State v. Juarez

• Citation: 794 S.E.2d 293,369 N.C. 351
• Decision Date: 21 December 2016
• Docket Number: No. 360PA15,360PA15
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Jorge JUAREZ
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina

369 N.C. 351

794 S.E.2d 293

STATE of North Carolina

v.Jorge JUAREZ

No. 360PA15

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Filed December 21, 2016

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by I. Faison Hicks, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellant.

Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Emily H. Davis, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellee.

BEASLEY, Justice.

We consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's judgment based upon defendant's conviction for first-degree felony murder and remanding this case to the trial court for a new trial. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter, and that the trial court committed plain error when it instructed the jury on the aggressor doctrine of self-defense. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the jury's verdict and the trial court's judgment.

This case involves events surrounding the death of Alfonzo Canjay (Canjay) in the early morning hours of 31 October 2012. On the evening of 30 October 2012, Jorge Juarez (defendant) and four acquaintances—Marcos Chaparro (Chaparro), Karen Gonzalez (Gonzalez), Erick Martinez (Martinez), and Karina Rodriguez (Rodriguez)—were drinking beer and smoking marijuana at Chaparro's Durham residence. Around 11:30 p.m., the group left Durham in Chaparro's Acura to drive Rodriguez home to Foxhall Village in Raleigh. The group arrived at Rodriguez's residence at around 12:00 a.m. on 31 October. After dropping off Rodriguez, Chaparro and Martinez decided to steal car stereos from vehicles parked at Foxhall Village, while Gonzales and defendant waited in the Acura.

As Chaparro and Martinez searched for car stereos to steal, the noises awoke Canjay and his wife, who looked outside and saw the two men peering into the family's car and trying to steal things. Upon being discovered, Chaparro and Martinez ran away to find Gonzalez and defendant. Once the four reunited, either Chaparro or Martinez insisted Gonzales drive back toward Canjay's house to retrieve a stereo they had hidden nearby before leaving Foxhall Village.

Meanwhile, Canjay got in his car and began searching for the men, while his wife and daughter unsuccessfully tried to call the police. Canjay saw the Acura as it neared the main office at the complex, and he drove toward it from the opposite direction such that Gonzalez had to swerve to go around his vehicle. Canjay turned his vehicle around to pursue the Acura and pulled up to its passenger side, making two separate sideswipe contacts with the Acura. After the second impact, defendant fired one shot from his handgun into the driver's side of Canjay's vehicle. The shot struck Canjay in the heart, killing him. Gonzales then drove the group back to Durham.

On 8 April 2013, defendant was indicted for the first-degree murder of Alfonzo Canjay. The State proceeded against defendant on the theory of felony murder based on the underlying felony of discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle while it was in operation. The trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss at the close of the State's evidence and again at the close of all of the evidence. The trial court also denied defendant's request for instructions on the lesser-included offenses of second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. The trial court instructed the jury on perfect self-defense including the aggressor doctrine; defendant did not object to this instruction. The jury found defendant guilty of first-degree felony murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment without parole. Defendant appealed.

On appeal defendant argued that the trial court (i) erred in denying his motion to dismiss; (ii) erred in denying his request for instructions on the lesser-included offenses of second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter; and (iii) erred in instructing the jury that perfect self-defense was unavailable if defendant was the initial aggressor. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss, State v. Juarez , ––– N.C. App. ––––, ––––, 777 S.E.2d 325, 328 (2015), but did err by not instructing the jury on the lesser-included offenses and also erred by instructing on the aggressor doctrine of self-defense, id. at ––––, ––––, 777 S.E.2d at 330, 331.

We allowed the State's petition for discretionary review of the Court of Appeals’ decision regarding the trial court's two alleged errors. Before this Court the State argues that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the trial court should have given jury instructions on second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter as lesser-included offenses of first-degree murder. The State also argues that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the trial court's instruction on the aggressor doctrine amounts to plain error. We agree on both counts.

First, we consider whether the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the lesser-included offenses. The court held that it was error not to instruct on the lesser-included offenses because the evidence was conflicting as to whether defendant acted in self-defense when he shot into Canjay's vehicle, which could render him not guilty of first-degree felony murder, and there was sufficient evidence to support a lesser-included offense. Id. at ––––, 777 S.E.2d at 331. The Court of Appeals’ reasoning was incorrect.

Felony murder is a murder "committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any arson, rape or a sex offense, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, or other felony committed or attempted with the use of a deadly weapon." N.C.G.S. § 14–17 (2015). This statute expresses the legislature's deliberate policy choice to hold individuals accountable "for deaths occurring during the commission of felonies," regardless of whether the murder was intentional or unintentional. State v. Bell , 338 N.C. 363, 386, 450 S.E.2d 710, 723 (1994), cert. denied , 515 U.S. 1163, 115 S.Ct. 2619, 132 L.Ed.2d 861 (1995). Because "the purpose of the felony murder rule is to deter even accidental killings from occurring during the commission of a dangerous felony," self-defense is not a defense to felony murder. State v. Richardson , 341 N.C. 658, 668, 462 S.E.2d 492, 499 (1995).

Perfect self-defense, however, may be a defense to the underlying felony, which would thereby defeat the felony murder charge, id. at 668–69, 462 S.E.2d at 499, as well as any other homicide charge, see, e.g. , State v. Bush , 307 N.C. 152, 158, 297 S.E.2d 563, 568 (1982) ("Perfect self-defense excuses a killing altogether. ..."). Perfect self-defense is a right that "rests upon necessity" to save one's self and is "only available to a person who is without fault," thus excusing a defendant altogether. State v. Marsh , 293 N.C. 353, 354, 237 S.E.2d 745, 747 (1977). If a person cannot establish perfect self-defense, but can establish imperfect self-defense,¹ that person's actions are not excused and he is still at fault, though to a lesser degree. See State v. Crisp , 170 N.C. 785, 792, 87 S.E. 511, 514–15 (1916) (explaining that perfect self-defense is only available "where the party ... was wholly free from wrong or blame," whereas if a party "was in the wrong ... then the law justly limits his right of self-defense, and regulates it according to the magnitude of his own wrong" (quoting Reed v. State , 11 Tex.App. 509, 517–18 (1882) )). Therefore, imperfect self-defense is not available as a defense to the underlying felony utilized to support a felony murder charge because allowing for such a defense, when the defendant is in some manner at fault, would defeat the purpose of the felony murder rule. Richardson , 341 N.C. at 668, 462 S.E.2d at 499.

Here, if defendant acted in perfect self-defense when he shot into Canjay's vehicle, the killing would be excused and defendant absolved of any fault. Bush , 307 N.C. at 158, 297 S.E.2d at 568. Only under a theory of imperfect self-defense could defendant be found guilty of a lesser degree of homicide. See id. at 159, 297 S.E.2d at 568 (stating that when a defendant shows "only that he exercised the imperfect right of self-defense," instead of perfect self-defense, he "remain[s] guilty of at least voluntary manslaughter"). Allowing jury instructions on the lesser-included offenses of second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter would permit the jury to find defendant not guilty of felony murder while at the same time finding defendant was, in some manner, at fault for shooting into Canjay's vehicle—the underlying felony in question. This outcome would undermine the imperfect self-defense limitation set out in Richardson and the purpose of the felony murder rule. Therefore, the trial court was correct to deny defendant's request for instructions on second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter.

The Court of Appeals’ and defendant's reliance on State v. Millsaps , 356 N.C. 556, 572 S.E.2d 767 (2002), is misguided, as is defendant's further reliance on State v. Thomas , 325 N.C. 583, 386 S.E.2d 555 (1989), and State v. Camacho , 337 N.C. 224, 446 S.E.2d 8 (1994). In State v. Millsaps this Court explained that when the State prosecutes a defendant for first-degree murder solely on a felony murder theory, a trial court must instruct on lesser-included offenses when the evidence of the underlying felony is in conflict and the evidence would support a lesser-included offense. 356 N.C. at 565, 572 S.E.2d at 773 (citing Thomas , 325 N.C. 583, 386 S.E.2d 555 ). The trial court is not required to instruct on lesser-included offenses if the evidence of the underlying felony is not in conflict and all the evidence supports felony murder. Id. at 565, 572 S.E.2d at 774 (citing State v. Covington , 290 N.C. 313, 226 S.E.2d 629 (1976) )....