Rme Mgmt., LLC v. Chapel
Decision Date | 17 January 2017 |
Docket Number | No. COA16-596,COA16-596 |
Citation | 795 S.E.2d 641,251 N.C.App. 562 |
Parties | RME MANAGEMENT, LLC, Plaintiff, v. CHAPEL H.O.M. ASSOCIATES, LLC and Chapel Hill Motel Enterprises, Inc., Defendants. |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Hedrick Gardner Kincheloe & Garofalo, LLP, Raleigh, by Patricia P. Shields and James R. Baker, for plaintiff-appellant.
Troutman Sanders LLP, by Ashley H. Story and D. Kyle Deak, Raleigh, for defendants-appellees.
Plaintiff RME Management, LLC (RME) appeals an order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants Chapel H.O.M. Associates, LLC (HOM) and Chapel Hill Motel Enterprises, Inc. (CHME). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
RME and HOM are the assignees of the lessor and the lessee, respectively, of real property located at 1301 Fordham Boulevard in Chapel Hill, North Carolina (the property). The lease was executed on 17 March 1966, and shortly thereafter, the original lessee built a hotel on the property, which is still in operation today. In January 1967, CHME entered into a sublease to operate the hotel. The lease and sublease were assigned to HOM in August 1988. RME became the owner and current lessor of the property in October 2012.
The lease's initial term commenced on 1 January 1966 and was scheduled to terminate on 31 December 2015. However, the lease contained a renewal option that allowed HOM to extend the lease for an additional forty-nine years. HOM exercised the renewal option in September 2014, and the additional forty-nine-year lease term was set to commence on 1 January 2016.
Central to this case, the lease contained two provisions that required HOM, as lessee, to pay taxes assessed against the property. Paragraph 17 of the lease provides, in pertinent part:
As a further rental hereunder, the Lessee shall pay all ad valorem and personal property taxes which may be assessed against the demised premises and the improvements thereon and personal property located therein, or any part thereof, for each year of the term of this lease. ...
Paragraph 19 further provides that:
The Lessee expressly agrees to pay all installments of taxes and assessments required to be paid by it hereunder when due , subject to the right of said Lessee to contest such tax or assessment, in good faith, provided the title of the Lessors shall not be placed in jeopardy by forfeiture, foreclosure, sale under tax warrant, or otherwise.
(Emphasis added). Although HOM's obligation to pay property taxes is clear, the lease does not define the term "when due" as it relates to the date by which the taxes must be paid. The lease also contains a default provision:
If any default of the Lessee hereunder shall continue uncorrected for thirty (30) days after notice thereof from the Lessors, the Lessors may, by giving written notice to the Lessee, at any time thereafter during the continuance of such default either (a) terminate the lease, or (b) re-enter the demised premises by summary process or otherwise, and expel the Lessee and remove all personal property therefrom and re-let the premises at the best rent obtainable. ...
Property tax notifications and bills were mailed to CHME (which was obligated to pay property taxes, in full, under the sublease), and HOM appears to have relied on CHME to make all necessary payments. While the subject of considerable dispute on appeal, it appears that RME, HOM, and their predecessors never gave much, if any, attention to when the property taxes were being paid before 2013.
On 23 October 2013, however, RME's attorney, Jonathan Ganz, sent a letter to defendants alleging that they had breached the lease by failing to pay property taxes on or before September 1st in each of the preceding four years. The letter stated that RME had just recently become aware of these circumstances, and further asserted that "[i]n Orange County, real property tax bills for a calendar year are due on September 1 of that year." HOM responded, through its attorney, by sending a letter to RME, asserting that the lease did not require the tenant to pay taxes by September 1st of any fiscal year. Despite the parties’ contrary positions on the issue of exactly when property tax payments were to be made, RME took no further action at that time, as Mr. Ganz's letter failed to comply with the technical requirements of the lease's notice and default provisions.
There was no dispute in 2014 as to when the property taxes had to be paid, as CHME appealed the property's valuation, thereby tolling the date on which the taxes were "due" under the lease. However, the 2015 tax bill for the property was issued in July 2015 and defendants did not pay the taxes by 1 September 2015. As a result, on 21 September 2015, RME sent HOM a notice of default "for failure to pay all taxes as required pursuant to the lease." HOM responded as follows in a letter dated 16 October 2016:
For whatever reason, defendants chose not to pay the property tax bill immediately, an action that would have cured the alleged default. Consequently, RME sent HOM a written notice that the lease had been terminated and instructed HOM and CHME to vacate the premises.
The notice of termination was dated 27 October 2015, the same day that RME filed a summary ejectment action against defendants in the Small Claims Division of Orange County District Court. RME paid the taxes on the morning of 3 November 2015. Later that same day, Federal Express delivered a tax payment from CHME to the Orange County Tax Administrator's Revenue Division. Thereafter, HOM tried to tender the amount of the 2015 tax payment to RME on two occasions, but RME refused to accept reimbursement.
The complaint seeking summary ejectment was dismissed by an Orange County Magistrate on 10 November 2015. RME noted an appeal to Orange County District Court on 18 November 2015, and also filed a motion for summary judgment. After conducting a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied RME's motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The trial court's order held:
RME appeals.
RME's principal arguments on appeal are that the trial court erred in denying its summary judgment motion and in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants. We disagree.
"Our standard of review of an appeal from summary judgment is de novo ; such judgment is appropriate only when the record shows that ‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ " In re Will of Jones , 362 N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 572, 576 (2008) (quoting Forbis v. Neal , 361 N.C. 519, 524, 649 S.E.2d 382, 385 (2007) ). "In ruling on a motion for summary judgment the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Hinson v. Hinson , 80 N.C.App. 561, 563, 343 S.E.2d 266, 268 (1986) (citation omitted). "A defendant may show entitlement to summary judgment by (1) proving that an essential element of the plaintiff's case is non-existent, or (2) showing through discovery that the plaintiff cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of his or her claim, or (3) showing that the plaintiff cannot surmount an affirmative defense." Draughon v. Harnett Cty. Bd. of Educ. , 158 N.C.App. 705, 708, 582 S.E.2d 343, 345 (2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "A trial court may enter summary judgment in a contract dispute if the provision at issue is not ambiguous and there are no issues of material fact." Malone v. Barnette , ––– N.C. App. ––––, ––––, 772 S.E.2d 256, 259 (2015) ( ). Furthermore, if a grant of "summary judgment can be sustained on any grounds, it should be affirmed on appeal." Shore v. Brown , 324 N.C. 427, 428, 378 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1989).
RME argues that the trial court improperly denied its motion for summary judgment on the summary ejectment claim and that that the court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants. More specifically, RME contends that Paragraph 19 of the lease, which states that taxes must be paid "when due," required defendants to pay the taxes...
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