Helton v. Phelps County Regional Medical Center

• Decision Date: 24 July 1992
• Docket Number: No. 4:92CV00883 GFG.,4:92CV00883 GFG.
• Citation: 794 F. Supp. 332
• Parties: Martha HELTON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. PHELPS COUNTY REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

794 F. Supp. 332

Martha HELTON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. PHELPS COUNTY REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, et al., Defendants.

No. 4:92CV00883 GFG.

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, E.D.

July 24, 1992.

Robert J. Albair, Clayton, Mo., for plaintiffs.

Mark A. Ludwig, Ronald R. McMillin, Carson and Coil, Jefferson City, Mo., for defendant Phelps County Regional Medical Center.

Cheryl A. Callis, Ben Ely, Jr., Joseph M. Kortenhof, Kortenhof and Ely, St. Louis, Mo., for defendant Dr. Donald James Curran, D.O.

MEMORANDUM

GUNN, District Judge.

Defendants Phelps County Regional Medical Center (Hospital) and Dr. Donald James Curran have moved to dismiss plaintiffs' two count complaint for failure to state a claim.

Plaintiffs are the surviving wife and children of Vergil Lee Helton, who committed suicide the day after his discharge from the Hospital. Count I of the complaint alleges that defendants improperly discharged Helton from the Hospital in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd, the so-called Anti-Dumping Act. Count II is a Missouri wrongful death claim predicated on federal supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

On July 15, 1991, Dr. Curran admitted Helton to the hospital under a diagnosis of major depression with anxiety. Plaintiffs allege that Helton's symptoms persisted during his two day hospital stay and that their manifestation continued at the time of his discharge on July 17, 1991. He committed suicide on July 18, 1991.

Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that Helton was prematurely discharged from the Hospital because he had no health insurance.

At the outset the Court notes that defendants have filed separate motions to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint, but the Court will consider the pending motions to dismiss with respect to Count I of the complaint as one in light of the fact that defendants raise the same contentions for dismissal.

Defendants have moved for dismissal of Count I — the 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd Anti-Dumping Act claim — contending that Helton was not admitted to the Hospital through its emergency room. Defendants contend that the Anti-Dumping Act applies only if there is denial of treatment at a hospital's emergency room facility. This contention is without merit.

Section 1395dd(b)(1) provides:

If any individual (whether or not eligible for benefits under this subchapter) comes to a hospital and the hospital determines that the individual has an emergency medical condition, the hospital must provide either —

(A) within the staff and facilities available at the hospital, for such further medical examination and such treatment as may be required to stabilize the medical condition, or

(B) for transfer of the individual to another medical facility in accordance with subsection (c) of this section.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that it is the condition of the patient when taken into a hospital that controls, not the type of facility in the hospital.

Specifically felicitous and well reasoned is Smith v. Richmond Memorial Hospital, 243 Va. 445, 416 S.E.2d 689 (1992), which holds that the Anti-Dumping Act applies to transfer or discharge of patients from a hospital and not solely those from an emergency room:

"Patient dumping is not limited to a refusal

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