In re Interest of J. H.

Decision Date21 February 2017
Docket NumberA16A2210,A16A2211,A16A2209,A16A2212,A16A2213
Citation340 Ga.App. 733,797 S.E.2d 185
Parties IN the INTEREST OF: J. H., a Child. In the Interest of: A. L., a Child. In the Interest of: T. L., a Child. In the Interest of: J. C., a Child. In the Interest of: K. S., a Child.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Carolyn J. Altman, for Appellant in A16A2209.

Kristi Winstead Wilson, Brian Keith Fortner, for Appellee in A16A2209, A16A2210, A16A2211, A16A2212 and A16A2213.

Ernest Cornel Crosby, for Appellant in A16A2210.

Thinel Bishop, for Appellant in A16A2211.

Christy Elaine Draper, for Appellant in A16A2212.

James John Anagnostakis, Atlanta, for Appellant in A16A2213.

Barnes, Presiding Judge.

In these related cases, the juvenile defendants filed direct appeals from the juvenile court's orders transferring their delinquency cases to superior court for prosecution. Because the juvenile proceedings in these cases commenced after January 1, 2014, we conclude that OCGA § 15-11-564 of Georgia's new Juvenile Code required that the defendants comply with this Court's interlocutory appeal procedures. Accordingly, given that the defendants failed to follow those procedures, we dismiss these appeals for lack of jurisdiction.

The record reflects that after a series of car break-ins, the State filed delinquency petitions in the Juvenile Court of Douglas County alleging that five juvenile defendants (J. H., L. A., T. L., J. C., and K. S.) had committed acts in July 2015 which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted 32 counts of entering an automobile with the intent to commit a theft, one count of criminal gang activity, and one count of theft by taking. The delinquency petitions were originally filed in September 2015 and were later amended.

The State filed motions to transfer the delinquency cases to the Superior Court of Douglas County for prosecution. After conducting hearings on the State's motions, the juvenile court entered orders transferring the delinquency cases to superior court. The juvenile defendants then filed these direct appeals from the juvenile court's transfer orders.

The State contends that the juvenile defendants' appeals must be dismissed because they were required to proceed by interlocutory application rather than by direct appeal in light of OCGA § 15-11-564, which was enacted as part of Georgia's new Juvenile Code.1 That statute provides:

(a) The decision of the court regarding transfer of the case shall only be an interlocutory judgment which either a child or the prosecuting attorney, or both, have the right to have reviewed by the Court of Appeals.
(b) The pendency of an interlocutory appeal shall stay criminal proceedings in superior court. A child transferred for trial as an adult in superior court shall be detained only in those places authorized for the preadjudication detention of a child as set forth in Code Section 15-11-504.

(Emphasis supplied.) Based on the language of OCGA § 15-11-564 and the legal context in which it was enacted, we agree with the State that the juvenile defendants were required to follow this Court's interlocutory appeal procedures.

"When we consider the meaning of a statute, we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Deal v. Coleman , 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a), 751 S.E.2d 337 (2013).

And where [the General Assembly] borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of [years] of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed.

Morissette v. United States , 342 U.S. 246, 263 (I), 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952). See Johnson v. Bradstreet Co. , 87 Ga. 79, 82, 13 S.E. 250 (1891) ("Where a statute uses a word which is well known and has a definite sense at common law, or in the written law, without defining it, it will be restricted to that sense, unless it appears that it was not so intended.") (citation and punctuation omitted).

"In our search for the meaning of a particular statutory provision, we look not only to the words of that provision, but we consider its legal context as well." (Citation and punctuation omitted.)

Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Loudermilk , 295 Ga. 579, 588 (2), 761 S.E.2d 332 (2014). To that end, we presume that our legislature enacts statutes "with full knowledge of [the] existing law, including court decisions." Dove v. Dove , 285 Ga. 647, 649 (4), 680 S.E.2d 839 (2009).

Mindful of these principles, we turn to OCGA § 15-11-564, and, in particular, the General Assembly's use of the word "interlocutory" in that statute. The legal term "interlocutory" means "interim or temporary; not constituting a final resolution of the whole controversy." Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). See In re Motion of Atlanta Journal-Constitution , 269 Ga. 589, 589, 502 S.E.2d 720 (1998) (per curiam) (citing Black's Law Dictionary and defining "interlocutory" as "interim" or "not final"). And Georgia courts have routinely held that a party seeking appellate review of an order viewed as interlocutory must follow the interlocutory appeal procedures in OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). See Cherry v. Coast House, Ltd. , 257 Ga. 403, 404 (2), 359 S.E.2d 904 (1987) ("[W]hen the order appealed from is an interlocutory order, the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction unless the procedure of OCGA § 5-6-34 (b) for interlocutory appeal is followed."). See also Gray v. Springs , 224 Ga.App. 427, 481 S.E.2d 3 (1997) ; Griffith v. Ga. Bd. of Dentistry , 175 Ga.App. 533, 333 S.E.2d 647 (1985). Accordingly, in light of the common legal understanding of the word "interlocutory" and its implications for appellate review, we conclude that by referring in OCGA § 15-11-564 to a transfer order as "only ... an interlocutory judgment" and as resulting in an "interlocutory appeal," the General Assembly intended for a party seeking appeal of an order transferring a delinquency case from juvenile court to superior court to follow the interlocutory appeal procedures in cases where the new Juvenile Code applies.

When the enactment of OCGA § 15-11-564 is viewed in the specific context of our longstanding jurisprudence addressing the appellate review of transfer orders, it becomes even more clear that the General Assembly intended for appeals in this context to proceed now by interlocutory application. The general rule has long been that a trial court order transferring a case from one court to another court is interlocutory in nature and thus is not directly appealable as a final judgment under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1). See In the Interest of W. L. , 335 Ga.App. 561, 562-563, 782 S.E.2d 464 (2016) ; Mauer v. Parker Fibernet, LLC , 306 Ga.App. 160, 161, 701 S.E.2d 599 (2010) ; Griffith v. Ga. Bd. of Dentistry , 175 Ga.App. 533, 533, 333 S.E.2d 647 (1985). For many years, however, Georgia courts have applied an exception to this general rule in cases where a juvenile court transfers a delinquency case to superior court for criminal prosecution. In that specific context, in cases predating the new Juvenile Code, Georgia courts held that an order transferring a delinquency case from juvenile court to superior court should be treated as a final order directly appealable under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1). See Fulton County Dept. of Family & Children Svcs. v. Perkins , 244 Ga. 237, 239, 259 S.E.2d 427 (1978) ; In the Interest of R. W. , 299 Ga.App. 505, 505, n. 1, 683 S.E.2d 80 (2009) ; Rivers v. State , 229 Ga.App. 12, 13 (1), 493 S.E.2d 2 (1997) ; Rocha v. State , 234 Ga.App. 48, 50 (1), 506 S.E.2d 192 (1998) ; J. T. M. v. State of Ga. , 142 Ga.App. 635, 636 (1), 236 S.E.2d 764 (1977).

Against this legal background, the General Assembly enacted OCGA § 15-11-564 as part of the new Juvenile Code, referring therein to an order transferring a delinquency case from juvenile court to superior court as "only ... an interlocutory judgment." OCGA § 15-11-564 (a). We must presume that the legislature was aware of the legal background and that its use of this specific phraseology "was a matter of considered choice." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Anderson Anesthesia v. Anderson , 333 Ga.App. 437, 439, 776 S.E.2d 647 (2015). Consequently, when viewed in the context of our case law regarding transfer orders, the General Assembly's adoption of OCGA § 15-11-564 reflects that in cases where the new Juvenile Code applies, orders transferring delinquency cases from juvenile court to superior court should now be treated like other types of transfer cases—i.e., as interlocutory orders subject to review by application under OCGA § 5-6-34 (b) —and no longer as an exception to the general rule.2

In concluding that this Court's interlocutory appeal procedures must be followed in the context of juvenile court transfer orders, we also note that OCGA § 15-11-564 (a) provides that an interlocutory transfer order entered by the juvenile court is one which "either a child or the prosecuting attorney, or both, have the right to have reviewed by the Court of Appeals." It is well-established law that "[a]ppeals by the State in criminal cases are construed strictly against the State," and that the State may not appeal an issue in a criminal case or juvenile delinquency matter, whether by direct or discretionary appeal, unless expressly authorized by statute. State v. Cash , 298 Ga. 90, 91 (1) (a), 779 S.E.2d 603 (2015). See OCGA § 5-7-1 (listing statutory grounds upon which State can appeal in criminal and juvenile delinquency cases). Given this well-established law relating to appeals by the State, the General Assembly clearly included the above-quoted language in OCGA § 15-11-564 (a) to enable the prosecution, like the child, to challenge a juvenile court's transfer ruling through this Court's interlocutory appeal procedures. See...

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5 cases
  • In re Interest of K. S.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • January 23, 2019
    ...appeal procedure when appealing an order transferring a case from juvenile court to superior court. In Interest of J. H. , 340 Ga. App. 733, 797 S.E.2d 185 (2017). The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed our decision, holding that K. S. could directly appeal the transfer order, and remanded t......
  • Love v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • March 7, 2019
    ...Rocha v. State , 234 Ga. App. 48, 53 (5), 506 S.E.2d 192 (1998), superseded by statute on other grounds, In the Interest of J. H. , 340 Ga. App. 733, 736, 797 S.E.2d 185 (2017). Compare Smith , supra, 249 Ga. App. at 41 (1), 547 S.E.2d 598 (trial court erred in denying severance of defendan......
  • In re Interest of K.S.
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • May 7, 2018
    ...the State’s motions, the juvenile court entered orders transferring the delinquency cases to superior court. In the Interest of J.S., 340 Ga. App. 733, 733, 797 S.E.2d 185 (2017). K.S., along with his juvenile co-defendants, directly appealed the juvenile court’s transfer orders, which the ......
  • State v. Dean
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • October 17, 2019
    ...we will affirm the order transferring jurisdiction." (punctuation omitted)), overruled on other grounds by In the Interest of J. H. , 340 Ga. App. 733, 797 S.E.2d 185 (2017) ; In the Interest of D. M. , 299 Ga. App. 586, 586-87, 683 S.E.2d 130 (2009) ("On appeal, the function of this court ......
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