Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC
Decision Date | 22 July 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 14–1540.,14–1540. |
Citation | 794 F.3d 353 |
Parties | Joanne NEALE, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Keri Hay, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated; David Taft ; Jeffrey Kruger ; Karen Collopy; Kelly McGary ; Svein A. Berg; Gregory P. Burns v. VOLVO CARS OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC; Volvo Car Corporation, Appellants. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Paul Daly, Esq., Hardin, Kundla, McKeon & Poletto, Springfield, NJ, Peter W. Herzog, III, Esq., Argued, Wheeler Trigg O'Donnell, St. Louis, MO, for Appellants.
David M. Freeman, Esq., Eric D. Katz, Esq., Argued, David A. Mazie, Esq., Matthew R. Mendelsohn, Mazie Slater, Katz & Freeman, Roseland, NJ, Benjamin F. Johns, Esq., Joseph G. Sauder, Esq., Matthew D. Schelkopf, Esq., Chimicles & Tikellis, Haverford, PA, for Appellees.
Daniel I. Rubin, Esq., Andrew R. Wolf, Esq., Henry P. Wolf, Esq., The Wolf Law Firm, North Brunswick, NJ, for Amicus Appellee.
Before: SMITH, CHAGARES, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.
This appeal involves a putative class action brought by consumers from six states alleging that Appellants–Defendants Volvo Cars of North America, LLC and Volvo Car Corporation (collectively “Volvo”) sold certain vehicles with defective sunroof drainage systems. Volvo challenges the grant of class certification by the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. For the reasons that follow, we will vacate the District Court's order and remand for further proceedings.
Plaintiffs–Appellees Joanne Neale, Keri Hay, Kelly McGary, Svein Berg, Gregory Burns, David Taft, Jeffrey Kruger, and Karen Collopy (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed suit on behalf of themselves and a nationwide class of current and former Volvo vehicle owners and lessees. Plaintiffs allege that a uniform design defect exists in the sunroof drainage systems in the following vehicles sold and leased to consumers by Volvo: S40, S60, S80, and V70 (model years 2004 to present); XC90 (model years 2003 to present); and V50 (model years 2005 to present) (the “Class Vehicles”).
On August 7, 2012, Plaintiffs proposed a nationwide class consisting of “[a]ll persons or entities in the United States who are current or former owners and/or lessees of a Class Vehicle (the ‘Nationwide Class').” Supplemental Appendix (“SA”) 19; Joint Appendix (“JA”) 140. In the alternative, Plaintiffs also proposed the following statewide classes:
SA 20; see also JA 140–41 . Volvo filed a brief in opposition to the proposed classes and separate motions for summary judgment against the individual class representatives.
On March 26, 2013, the District Court denied Plaintiffs' motion to certify a nationwide class, granted Plaintiffs' motion to certify six statewide classes, and denied Volvo's motions for summary judgment. After the Supreme Court's decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1426, 185 L.Ed.2d 515 (2013), Volvo moved for reconsideration of the District Court's order granting class certification, which the District Court also denied. Volvo filed this timely appeal.
The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2) and (d)(6) and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) and Rule 23(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
“We review a class certification order for abuse of discretion, which occurs if the district court's decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.” Grandalski v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., 767 F.3d 175, 179 (3d Cir.2014) (quoting Hayes v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 354 (3d Cir.2013) ) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review de novo a legal standard applied by a district court. Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 305 (3d Cir.2013).
Volvo argues on appeal that: (1) putative members of the class have not suffered an injury and therefore lack Article III standing; (2) the District Court failed to identify the class claims and defenses in its certification order; (3) the District Court erred in its analysis of the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement; and (4) the Supreme Court's decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend means that Plaintiffs must have class-wide proof of damages in order for the class to be certified. We address each issue in turn.
Volvo argues that all putative class members must have Article III standing. We begin with this argument because “[w]e have ‘an obligation to assure ourselves' of litigants' standing under Article III.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 340, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) ); see also In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 798 (5th Cir.2014). We exercise plenary review over a threshold question of law, such as that presented by an Article III standing challenge. McNair v. Synapse Grp. Inc., 672 F.3d 213, 222 n. 9 (3d Cir.2012).
Article III governs constitutional standing and limits our jurisdiction to actual “cases or controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Article III requires a plaintiff to demonstrate “(1) an ‘injury in fact,’ (2) a sufficient ‘causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of,’ and (3) a ‘likel[ihood]’ that the injury ‘will be redressed by a favorable decision.’ ” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, –––U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2334, 2341, 189 L.Ed.2d 246 (2014) (alterations in original) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) ). Constitutional standing ensures that litigants are truly adverse to one another and are not merely “suitors in the courts of the United States.” Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 476, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982) ; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) (). “The law of Article III standing, which is built on separation-of-powers principles, serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches.”Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 1146, 185 L.Ed.2d 264 (2013) ; see also William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 Yale L.J. 221, 222 (1988) ( ).
The case before us concerns the injury-in-fact requirement. The requisite injury-in-fact is an “invasion of a legally protected interest.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. That injury must be “particularized,” id., and “concrete in both a qualitative and temporal sense,” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990). That injury must also be “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (quoting Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). A risk of future injury may support standing if the threatened harm is “certainly impending,” or there is a “ ‘substantial risk’ ” that the harm will occur. Clapper, 133 S.Ct. at 1148, 1150 n. 5 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 153, 130 S.Ct. 2743, 177 L.Ed.2d 461 (2010) ).
Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 1257, 1276, 191 L.Ed.2d 314 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130 ).
In the context of a class action, Article III must be satisfied “by at least one named plaintiff.” McNair, 672 F.3d at 223 ; see also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974) (). The Supreme Court has yet to comment on what Article III requires of putative, unnamed class members during a Rule 23 motion for class certification...
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