Rogoz v. City of Hartford

Decision Date10 August 2015
Docket NumberDocket No. 14–0876.
Citation796 F.3d 236
PartiesDavid ROGOZ, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. CITY OF HARTFORD; Chief Daryl K. Roberts, in his individual and official capacity; Detective G. Watson, in his individual and official capacity; Detective Rivera, in his individual and official capacity; Officer George Water, in his individual and official capacity; Officer James Rutkauski, in his individual and official capacity; Officer Brandon Flores, in his individual and official capacity; Officer Steven J. Pileski, in his individual and official capacity; Officer Cesar A. Beiros, in his individual and official capacity, Defendants–Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

A. Paul Spinella, Hartford, Connecticut (Spinella & Associates, Hartford, Connecticut, on the brief), for PlaintiffAppellant.

Nathalie Feola–Guerrieri, Senior Assistant Corporation Counsel, Hartford, Connecticut, for DefendantAppellee City of Hartford.

William J. Melley III, Hartford, Connecticut, for DefendantsAppellees Watson, Rivera, Water, Rutkauski, Flores, Pileski, and Beiros.

Before: KEARSE, PARKER, and WESLEY, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

KEARSE, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff David Rogoz appeals from a final judgment entered in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, Vanessa L. Bryant, Judge, summarily dismissing all of his claims against defendants City of Hartford (the City), individual detectives and officers in the City's Police Department (together the “police officer defendants), and the City's Chief of Police, arising out of Rogoz's arrest in May 2009, during which, the police officer defendants concede for purposes of this appeal, Rogoz's rib was broken and his spine was broken

in two places. On appeal, Rogoz seeks reinstatement only of (a) his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendant Detective G. Watson for use of excessive force, (b) his claims under § 1983 against the other defendant police detective and five defendant police officers (collectively the “other officers” or the “other police officers”) for failure to intervene to prevent Watson's use of excessive force, and (c) his claims under state law that are related to his federal claims of excessive force. Rogoz contends principally that, in granting summary judgment in favor of Watson and the other officers on those claims, the district court, which found that Watson used only reasonable force and was entitled to qualified immunity, see Rogoz v. City of Hartford, No. 3:11–CV–00500, 2013 WL 3816580 (D.Conn. July 22, 2013) (D.Ct. Op.), erred in failing to view the record in the light most favorable to Rogoz as the party opposing summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we agree that summary judgment dismissing the § 1983 claim against Watson for use of excessive force was error; we vacate so much of the judgment as dismissed that claim and the analogous state constitutional claim and as declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Rogoz's state-law claims relating to the alleged use of excessive force by Watson, and we remand for further proceedings with respect to those claims. We affirm the dismissal of Rogoz's claims against the other police officers.

I. BACKGROUND

Most of the facts are undisputed; and certain other facts have been admitted by the police officer defendants for the purpose of defending summary judgment on this appeal.

A. The Events

It is undisputed that on May 8, 2009, shortly after 11:00 a.m., Rogoz drove to the vicinity of Lawrence Street in Hartford, Connecticut (hereafter the Lawrence Street area), “a hot spot area for illegal drug activity,” D.Ct. Op., 2013 WL 3816580, at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted), and, through the window of his vehicle, bought $50 worth of heroin. Rogoz then turned onto a one-way street and pulled over to the curb. A red Honda pulled in directly behind him. Rogoz promptly drove on and pulled over to the curb farther down the street. The red Honda then pulled in front of Rogoz, and a man exited. In an attempt to get away from the Honda man, Rogoz began to back his car up the one-way street, and the man began running toward him. When Rogoz saw a car coming behind him, he ceased backing up; drove forward over the curb and onto the sidewalk to pass the Honda man before reentering the roadway; and drove off at an unreasonably high rate of speed. He eventually reached a highway, the scene of his arrest.

Rogoz's brief on appeal describes the events after he reached the highway in flight from the Honda man, and the police officer defendants have “no material disagreements” (Brief on appeal for defendants-appellees Watson and the other officers (“Watson brief on appeal”) at 5) with the following description:

[After] Rogoz ... fled through the City of Hartford, [he] eventually dr[ove] onto Route 2 eastbound; ...Rogoz did not realize that he was being pursued by police vehicles until he saw the police lights and heard the sirens; ...
Upon this realization, Rogoz immediately pulled over onto the shoulder of the highway; ...
When Rogoz stopped the vehicle, Rogoz was directed by an officer to exit the vehicle with his hands up, and he complied; ...
Rogoz was ordered by the officers to lay face down on the ground with his hands behind his back, and he complied; ...
Rogoz complied with each of the officers' commands, and did not resist in any way; ...
Rogoz was lying face down on the ground, with his hands behind his back, awaiting to be handcuffed, when one of the officers, believed to be George Watson, jumped onto Rogoz's back, landing knees first .... The force of the impact fractured one of Rogoz's ribs and fractured his spine

in two places ....

(Rogoz brief on appeal at 5–6 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphases ours).) Watson and the other officers state in their brief on appeal that they accept for the purpose of this Motion for Summary Judgment Plaintiff's characterization that Detective George Watson jumped on Mr. Rogoz's back, landing knees first, and fracturing Mr. Rogoz's ribs and spine. (Watson brief on appeal at 5–6 (emphases added).)

B. The Present Action and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

Rogoz was charged with three state-law crimes: possession of narcotics, reckless driving, and disobeying an officer's signal to stop in order to escape. He pleaded guilty to the narcotics charge and was fined $300; the other two charges were dismissed.

Rogoz commenced the present § 1983 action in 2011 against the City, its Chief of Police, and the police officer defendants, asserting various claims under, inter alia, the Fourth Amendment and state law in connection with his arrest, including false arrest, false imprisonment, and use of excessive force. To the extent pertinent to this appeal, which pursues only the excessive-force-related claims against the police officer defendants and the City, the complaint included allegations that, at the Lawrence Street area, the man who exited the red Honda had “charged toward the Plaintiff's vehicle” and failed to identify himself as a police officer in any respect (Complaint ¶ 15 (emphasis added)); that Rogoz had fled the area [b]elieving himself to be in imminent danger” (id. ¶ 16); that when Rogoz became aware on the highway that he was being pursued by police officers, he immediately stopped his vehicle on the shoulder of the highway (see id. ¶¶ 17–18); and that he complied with the Defendant Officers' commands to show his hands, exit his vehicle and lie face down with his hands behind his back, offering no resistance of any sort (id. ¶ 19 (emphasis added)). Then,

[w]hile the Plaintiff was on the ground, the Defendant Officers subjected his upper back to severe physical assault, causing him to suffer excruciating pain....
21. After the Plaintiff was placed in custody, he requested but did not receive prompt medical care for two days.
22. Upon finally receiving medical care, the Plaintiff was informed that he had sustained severe muscular strain and multiple fractures to his back and ribs.

(Complaint ¶¶ 20–22.)

In his deposition, Rogoz testified that when he was in the Lawrence Street area he had no idea who the man who exited the Honda was. He never showed nothing, you know. I had no idea who it was....” (Deposition of David William Rogoz (“Rogoz Dep.”) at 86; see also id. at 67 (“Q. Do you recall any gesture from the person that was in this Honda at all to you, any arm movement, anything like that? A. No, no.”).) Rogoz testified, [i]t's not the best area over there” (id. at 67–68), and that he “was trying to get out of there.... I just didn't know what was going on. I was afraid” (id. at 65).

As to his arrest, Rogoz testified that when he had lain face down on the ground as instructed,

that was when ... someone came up on me, and it was boom. Someone like threw all their weight on me. I could feel like their knees in my back smashed me, smashed my face into the pavement.”

(Rogoz Dep. at 79.) “It felt like he like jumped, you know.... [I]t seemed like, you know, he just like jumped on me is what it felt like, just hit so hard.” (Id. at 80.) “It seemed like he ran up and jumped with his weight onto my back....” (Id. at 81.) The officer who jumped on Rogoz's back then handcuffed him; since a police report said that Rogoz was handcuffed by Watson, Rogoz inferred that the officer who jumped on his back was Watson. (See id. at 84–85.)

In an affidavit opposing defendants' motion for summary judgment, Rogoz's description of the scene of his arrest on the highway was similar to the allegations in his complaint:

[w]hen I saw the [police] lights I immediately pulled over onto the shoulder of the highway.
11. After I stopped, the police officers ordered me to show my hands, to exit the vehicle and to lie face down with my hands behind my back, and I complied with their directions, and did not resist in any way.
12. While I was lying on the ground, one or two of the defendant officers jumped onto me with their knees, landing
...

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