U.S. v. Melendez-Carrion
| Citation | 790 F.2d 984 |
| Decision Date | 02 May 1986 |
| Docket Number | 926,881,899,908 and 962,906,907,MELENDEZ-CARRIO,874,H,Nos. 830,898,877,D,s. 830 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Yvonneilton Fernandez-Diamante, Luis Alfredo Colon Osorio, Filiberto Ojeda Rios, Isaac Camacho-Negron, Orlando Gonzales Claudio, Elias Samuel Castro-Ramos and Juan Enrique Segarra Palmer, Defendants-Appellants. ockets 85-1431, 85-1432, 85-1443, 85-1444, 85-1451 to 85-1453, 86-1010 to 86-1012 and 86-1031. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit) |
Michael E. Deutsch, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellant Gonzales claudio.
John R. Williams, New Haven, Conn. (Judith Berkan, Williams and Wise, New Haven, Conn., on brief), for defendant-appellant Fernandez-Diamante.
Jon L. Schoenhorn, Hartford, Conn. (Hurvitz, Hershinson & Schoenhorn, Hartford, Conn., on brief), for defendant-appellant Segarra Palmer.
Richard A. Reeve, Asst. Fed. Public Defender, New Haven, Conn. (Thomas G. Dennis, Fed. Public Defender, New Haven, Conn., on brief), for defendant-appellant Camacho-Negron.
P. Spencer Clapp, Hartford, Conn., for defendant-appellant Melendez-Carrion.
Diane Polan, New Haven, Conn. (Peter Berkowitz, Levine & Polan, New Haven, Conn., on brief), for defendant-appellant Castro-Ramos.
Ronald L. Kuby, New York City, for defendant-appellant Colon Osorio.
William M. Kunstler, New York City for defendant-appellant Ojeda Rios.
Maury S. Epner, Dept. of Justice, Washington D.C. (Stanley A. Twardy, Jr., U.S. Atty., Carmen E. Van Kirk, Asst. U.S. Atty., Hartford, Conn., on brief), for appellee.
Leonard B. Boudin, Cheryl Howard, Eric Lieberman, Haywood Burns, Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky & Lieberman, Lewis Kornhauser, New York, N.Y., submitted a brief for amici curiae National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee et al.
Before FEINBERG, Chief Judge, TIMBERS and NEWMAN, Circuit Judges.
In 1984, for the first time in the two centuries of our Nation's existence, Congress enacted comprehensive national legislation providing for the preventive detention on grounds of dangerousness of those awaiting trial. Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-473, Sec. 203(a) et seq., 98 Stat. 1976 (). The Bail Reform Act of 1966 had authorized pretrial detention on grounds of dangerousness only for those accused of capital offenses, Pub.L. No. 89-465, Sec. 3(a), 80 Stat. 214, 215-16 (formerly codified at 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3148 (1982)), but no reported decision has adjudicated the constitutionality of that provision. This appeal challenges the constitutionality of preventive detention for dangerousness and the lawfulness of various steps taken in the application of the new statute. The issues arise on a consolidated appeal from orders of the District Court for the District of Connecticut (T. Emmet Clarie, Judge) detaining without bail eight defendants indicted on charges related to the September 12, 1983, armed robbery of a Wells Fargo office in West Hartford, Connecticut. For separate reasons that follow, a majority of the panel concludes that continued pretrial detention of the defendants because of dangerousness violates the Constitution. All of the other challenges of all defendants are rejected.
The indictment, returned August 28, 1985, charged seventeen persons, including appellants Isaac Camacho-Negron, Elias Samuel Castro-Ramos, Luis Alfredo Colon Osorio, Hilton Fernandez-Diamante, Orlando Gonzales Claudio, Ivonne Melendez-Carrion, Filiberto Ojeda Rios, and Juan Enrique Segarra Palmer, with violating the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1951 (1982). Other charges arising out of the Wells Fargo robbery were also made against Ojeda Rios and Segarra Palmer. All of the appellants were arrested on August 30, seven in Puerto Rico and Segarra Palmer in Dallas, Texas.
The seven arrested in Puerto Rico were brought before United States Magistrate Justo Arenas in San Juan on the day of their arrest. The Magistrate stated that he would conduct removal proceedings two days later, on Sunday, September 1. During this initial presentment, the Government moved for pretrial detention pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142(f). For convenience, all provisions of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 will be referred to only by the appropriate section of Title 18. Appellants then moved for a five-day continuance of their bail hearings and requested postponement of removal proceedings until completion of the bail hearings. The Government objected to postponement of removal proceedings. The Magistrate ordered that removal proceedings occur as originally scheduled on September 1. Appellants then withdrew their motion for a five-day continuance and requested immediate bail hearings. Following a brief recess, the Government moved for a three-day continuance of bail hearings, contending that time was required to analyze and process weapons and other items that it had just learned had been seized pursuant to search warrants. The Magistrate granted the Government's motion and maintained the September 1 date for the removal proceedings. The Magistrate's scheduling rulings were affirmed by the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico on August 31. On September 1, the seven appellants were ordered removed to the District of Connecticut.
Segarra Palmer was brought before United States Magistrate William F. Sanderson, Jr. in Dallas on the day of his arrest. Advised of his right to a removal hearing, Segarra Palmer admitted that he was the person named in the indictment. The Magistrate on his own motion decided to proceed with a detention hearing pursuant to section 3142(f)(2). Segarra Palmer was advised by the Magistrate that he could elect a bail hearing immediately in Dallas or, after removal, in Connecticut. Segarra Palmer chose the latter option. The Magistrate then ordered his removal to the District of Connecticut.
The seven appellants arrested in Puerto Rico arrived in Hartford, Connecticut, on September 3 and were promptly presented before United States Magistrate F. Owen Eagan. Appellants were represented by counsel. The Government stated, with respect to bail hearings, that its three-day continuance, granted in Puerto Rico, would expire on September 5. The Government took the position that the three days of the Labor Day weekend were excluded from the three-day continuance. The Government announced its readiness to begin bail hearings on September 5. Appellants then moved for a continuance until September 17. Magistrate Eagan granted a continuance until September 13. On September 9, Segarra Palmer arrived in Hartford and was promptly presented before Magistrate Eagan. Segarra Palmer requested and was granted a continuance of his bail hearing until September 13, the same day previously set for the hearings of his co-defendants.
Hearings began on September 13, focusing initially on various motions made by some or all of the defendants. The hearings continued on Saturday, September 14, and resumed on Tuesday, September 17. The Magistrate decided to conduct the evidentiary phase of the bail hearings individually for each defendant. The sequence of hearings, though not the fact of separate hearings, was agreed to by the defendants. The hearings occurred from September 17 through October 7.
With respect to all eight appellants the Government presented evidence of the risks of both flight and dangerousness. The evidence concerned the Wells Fargo robbery, in which $7.6 million was taken, and each appellant's connection with a group known as "Los Macheteros" (the machete wielders), which had claimed responsibility for the robbery. The group was identified as a paramilitary, terrorist organization that had committed various crimes, including the Wells Fargo robbery, to advance the cause of Puerto Rican independence. The evidence pertinent to the claims of each appellant will be discussed as those claims are considered. At the conclusion of the hearings, the Magistrate ordered Camacho-Negron, Colon Osorio, Ojeda Rios, and Segarra Palmer detained because of both flight and dangerousness, Gonzales Claudio detained solely because of dangerousness, Fernandez-Diamante detained solely because of flight, and Castro-Ramos and Melendez-Carrion released on bail of $500,000 and $250,000, respectively. Judge Clarie affirmed the Magistrate's orders of detention with respect to Camacho-Negron, Colon Osorio, Fernandez-Diamante, Gonzales Claudio, Ojeda Rios, and Segarra Palmer, though affirmance with respect to Camacho-Negron was solely on grounds of dangerousness. However, the District Judge, acting on the Government's appeal, reversed the orders setting bail for Castro-Ramos and Melendez-Carrion and ordered both detained on grounds of both flight and dangerousness. Thus, as the defendants' appeal comes to this Court, two defendants, Camacho-Negron and Gonzales Claudio, have been detained solely because of dangerousness, Fernandez-Diamante has been detained solely because of flight, and the other five defendants have been detained on grounds of both flight and dangerousness.
We consider first a series of contentions, advanced by some or all of the appellants, that the Government failed to observe procedural requirements of the Bail Reform Act in the events leading up to the entry of detention orders. Most of these contentions concern compliance with the time requirements of the Act, specified in section 3142(f). Subsection (f) provides that a detention hearing shall be held "immediately upon the person's first appearance before the judicial officer unless that person, or the attorney for the Government, seeks a continuance." It further provides, "Except for good cause, a continuance on motion of the person may not exceed five days, and a continuance on motion of the attorney for the Government may not exceed three...
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