McMillan v. Goleta Water Dist.

• Decision Date: 30 June 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-5894,85-5894
• Citation: 792 F.2d 1453
• Parties: A. Frank McMILLAN and Gladys McMillan, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GOLETA WATER DISTRICT, Edward G. Maschke, Patricia Shewczyk, Donna O. Hone, Donald W. Weaver, Jack D. Walker, and Lloyd C. Fowler, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1453

792 F.2d 1453

A. Frank McMILLAN and Gladys McMillan, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GOLETA WATER DISTRICT, Edward G. Maschke, Patricia Shewczyk, Donna O. Hone, Donald W. Weaver, Jack D. Walker, and Lloyd C. Fowler, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 85-5894.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted March 5, 1986.

Decided June 30, 1986.

Thomas W. Birmingham, Sacramanto, Cal., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Robert Goodwin, Santa Barbara, Cal., Thomas P. Anderle, Santa Barbara, Cal., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Before PREGERSON, POOLE, and THOMPSON, Circuit Judges.

POOLE, Circuit Judge:

I. OVERVIEW

Frank and Gladys McMillan appeal the summary judgment of their 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 claim for inverse condemnation and violations of their equal protection and substantive due process rights. The McMillans argue on appeal that (1) the Goleta County Water District ("Water District") took their property without just compensation by applying a water service moratorium to deny their application for water service; (2) the Water District subjected them to disparate treatment for an illegitimate governmental purpose; and (3) the Water District and the district court denied them substantive due process by relying on a California state court decision holding that the moratorium did not effect an unconstitutional taking of property. We affirm the dismissal of the equal protection claim, and reverse on the statute of limitations and due process issues.

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

In 1966, the McMillans acquired real property located within the Goleta County Water District. At that time, a residence on the property was supplied with water through a meter installed by the Water District. In 1967, the McMillans began to redevelop the property and to demolish the residence, and the water service was officially disconnected. Due to financial difficulties, the McMillans did not complete the redevelopment. In 1968, the Water District installed a new water meter on the property, but no water has been used on the property since 1967.

In December 1972, the Water District's board of directors declared the existence of a water shortage emergency, and enacted Ordinance No. 72-2, which imposed a moratorium on new water connections. The moratorium applied to the McMillans' property even though there was a "connection" (water meter) on the property, inasmuch as Section 9 of the Ordinance provided that

[w]ater service shall not be provided through any existing, installed water service facilities which were not used for furnishing any significant quantity of water for any bonafide (sic) purpose at any time within five years prior to December 7, 1972, unless an applicant for water service through said facilities has satisfied the conditions of Sections 2, 3, 4 or 5 of this ordinance.

In May 1983, the Water District's voters adopted by referendum a "Responsible Water Policy Ordinance" also prohibiting new water connections during times of water shortage. On September 15, 1982, the McMillans formally applied to the Water District for renewal of their water service, claiming eligibility under Ordinance 72-2, Section 13. ¹

After a hearing, the Water District's board of directors denied the McMillans' request for an exception to the moratorium. The Water District's general manager denied the McMillans' request for reconsideration of their application on the basis of hardship.

On May 2, 1983, the McMillans commenced this action against the Water District and several of its officers and employees. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for failure to properly allege subject matter jurisdiction. The McMillans appealed the dismissal, and this court remanded the case to the district court with instructions to grant the McMillans leave to amend their complaint to allege that they were at least "constructive" users of water. ² The McMillans amended their complaint, alleging that they "at all times were actual users of water." They also alleged that their substantive due process rights were violated because the moratorium was irrational and a "sham" and that their equal protection rights were violated because other applicants were granted hardship exceptions while they were not. They requested damages for violations of their civil rights, interim damages for the temporary taking of their property, and an order directing the Water District to provide water service to the property. The Water District filed an answer to the amended complaint, alleging, inter alia, that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations, and that the district court should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction. On May 3, 1985, the district court granted summary judgment to the Water District on the inverse condemnation and equal protection claims, and dismissed the substantive due process claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The McMillans timely appealed.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party, the district court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Triangle Mining Co., Inc. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 753 F.2d 734, 738 (9th Cir.1985). This court reviews de novo a district court's order of summary judgment. Id. This court also reviews de novo a district court's order dismissing a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, favorably viewing the facts alleged to support jurisdiction. Boettcher v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 759 F.2d 719, 720 (9th Cir.1985).

B. Equal Protection Claim

Appellants assert that their right to equal protection was violated because applying the moratorium to them served no legitimate governmental purpose. However, they have set forth no evidence showing that the Water District's motivation was other than a rational interest in upholding the moratorium. ³

The mere showing of some discrimination by the state is not sufficient to prove an invasion of one's constitutional rights. * * * However, absent a suspect classification or invasion of fundamental rights, equal protection rights are violated only where the classification does not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.

Construction Industry Ass'n, Sonoma City v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 906 n. 11 (9th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934, 96 S.Ct. 1148, 47 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). Inasmuch as the McMillans have not alleged the existence of a suspect classification or an invasion of fundamental rights, no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding their equal protection claim. Consequently, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on the equal protection claim.

C. Inverse Condemnation Claim: The Statute of Limitations

In remanding this case to the district court, we directed that

After the complaint is amended, the district court should explicitly consider whether the statute of limitations bars suit for discontinuation of actual or "constructive" use of water service. Also, if necessary, it should consider whether California law recognizes a property right to water service for constructive users and whether the district court should abstain from deciding this case under the doctrine established in Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941).

McMillan v. Goleta Water District, 738 F.2d 447 (9th Cir.1984) (memorandum disposition), at 1455. In their amended complaint, appellants alleged that they were actual users of water at the time the moratorium was declared. In its memorandum and order on remand, the district court assumed, for purposes of applying the statute of limitations, that "plantiffs could provide sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact whether they were actual (or 'constructive') users and not merely potential users."

The proper statute of limitations for this action is one year. Wilson v. Garcia, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1949, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (all Section 1983 claims are best characterized as personal injury actions); Cal.Code Civ.Proc. Sec. 340(3) (statute of limitations for a cause of action for personal injury in California is one year). The district court here, before Wilson v. Garcia was decided, borrowed California's five-year statute under Code of Civil Procedure Section 336 governing actions for mesne profits of real property. Under either statute of limitations, appellants' claim would be barred if the cause accrued in 1973 or 1974 (as asserted by appellees), and would not be barred if it accrued when the Water District issued the final denial of appellants' application on November 12, 1982 (as asserted by appellants). Thus the determinative issue is whether the cause of action accrued in or before 1974, or on November 12, 1982.

The district court determined that the McMillans' claim arose in 1973 or 1974 when they knew or should have known that their rights to continued water service had been interrupted on other than a temporary basis. In so doing, the district court relied on Mosesian v. County of Fresno, 28 Cal.App.3d 493, 104 Cal.Rptr. 655 (1972), which held that an inverse condemnation claim accrues when the taking is objectively complete, not when the claimant is subjectively convinced that the taking is permanent rather than temporary. The district court considered the Water District's final refusal of the McMillans' claim significant only insofar as it caused the McMillans to become subjectively convinced of the permanence of their water deprivation. Under Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of...