Miller v. Fairchild Industries, Inc.
| Decision Date | 12 August 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-5614,85-5614 |
| Citation | 797 F.2d 727 |
| Parties | 41 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 809, 41 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 36,501, 1 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. 586 Diane MILLER and Pamela Lewis, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FAIRCHILD INDUSTRIES, INC., a Maryland Corporation, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Tryon J. Sheppard, Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Wendy Carson, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
Before FLETCHER, PREGERSON, and CANBY, Circuit Judges.
Diane Miller and Pamela Lewis appeal from the trial court's granting of Fairchild Industries' motion for summary judgment. Miller and Lewis claim that Fairchild discharged
them from employment in retaliation for filing discrimination charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Lewis and Miller also allege intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract, tortious breach of contract, and fraud. We reverse and remand.
Diane Miller worked as a contracts administrator and Pamela Lewis worked as a junior designer for Fairchild Industries. In mid-1982, Lewis and Miller, both black women, filed race discrimination charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). In September 1982, Fairchild, Miller and Lewis, with EEOC participation, signed EEOC no fault settlement agreements.
In the agreements, Fairchild promised to transfer Lewis to a different supervisor, permit her to remain in the Engineering Department, allow her to begin "Cad/Cam" training and attend subsequent courses, and to remove any negative material from her personnel file.
In its agreement with Miller, Fairchild promised to review her attendance records to determine whether a previously refused merit increase could be granted, to inform Miller of training opportunities, and to provide her with an equal opportunity to attend available training.
In consideration for Fairchild's promises, Miller and Lewis agreed to give up their rights to sue under Title VII for the discrimination charges they had made. Both settlement agreements contained clauses stating that the agreement constituted the "complete understanding" between the parties, and that "[n]o other promises or agreements shall be binding unless signed by these parties." Fairchild also agreed to notify the EEOC within ten days of satisfying its promises under the agreement.
Less than two months later, on November 5, 1982, Fairchild laid off Miller and Lewis. Miller and Lewis claim that the layoffs were in retaliation for the protected activities in which they had engaged--the filing of EEOC complaints.
Miller and Lewis brought this action, claiming that their retaliatory discharges constituted prohibited discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, section 704(a), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-3(a), and state law. They also claim emotional distress, breach of the EEOC settlement agreements, tortious breach, and fraud. The trial court granted Fairchild's motion for summary judgment on all counts.
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Miller and Lewis, we must determine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact, and whether the substantive law has been applied correctly. Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1003 (9th Cir.1985), amended, 784 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir.1986)
Under section 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-3(a), it is unlawful to retaliate against an employee because she has taken action to enforce rights protected under Title VII.
Lewis and Miller allege that their layoffs directly resulted from filing discrimination charges with the EEOC, settled between the parties less than two months before the termination. Fairchild disputes this contention, arguing that the company terminated Miller and Lewis as part of a necessary, ongoing layoff program instituted for economic reasons.
The order and allocation of proof for Title VII suits outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-25, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), also governs actions for retaliatory discharge under section 704(a). Cohen v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 686 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir.1982). To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory retaliation, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she engaged in an activity protected under Title VII; (2) her employer subjected her to adverse employment action; (3) there was a causal link between the protected activity and the employer's action. Wrighten v. Metropolitan Hospitals, Inc., 726 F.2d 1346, 1354 (9th Cir.1984); Cohen, 686 F.2d at 796. Causation sufficient to establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation may be inferred from the proximity in time between the protected action and the allegedly retaliatory discharge. 1 See Love v. Re/Max of America, Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 386 (10th Cir.1984); Burrows v. Chemed Corp., 567 F.Supp. 978, 986 (E.D.Mo.1983), aff'd, 743 F.2d 612 (8th Cir.1984) (); Cf. Ayon v. Sampson, 547 F.2d 446, 448-51 (9th Cir.1976) (). Alternatively, the plaintiff can prove causation by providing direct evidence of retaliatory motivation. See A. Larson, Employment Discrimination Sec. 87.31 at 17-120 (1984).
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory explanation for the action. Wrighten, 726 F.2d at 1354. To satisfy this burden, the employer "need only produce admissible evidence which would allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment decision had not been motivated by discriminatory animus." Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 257, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1096, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); see Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1007.
If the employer successfully rebuts the inference of retaliation that arises from establishment of a prima facie case, then the burden shifts once again to the plaintiff to show that the defendant's proffered explanation is merely a pretext for discrimination. Wrighten, 726 F.2d at 1354.
At the summary judgment stage in discrimination cases, the order of proof and shifting of burdens is viewed in light of the traditional summary judgment test. Foster v. Arcata Associates, Inc., 772 F.2d 1453, 1459 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 1267, 89 L.Ed.2d 576 (1986). Thus, to withstand a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must "produce 'specific facts showing that there remains a genuine factual issue for trial' and evidence 'significantly probative' as to any [material] fact claimed to be disputed.' " Steckl v. Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir.1983) (emphasis in original) (quoting Ruffin v. County of Los Angeles, 607 F.2d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951, 100 S.Ct. 1600, 63 L.Ed.2d 786 (1980)). The plaintiff need not prove her prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence at this stage. Foster, 772 F.2d at 1459.
The first two elements of a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge clearly have been established here: the filing of discrimination charges with the EEOC constituted a protected activity; and Miller and Lewis subsequently were laid off from employment at Fairchild. At issue is whether they have provided evidence sufficient to warrant the inference that their discharges were causally related to their protected activities.
To support their claim, Miller and Lewis point to two facts: (1) the management personnel who participated in the EEOC settlement negotiations were also responsible for their layoffs, thus proving that the company knew Miller and Lewis had engaged in protected activity; and (2) Lewis's and Miller's layoffs occurred less than two months after they negotiated the EEOC settlement agreements.
This evidence is sufficiently probative of Fairchild's alleged retaliatory motivations in discharging Lewis and Miller to withstand a summary judgment motion on grounds of failure to establish a prima facie case. Love, 738 F.2d at 386 (); Summers v. Allis Chalmers, 568 F.Supp. 33, 37 (N.D.Ill.1983) (); Burrows, 567 F.Supp. at 986 (); Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F.Supp. 318, 324-25 (D.Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir.1976) ().
Because Lewis's and Miller's evidence establishes a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge, the burden then shifts to Fairchild to provide a legitimate explanation for the layoffs. Fairchild's stated reason was that the layoffs resulted from economic necessity. Fairchild furnished evidence that during the two-year period from 1980 to 1982, the...
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