Eldridge v. Berkebile
| Decision Date | 30 June 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 15–1053.,15–1053. |
| Parties | Clinton T. ELDRIDGE, Petitioner–Appellant, v. D. BERKEBILE, Respondent–Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
791 F.3d 1239
Clinton T. ELDRIDGE, Petitioner–Appellant
v.
D. BERKEBILE, Respondent–Appellee.
No. 15–1053.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
June 30, 2015.
Submitted on the briefs:*
Clinton T. Eldridge, pro se.
Paul Farley, Assistant United States Attorney, and John F. Walsh, United States Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Denver, CO, for Respondent–Appellee.
Before MATHESON, MURPHY, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.
Clinton Eldridge pleaded guilty in the District of Columbia Superior Court1 to various violent felonies and is incarcerated in a federal prison. He appeals the district court's denial of his habeas petition that he filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In his petition, and now on appeal, Eldridge contends that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) incorrectly computed his sentence by not crediting all of his time served from his original sentencing hearing through his resentencing, a period of nearly nine years. He also contends that the district court failed to address his arguments concerning credit for time he served from his arrest to his original sentencing (235 days) and for time he served after his parole (for an earlier crime) was revoked (61 days).
Because Eldridge was convicted and sentenced in the District of Columbia Superior Court, a court of general jurisdiction separate from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, it is not obvious whether he is a federal or state prisoner. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1), if Eldridge is a state prisoner, he must obtain a Certificate of Appealability (COA) before he can appeal. If he is a federal prisoner, he does not need a COA to appeal a final judgment in a § 2241 case.
We conclude that Eldridge is a state prisoner for purposes of § 2253(c)(1) and that he must obtain a COA to proceed on appeal. We further conclude that Eldridge has not met the necessary showing to obtain a COA. Accordingly, we DENY a COA and DISMISS this appeal.
BACKGROUND
In 1981, Eldridge, while a juvenile, committed an offense for which he received a sentence under the Youth Corrections Act (YCA), 18 U.S.C. § 5005 et seq. (repealed 1984). On March 7, 1983, Eldridge was released on parole under the YCA. Eldridge lived in Washington D.C. while on parole. On November 18, 1983, while he was still on YCA parole for his juvenile crimes, D.C. police arrested him for different crimes he committed as an adult. These more serious crimes included rape, robbery, and burglary. See Eldridge v. Berkebile, 526 Fed.Appx. 897, 898–99 (10th Cir.2013) (unpublished). Eldridge remained in custody following his arrest and while pending trial.
On November 23, 1983, the District of Columbia Board of Parole issued a warrant to revoke Eldridge's YCA parole. In May 1984, Eldridge pleaded guilty in the District of Columbia Superior Court to several of his adult felony charges. Eldridge v. United States, 618 A.2d 690, 693 (D.C.1992). Because his adult charges violated the terms of his juvenile parole conditions, on July 10, 1984, the District of Columbia parole board executed the parole-violation warrant against Eldridge, who began serving his juvenile-parole sentence that same day.
On July 19, 1984, the D.C. Superior Court sentenced Eldridge to consecutive prison terms totaling 40 to 120 years for his adult convictions. Because the Superior Court imposed consecutive sentences on the individual convictions, it did not matter in which order Eldridge serves them. See D.C.Code § 24–404 (requiring a defendant to serve “the minimum sentence imposed or the prescribed portion of [his] sentence” before he is eligible for parole). Perhaps
because neither party had addressed it, the Superior Court did not state in which order Eldridge was to complete the consecutive prison terms of his adult sentence. On September 10, 1984, likely because of his adult convictions, the D.C. parole board granted an administrative parole (as opposed to parole for good behavior) to Eldridge. Still confined, of course, Eldridge then instead began to serve his 40–to–120 year adult sentence that same day.2
Eldridge appealed his adult convictions, and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals vacated his conviction on Count 20, a first-degree burglary charge. Eldridge, 618 A.2d at 696–97. It found that the parties had agreed at the last minute to a different plea package (adding Count 20) and that defense counsel had not adequately informed Eldridge that a guilty plea on that count would result in a higher total sentence because it carried a separate five-year mandatory-minimum sentence. Id. Nevertheless, that court affirmed Eldridge's remaining convictions, noting that Eldridge's plea statements established his having committed the burglary and forcible rape of “Complainant W” (Counts 20 and 24). Id. at 698.
On July 20, 1993, the trial judge resentenced Eldridge to the same aggregate, consecutive prison term of 40 to 120 years on the remaining eight counts affirmed on appeal. The trial court reached the same aggregate sentence by increasing the sentence on one of the remaining counts, Count 24 (a rape charge) from 10–30 years to 15–45 years. It did so knowing that Eldridge otherwise would escape punishment for the burglary enabling him to commit the rape (Counts 20 and 24). The Superior Court did not state if Eldridge had to serve the consecutive prison terms in a different order from the originally-imposed sentence.
Except for the time Eldridge had served for his juvenile parole-violation sentence (July 10, 1984 to September 10, 1984), the BOP credited to Eldridge's adult sentence all time he had served before his 1993 resentencing. In this regard, the BOP noted that—notwithstanding the remand and resentencing—Eldridge had begun serving his adult sentence on September 10, 1984, the day when Eldridge received his administrative parole from the juvenile sentence, effectively ending the juvenile case. In short, the BOP counted all time after September 10, 1984 towards Eldridge's 40 to 120–year sentence. Additionally, the BOP credited 235 days to Eldridge's adult sentence for the time he spent in presentence custody from November 18, 1983 (the date of his arrest) to July 9, 1984 (the day before Eldridge started serving his juvenile parole-violation sentence).
Eldridge filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, claiming that the BOP had not credited against his adult sentence any of the time he served between July 19, 1984 (the date of his original sentencing) and July 20, 1993 (the date of his resentencing). Eldridge, 526 Fed.Appx. at 898. He argued that the BOP had improperly failed to credit to his adult sentence the time he served between the original sentencing in 1984 and resentencing in 1993. See id. We affirmed the district court's dismissal based on Eldridge's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Id. at 899.
After exhausting his administrative remedies, Eldridge filed another § 2241 habeas petition. Again, we affirmed the district
court's dismissal because, although Eldridge had started the administrative-review process, he still had not yet exhausted all administrative appeals. See Eldridge v. Berkebile, 576 Fed.Appx. 746, 748 (10th Cir.2014) (unpublished). Nine days later, Eldridge filed a third § 2241 petition—the one now at issue. Again, Eldridge argued that the BOP had failed to credit his adult sentence for the time he had served between 1984 and 1993. He also contended that the trial court had violated his due process rights by resentencing him to a longer prison term on Count 24 in order to achieve the same 40–to–120 year sentence.
The district court denied relief. As noted above, we agree with the district court that the BOP properly attributed Eldridge's earlier-served time between his juvenile and adult sentences. In other words, the district court found that the BOP properly credited Eldridge's adult sentence for the period of November 18, 1983 (his arrest) to July 9, 1984 (the date of his juvenile-parole revocation) and all time after September 10, 1984, the end of his juvenile sentence and the start of his adult sentence. It further concluded that Eldridge's sentence did not violate either the Due Process or Double Jeopardy Clauses. Finally, the district court also denied Eldridge's request for a COA.3
DISCUSSION4
A. Eldridge's Status
The first question we must address is whether Eldridge is a federal or state prisoner. The distinction is significant: if Eldridge is a state prisoner, he must first obtain...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Hale v. Fox
...a certificate of appealability to seek review of a district court's denial of a habeas application under § 2241. Eldridge v. Berkebile , 791 F.3d 1239, 1241 (10th Cir. 2015).2 The principal purpose of a § 2241 application is to challenge the execution, rather than the validity, of a federal......
-
Seadin v. Raimisch
...matters are state law concerns that do not raise federal issues cognizable on federal habeas review. See Eldridge v. Berkebile, 791 F.3d 1239, 1244 (10th Cir. 2015); Apodaca v. Ferguson, 125 F.3d 861, at *1 (10th Cir. 1997) (unpublished op.). Under these circumstances, Applicant has alleged......
-
Sanchez-Rengifo v. Caraway
...purposes of federal habeas review. See Madley v. United States Parole Comm'n, 278 F.3d 1306, 1309 (D.C.Cir.2002) ; Eldridge v. Berkebile, 791 F.3d 1239, 1243 (10th Cir.2015). Before he may appeal the denial of relief by the district court, therefore, he must obtain a certificate of appealab......
-
Eldridge v. Oliver
...will issue because Applicant has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. See Eldridge v. Berkebile, 791 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir. 2015). It is FURTHER ORDERED that leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is denied for the purpose of appeal. The Court certifie......
-
Sentencing
...not required because overall sentence on remand not increased and judge properly considered other factors); Eldridge v. Berkebile, 791 F.3d 1239, 1245-46 (10th Cir. 2015) (resentencing not required because judge provided rationale to increase sentence without actual vindictiveness); U.S. v.......