US v. American Cyanamid Co.

Decision Date31 May 1990
Docket NumberC.A. No. 89-0565P.
Citation794 F. Supp. 61
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island
PartiesUNITED STATES of America v. AMERICAN CYANAMID CO.; Rohm & Haas Co.

Alex A. Beehler and Steve C. Gold, Environment and Natural Resources Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff.

Deming Sherman, Edwards & Angell, Providence, R.I., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PETTINE, Senior District Judge.

This case is another volley in the longrunning battle to clean up the Picillo Pig Farm, a hazardous waste site in Coventry, Rhode Island. As this Court wrote in an earlier decision involving these defendants and the State of Rhode Island:

State environmental authorities discovered this chemical wasteland at Picillo Pig Farm in 1977 after combustible chemicals caused a dramatic explosion and towering flames to rip through the waste disposal site. After the fire, state investigators discovered large trenches and pits filled with free-flowing, multicolored, pungent liquid wastes; they also excavated approximately 10,000 barrels and containers in varying states of decay containing hazardous chemical wastes.

Violet v. Picillo, 648 F.Supp. 1283, 1286 (D.R.I.1986). Of the containers the state discovered, 303 five-gallon cans and 49 fifty-five gallon drums were traced to Rohm & Haas and 10 fifty-five gallon drums to American Cyanamid.1 This Court, in O'Neil v. Picillo, 682 F.Supp. 706 (D.R.I. 1988), aff'd, 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071, 110 S.Ct. 1115, 107 L.Ed.2d 1022 (1990), found those two defendants jointly and severally liable to the State of Rhode Island for the state's past and future clean up ("response") costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") § 107, 42 U.S.C. 9607 (1982).

The federal Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") was not a party in the O'Neil litigation, although it shared in the settlement by some of the defendants for their part of the response costs.2 Now, the United States sues to recover its response costs associated with the clean-up at Picillo Farms, claiming that defendants are liable under CERCLA § 107. After the defendants sought discovery on the issue of their liability, the United States moved for partial summary judgment. It argues that because Rohm & Haas and American Cyanamid were found liable to the state under § 107 in O'Neil, they are precluded from relitigating their liability in this case under the doctrine of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel.3 The defendants retort that such a remedy is unfair because it deprives them of important discovery opportunities and is unwarranted because the United States could have, but did not, join in O'Neil.

NONMUTUAL OFFENSIVE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents relitigation in a second suit of issues actually litigated in, and necessary to the outcome of, a prior suit. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n. 5, 99 S.Ct. 645, 649 n. 5, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979). The defendants here make this Court's task much easier by not contesting the conclusion that their liability was actually litigated in and necessary to O'Neil; the Court is convinced that revisiting that issue here would be nothing more than O'Neil redux. The sole concern for this Court is whether it should, following the concerns of Parklane Hosiery, prevent the United States from invoking collateral estoppel offensively, even though the basic tenets of collateral estoppel are satisfied here.

Parklane Hosiery recognized that offensive issue preclusion

does not promote judicial economy in the same manner as defensive issue preclusion does. Defensive use of collateral estoppel precludes a plaintiff from relitigating identical issues by merely "switching adversaries." Thus defensive collateral estoppel gives a plaintiff a strong incentive to join all potential defendants in the first action if possible. Offensive use of collateral estoppel, on the other hand, creates precisely the opposite incentive. Since a plaintiff will be able to rely on a previous judgment against a defendant but will not be bound by that judgment if the defendant wins, the plaintiff has every incentive to adopt a "wait and see" attitude, in the hope that the first action by another plaintiff will result in a favorable judgment. Thus offensive use of collateral estoppel will likely increase rather than decrease the total amount of litigation, since potential plaintiffs will have everything to gain and nothing to lose by not intervening in the first action.

Id. at 329-30, 99 S.Ct. at 650-51 (citations and footnote omitted). Parklane Hosiery also observed that offensive collateral estoppel could be unfair to a defendant. See id. at 330, 99 S.Ct. at 651.

To guard against those two evils, the proliferation of suits and unfairness to defendants, the Supreme Court held that courts have "broad discretion" to determine when they should allow nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel, but that the courts' discretion should be tempered by "a general rule": "In cases where a plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier action or where ... the application of offensive estoppel would be unfair to a defendant, a trial judge should not allow the use of offensive collateral estoppel." See id. at 331, 99 S.Ct. at 652.

Issue preclusion in this case would not be unfair to Rohm & Haas and American Cyanamid. They had every incentive, given their substantial potential liability, to litigate O'Neil vigorously. Moreover, a future suit by the United States was entirely foreseeable: the United States shared in settlement in the first suit, the EPA joined with the state in trying the clean up Picillo Pig Farm, and the defendants moved, unsuccessfully, to bring the United States in as a party to O'Neil.

Finally, the procedural opportunities in both cases are the same. Defendants had ample opportunity to pursue discovery to its fullest and to call all necessary witnesses. This Court is confident that every aspect of defendants' liability was exhaustively explored. Moreover, the burden of proof is the same here as in O'Neil.

Defendants contend, however, that collateral estoppel is unwarranted because they will not have "the opportunity to conduct full discovery against the government." See Defendants' Memorandum of Law at 10. They claim, without further discussion, that "evidence which was not in the possession of these defendants in the earlier action may be in the possession of the government." Id.

This Court cannot understand how such evidence, if it existed, could warrant a reopening of O'Neil, especially since defendants make no effort in their brief to identify, even generally, such evidence. I ruled in O'Neil that the defendants, as generators of some of the hazardous waste at Picillo Farm, were strictly liable, jointly and severally, for the response costs of the state. The only issue different in this case is the existence and size of the response costs the United States has incurred. On that issue, defendants will have every opportunity to pursue discovery.4

A thornier question is whether the United States' failure to join the first suit should lead this Court to bar it from invoking collateral estoppel here....

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • American Cyanamid Co. v. Capuano
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • 18 Agosto 2004
    ...States filed a cost recovery action under § 9607 against R & H and another company, American Cyanamid. See United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 794 F.Supp. 61 (D.R.I.1990). The district court entered a judgment against them for $3,339,029 plus interest. United States v. American Cyanamid......
  • Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Beazer Materials & Services
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
    • 27 Enero 1993
    ...aff'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir.1988); Violet v. Picillo, 648 F.Supp. 1283, 1292 (D.R.I.1986), overruled in part on other grounds, 794 F.Supp. 61 (D.R.I. 1992); United States v. Wade, 577 F.Supp. 1326, 1333 (E.D.Pa.1983); Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 Harv.L.Rev. 1458, 1520 (1986). See also Dedham......
  • Rodriguez v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, Civ. No. 90-2093(PG).
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
    • 21 Julio 1992
  • Acevedo-Garcia v. Vera-Monroig, Civil No. 97-2639(JP).
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
    • 30 Enero 2002
    ...procedural opportunities in both cases are the same. See Faigin v. Kelly, 184 F.3d 67 (1st Cir.1999); see also United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 794 F.Supp. 61 (D.R.I.1990). The jury trial of the 20 Plaintiffs in the instant case resulted in the following 1. That political affiliation......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT