3199, 82 We accord, as we must, prison officials wide-ranging deference in adopting policies that are needed to preserve internal order and security, Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 474, 103 S.Ct. 864, 872-73, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 547-48, 99 S.Ct. at 1878; Pell, 417 U.S. at 827, 94 S.Ct. at 2806, and we will not substitute our judgment for theirs "in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations." Pell, 417 U.S. at 827, 94 S.Ct. at 2806; see Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 104 S.Ct. 3227, 82 L.Ed.2d 438 (1984); Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 467, 470, 103 S.Ct. at 869-70; Bell v....