Gaztambide v. Gaztambide

Decision Date20 May 1992
Docket NumberCiv. No. 85-1114 GG.
Citation794 F. Supp. 451
PartiesHernan GAZTAMBIDE, Plaintiff, v. Jaime Torres GAZTAMBIDE, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

Frank Rodriguez Garcia, Ponce, Puerto Rico, for plaintiff.

Ramirez & Ramirez, Zuleika Llovet, Hato Rey, Puerto Rico, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

GIERBOLINI, Chief Judge.

Defendants have filed a notice of appeal of our denial of the qualified immunity defense in their fourth motion for summary judgment. They have likewise filed a motion for stay of the trial proceedings set for May 27, 1992 due to the appeal they have filed. In their motion for a stay they assert among other things that a properly filed appeal of qualified immunity should produce an automatic stay. Notwithstanding this, they also request that we issue an order confirming this alleged automatic stay or in the alternative, that we issue a stay. We decline defendants' request and accordingly DENY their motion for a stay of the trial for the reasons stated below.

Defendants cite the Supreme Court case of Mitchell v. Forsyth to the effect that a trial court's denial of a defendant's qualified immunity defense is immediately appealable to the appellate court, much like a denial of absolute immunity is appealable via an interlocutory appeal. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). The rationale behind Mitchell is that qualified immunity is more than an immunity from money damages: it is "an immunity from suit ... which is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." De Abadia v. Izquierdo Mora, 792 F.2d 1187, 1189 (1st Cir.1986), citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at 2816.

Our circuit has recognized a narrow exception to the normal rule that interlocutory decisions of a federal district court are not immediately appealable, in cases where a state actor, by pretrial motion, has unsuccessfully asserted "a substantial claim of qualified immunity." Roque-Rodriguez v. Lema Moya, 926 F.2d 103, 104-105 (1st Cir.1991) (emphasis added).

Defendants have cited no authority for their proposition that they are entitled to a second interlocutory appeal of a trial court's denial of qualified immunity contained in a motion for summary judgment. In our July 13, 1989 Opinion and Order we found that defendants were "not entitled to qualified immunity on the first or the fourteenth amendment claims", and denied their second motion for summary judgment.

Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal from our denial of qualified immunity to them on either the first or fourteenth amendment claims. The First Circuit affirmed our denial of qualified immunity to defendants in an April 20, 1990 opinion. Gaztambide-Barbosa v. Torres-Gaztambide, 902 F.2d 112, 116 (1st Cir.1990).

Not to be deterred, defendants filed a third motion for summary judgment on November 30, 1990, and a reply to plaintiff's opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment on April 2, 1991. In both filings defendants once again raised the issue of qualified immunity.

In our Opinion and Order of August 30, 1991, 776 F.Supp. 52, we granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment finding that his dismissal violated the fourteenth amendment due process clause. In such opinion and order we also denied defendants' third motion for summary judgment specifically noting how "presumptuous is defendant's new argument in favor of summary judgment."

Still unsatisfied with our dismissal of their third motion for summary judgment, defendants filed yet a fourth summary judgment motion. Content to beat a dead horse one more time in their fourth motion for summary judgment, defendants resurrected their notion that they are entitled to qualified immunity on the first amendment claim.

In our Opinion and Order of March 17, 1992 we denied their fourth motion for summary judgment finding it to have been submitted in bad faith, since defendants' same qualified immunity argument had been rejected on three separate occasions, twice by this court and once by the Circuit in Gaztambide-Barbosa, 902 F.2d at 116. We also found that this motion was frivolous and had been interposed solely for the purpose of delay, and that defendants had continuously and needlessly prolonged this litigation over a seven-year period with their piecemeal motions for summary judgment.

We find that defendants' motion to stay the trial proceedings pending an interlocutory appeal on the issue of qualified immunity to the First Circuit is an equally frivolous one and we DENY such motion. The Seventh Circuit has specifically held that a district court when confronted with a meritless notice of appeal, may certify to the court of appeals that the appeal is frivolous and proceed to try the case. Apostol v. Gallion, 870 F.2d 1335, 1339 (7th Cir.1989), citing Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 322, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 3084, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984). We agree with the Seventh Circuit that a trial court's docket should not be held hostage by a meritless claim. We also find that Circuit's approach not to be inconsistent with the First Circuit's ruling in Roque-Rodriguez, that interlocutory appeals are proper when defendants raise a "substantial" claim of qualified immunity on appeal upon denial of an immunity defense by a trial court. Roque-Rodriguez, 926 F.2d at 105.

In Kaiter v. Town of Boxford, 836 F.2d 704, 706 (1st Cir.1988), our circuit found that a defendant had no right to an interlocutory appeal on the issue of absolute immunity, when defendant had preserved a claim of qualified immunity for a later pretrial proceeding below. Kaiter specifically held that:

the issue of immunity must be subject to one interlocutory appeal in order to establish the defendant's right to avoid trial altogether. There is no need to burden the appellate system and prolong the pretrial process with multiple interlocutory appeals, one from an order denying the motion to dismiss on grounds of absolute immunity and the later appeal from the denial of a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity." Kaiter, 836 F.2d at 707.

See also Fernández v. Leonard, 784 F.2d 1209, 1214 n. 2 (1st Cir.1986) ("we do not think, for example, that Mitchell supra, allows a defendant to bring two interlocutory appeals from his claim of qualified or absolute immunity, first on the pleadings and then on the facts as produced after discovery.")

Although Kaiter on its facts dealt with a claim of absolute immunity raised in a motion to dismiss and a potential claim of qualified immunity via summary judgment, we believe its logic is even more compelling when confronted with two identical claims of qualified immunity for the same defendants both raised on interlocutory appeals from denials of summary judgment. The language of Kaiter is not limited just to its narrow facts since the circuit explicitly held there that, "We do not think that a defendant who claims immunity has a right to two interlocutory appeals." Id. at 708.

Later circuit opinions have affirmed this interpretation of Kaiter. Zayas-Green v. Casaine, 906 F.2d 18, 22 (1st Cir.1990); Unwin v. Campbell, 863 F.2d 124, 132 n. 5 (1st Cir.1988) ("Regardless of the number of immunity motions made at various stages of a case in the district court, only one interlocutory appeal to this court will normally be allowed."); and Feliciano-Angulo v. Rivera-Cruz, 858 F.2d 40, 48 n. 8 (1st...

To continue reading

Request your trial
3 cases
  • Npr, Inc. v. American Intern. Ins. Co. of P.R, CIV.01-1395 SEC.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
    • January 28, 2003
    ...(finding that federal courts retain the power to reconsider issues that were decided before if they wish); Gaztambide v. Gaztambide, 794 F.Supp. 451, 453-54 (D.P.R.1992) (holding that clear error and preventing a manifest injustice justify reconsideration of an issue). Nevertheless, while t......
  • Bean v. City of Buffalo, 90-CV-880S.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of New York
    • May 28, 1993
    ...adopted by a number of courts that do not have provisions for certifying that an appeal is frivolous. See, e.g., Gaztambide v. Gaztambide, 794 F.Supp. 451 (D.Puerto Rico, 1992); Chuman v. Wright, 960 F.2d 104 (9th Cir.1992); Stewart v. Donges, 915 F.2d 572 (10th Therefore, this Court conclu......
  • Pioneer Food and Beverage, Inc. v. Mosher, Civ.A. No. 92-11706-H.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • July 27, 1992

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT