Estate of Williams v. Ind. State Police Dep't

• Citation: 797 F.3d 468
• Decision Date: 13 August 2015
• Docket Number: 14–2808.,Nos. 14–2523,s. 14–2523
• Parties: Estate of William E. WILLIAMS, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. INDIANA STATE POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants–Appellees. Nancy Brown, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Wayne Blanchard and Walworth County, Wisconsin, Defendants–Appellants.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

797 F.3d 468

Estate of William E. WILLIAMS, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants

v.INDIANA STATE POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants–Appellees.

Nancy Brown, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Wayne Blanchard and Walworth County, Wisconsin, Defendants–Appellants.

Nos. 14–2523

14–2808.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Jan. 20, 2015.

Decided Aug. 13, 2015.

Samuel Mark Adams, Attorney, Michael K. Sutherlin, Attorney, Sutherlin & Associates, Indianapolis, IN, for Estate of William E. Williams, et al.

Kristin Garn, Attorney, Office of the Attorney General, Ronald J. Semler, Attorney, James S. Stephenson, Attorney, Stephenson Morow & Semler, Indianapolis, IN, Douglas A. Hoffman, Attorney, Carson Boxberger, Bloomington, IN, Kirk A. Horn, Attorney, Mandel Horn McGrath & Reynolds, PC, Carmel, IN, for Indiana State Police Department, et al.

Michael W. Rathsack, Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Nancy Brown.

Samuel C. Hall, Jr., Attorney, Crivello Carlson, S.C., Milwaukee, WI, for Wayne Blanchard and Walworth County, Wisconsin.

Before RIPPLE and ROVNER, Circuit Judges, and KENNELLY, District Judge.^*

Opinion

ROVNER, Circuit Judge.

We have consolidated for decision these two appeals, heard on the same day, that present similar issues of law relating to the reasonableness of force under the Fourth Amendment. In both cases, family members called police officers to their home because a family member had locked himself in a room of his home and was threatening suicide. The officers responded to the distress call, but in both cases the situation tragically ended with the person's death as a result of shots fired by the officers. Although we will discuss the facts in more detail later, the basic circumstances were as follows. In the case on behalf of the estate of Williams, the police officers were faced with a person, William E. Williams, who had locked himself in a bathroom, had taken all the Xanax left in a prescription bottle, and had cut himself and complained that it was taking longer than expected for him to bleed out. The officers had no good vantage point to see him in the second floor bathroom, and he repeatedly threatened to kill anyone who attempted to come into the bathroom. The officers unlocked the bathroom door and fired tasers at Williams, but those tasers had no effect. When Williams pursued the officers with a knife, the officers shot and killed him. In the case brought by Nancy Brown, John Brown had also cut himself, and was locked in his bedroom although his mother had a key and had come in and spoken with him. Officers could see him through the bedroom window. Shortly after arriving, an officer at the scene decided to kick the bedroom door in, and ultimately he fatally shot John Brown who also possessed a knife. On behalf of the deceased person, the plaintiffs in each case brought suit against the officers pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment when they effected the seizure.

I.

Because the Fourth Amendment explicitly addresses the sort of physically intrusive government conduct that constitutes a seizure, that amendment rather than generalized notions of substantive due process guides such claims. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). In determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment, we must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interest alleged to justify the intrusion. Id. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865 ; Fitzgerald v. Santoro, 707 F.3d 725, 733 (7th Cir.2013) ; Abbott v. Sangamon County, Illinois, 705 F.3d 706, 724 (7th Cir.2013). Such an analysis is inherently fact-dependent, requiring consideration of such factors as the severity of the crime at issue, whether the person posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether the person was actively resisting the officers. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865 ; Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 829 (7th Cir.2014) ; Abbott, 705 F.3d at 724. In assessing such a claim, however, we must remain cognizant of the incredibly difficult task facing law enforcement officers called to address fluid situations such as those presented in these cases. Accordingly, the reasonableness of an officer's actions must be assessed from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, not based on the “20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865 ; Fitzgerald, 707 F.3d at 733 ; City and County of San Francisco, California v. Sheehan, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 1765, 1775, 191 L.Ed.2d 856 (2015). That assessment must include a recognition that officers are often forced to make split second judgments in tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving situations, as to the amount of force necessary in a particular situation. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97, 109 S.Ct. 1865 ; Abbott, 705 F.3d at 724 ; Sheehan, 135 S.Ct. at 1775. We thus give considerable leeway to law enforcement officers' assessments regarding the degree of force appropriate in dangerous situations. Abbott, 705 F.3d at 724–25. Throughout the analysis, the reasonableness inquiry is an objective one, which examines whether the officer's actions are objectively reasonable in light of the totality of the facts and circumstances confronting him or her, without regard for consideration of the officer's subjective intent or motivations. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865 ; Miller, 761 F.3d at 828–29 ; Fitzgerald, 707 F.3d at 733. An officer's use of force is unreasonable if in light of all those circumstances at the time of the seizure, the officer used greater force than was reasonably necessary to effectuate the seizure. Id. “The Supreme Court further has counseled that it is reasonable for a law enforcement officer to use deadly force if an objectively reasonable officer in the same circumstances would conclude that the suspect posed a threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or to others.” Marion v. City of Corydon, Indiana, 559 F.3d 700, 705 (7th Cir.2009), citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11–12, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985).

If we determine that the use of force was excessive under that constitutional standard, we must turn to the next question, which is whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity for their actions. “Qualified immunity, in effect, affords enhanced deference to officers' on-scene judgments about the level of necessary force ... because, even if the plaintiffs demonstrate that excessive force was used, they must further establish that it was objectively unreasonable for the officer to believe that the force was lawful—i.e., they must demonstrate that the right to be free from the particular use of force under the relevant circumstances was ‘clearly established.’ ” Abbott, 705 F.3d at 725. For qualified immunity purposes, a right is clearly established if the contours of that right are sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer would understand that his actions violate that right—“[i]n other words, ‘existing precedent must have placed the ... constitutional questions beyond debate.’ ” Id., quoting Reichle v. Howards, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 2093, 182 L.Ed.2d 985 (2012) ; Sheehan, 135 S.Ct. at 1774.

In both cases before us today, the district court was presented with a motion for summary judgment. In Williams, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the officer defendants, concluding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The plaintiffs now appeal that determination. In contrast, the district court in Brown denied summary judgment to the officers on the constitutional claim as well as on the issue of qualified immunity. The defendants appealed that denial to this court. See Weinmann v. McClone, 787 F.3d 444, 447 (7th Cir.2015) (discussing the appealability of denials of qualified immunity).

The Supreme Court recently addressed a Fourth Amendment challenge in circumstances analogous to the ones presented here in Sheehan, 135 S.Ct. 1765, and its analysis is instructive. Teresa Sheehan resided in a group home for persons dealing with mental illness. Id. at 1769. Sheehan's mental condition appeared to be deteriorating to the extent that she had stopped taking her medications, no longer spoke with her psychiatrist, and reportedly had stopped changing her clothes or eating. Id. When the social worker used a key to enter Sheehan's room, Sheehan yelled at the social worker to get out and shouted that she had a knife and would kill the social worker if necessary. Id. at 1769–70. Police officers were then called to the group home. The officers knocked on Sheehan's door, announced who they were, and indicated that they wanted to help Sheehan. Id. at 1770. When Sheehan failed to respond, the officers entered the room using a key, and again Sheehan responded in a violent manner. Sheehan grabbed a knife and began approaching the officers, yelling that she was going to kill them, that she did not need help, and that they should get out.Id. The officers left the room, but determined that immediate action was required, and chose not to wait for the backup that was already on the way. Id. at 1771. One officer then pushed the door open while the other began using pepper spray on Sheehan. Id. Sheehan did not drop the knife, however, and when Sheehan was within a few feet of the officers, one of the officers shot her twice. Id. When she failed to collapse, the other officer fired multiple shots at her. Id. Sheehan survived the incident, and ultimately brought a § 1983 challenge alleging that the officers violated her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures.

The Ninth Circuit held that although the initial entry into the room was lawful, and the firing of the shots was reasonable when the pepper spray failed to stop Sheehan's advance, a jury...