Maldonado v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co.

Decision Date27 August 1986
Docket NumberNo. 85-2164,85-2164
Citation798 F.2d 764
Parties21 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 534 Enrique MALDONADO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Person, Whitworth, Ramos, Borchers & Morales, Donato D. Ramos, Mark D. Willett, Laredo, Tex., for defendant-appellant.

Arnulfo Gonzalez, Jr., Laredo, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before RANDALL and GARWOOD, Circuit Judges, and SCHWARTZ, * District Judge.

GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Missouri Pacific Railroad Company appeals from a judgment in favor of its employee, plaintiff Enrique Maldonado, who sued Missouri Pacific under the Federal Safety Appliance Act (FSAA), 45 U.S.C. Sec. 2, for injuries he sustained in attempting to align a drawbar on one of defendant's railroad cars during a train car switching operation. Missouri Pacific asserts several errors, including the claim that the district court erred by instructing the jury that it is a violation of the FSAA "for the railroad to operate a car which has a draw bar sufficiently out of line that it does not couple on impact." We hold that, because Missouri Pacific did not produce evidence that would support a defense based on drawbar misalignment, if we were to adopt such a defense, the instruction is not erroneous in the context of this case. Finding that defendant's contentions present no reversible error, we affirm.

Facts and Proceedings Below

The facts, for the most part, are undisputed. On February 1, 1981, Maldonado, employed as a switchman by Missouri Pacific, was a member of a four-man crew engaged in switching operations at Missouri Pacific's train yard in Laredo, Texas. The crew was assigned to make up an outbound train by linking specified cars together in accordance with a switch list. In making up this train, the crew was required to switch a TTX flatcar from Track No. 6 to Track No. 4 and to link it up with cars already on Track No. 4. The TTX car was to be the lead car (behind the engine) on the outbound train. The crew planned to couple the TTX car to the next car on Track No. 4 and then shove the line of connected cars southward down the track to make room for other trains.

The crew went onto Track No. 6 and pulled several cars, including the TTX car, northward onto the main track until they were north of the intersection between the tracks. The engine then came southward on to Track No. 4 with the purpose of "throwing" or "kicking" the TTX car down the track to couple with those cars already on the track. This involved uncoupling the TTX car and using the engine to set the TTX car rolling about four miles per hour toward the next car on the track, which was about a block away. Both cars were equipped with drawbars that had automatic couplers designed to connect upon impact. Before kicking the TTX car down the track, plaintiff Maldonado observed that the TTX drawbar was properly aligned and he opened the knuckle on the coupler. 1 After the TTX car was sent down the track, Maldonado heard the TTX car strike the next car.

The engine returned the remaining cars to Track No. 6 and then came back to Track No. 4. At this point, the engine coupled with the TTX car by backing directly into it. The engineer then pulled forward or northward to "stretch out" the cars to ensure that they were connected before they were shoved southward. Maldonado noticed that the TTX car had failed to couple to the second car in line and saw that the drawbars on both cars were misaligned. He then aligned the drawbar on the second car. Next, he attempted to align the TTX drawbar, but was unable to do so. He signaled to another crew member who came to assist him. During their concerted efforts to align the TTX drawbar, Maldonado injured his back.

Maldonado filed this action against Missouri Pacific, seeking compensation for his injuries originally under the FSAA and the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA). Plaintiff dismissed his FELA action during trial, but obtained a favorable jury verdict on his FSAA claim.

Discussion
Federal Safety Appliance Act

Section 2 of the FSAA, 45 U.S.C. Sec. 2, provides:

"It shall be unlawful for any common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad to haul or permit to be hauled or used on its line any car used in moving interstate traffic not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact, and which can be uncoupled without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars."

The broad purpose of the FSAA was the requirement of equipment for automatic coupling to avoid the great risks incurred by the railroad employees in going between the cars. St. Louis & San Francisco R.R. Co. v. Conarty, 238 U.S. 243, 35 S.Ct. 785, 786, 59 L.Ed. 1290 (1915); United Transportation Union v. Lewis, 711 F.2d 233, 243-47 (D.C.Cir.1983); Southern Pacific Co. v. Mahl, 406 F.2d 1201, 1203 (5th Cir.1969). Section 2 imposes absolute liability upon a railroad for injuries sustained when the automatic couplers fail to perform "on the occasion in question." Affolder v. New York, C & St. L.R. Co., 339 U.S. 96, 70 S.Ct. 509, 510, 94 L.Ed. 683 (1950); Carter v. Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay Ry. Co., 338 U.S. 430, 70 S.Ct. 226, 229, 94 L.Ed. 236 (1949). Therefore, neither the diligence of the railroad nor the absence of a specific defect in the coupler is relevant to a finding of liability. Carter, 70 S.Ct. at 229; O'Donnell v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 338 U.S. 384, 70 S.Ct. 200, 204, 94 L.Ed. 187 (1949); Coleman v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 681 F.2d 542, 544-45 (8th Cir.1982). In fact, no question "regarding the normal efficiency of the couplers" is material to an FSAA action. Affolder, 70 S.Ct. at 510.

The railroads may take comfort, however, in at least one clearly established defense. In Affolder, the Supreme Court stated that failure of the equipment to function is a violation, assuming "that the coupler was placed in a position to operate on impact." Id. at 511; see also Carter, 70 S.Ct. at 229. The Affolder Court thus found that the railroad had a good defense if neither of the couplers was in an open position so as to operate on impact. 70 S.Ct. at 511. The courts have been reluctant to extend the general language of Affolder beyond the facts of that case. Therefore, the requirement that the coupler be placed in position to operate has widely been interpreted as referring to the necessity of opening the knuckle on at least one of the couplers. See Clark v. Kentucky & Indiana Terminal R.R., 728 F.2d 307, 312-13 (6th Cir.1984); Hallada v. Great Northern Ry., 244 Minn. 81, 69 N.W.2d 673, 680, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 874, 76 S.Ct. 119, 100 L.Ed. 773 (1955); White v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 244 S.W.2d 26, 28-30 (Mo.1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 915, 72 S.Ct. 648, 96 L.Ed. 1330 (1952); Schaaf v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 113 Mich.App. 544, 317 N.W.2d 679, 681 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 848, 104 S.Ct. 153, 78 L.Ed.2d 142 (1983). Of course, because the FSAA violation must be a causative factor in the plaintiff's injuries, the railroad in appropriate circumstances may raise a sole cause defense. Beimert v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 726 F.2d 412, 414 (8th Cir.) (no liability under FSAA if plaintiff's negligence is sole cause of injuries), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1216, 104 S.Ct. 2659, 81 L.Ed.2d 365 (1984). 2

The issue in the present case is whether the district court erred in instructing the jury that it is a violation of the FSAA "for the railroad to operate a car which has a draw bar sufficiently out of line that it does not couple upon impact." Both parties contend that the cars failed to couple because of drawbar misalignment before the impact. Their dispute concerns the legal significance of this theory. Defendant urges us to read Affolder to mean that there can be no FSAA violation unless at least one knuckle was opened and the drawbars were properly aligned before the attempted coupling. 3 However, we need not determine when, if ever, a railroad may rely on drawbar misalignment because Missouri Pacific did not produce the evidence that would be required at a minimum to support such a defense.

We believe that, because the FSAA is essentially an equipment safety statute, drawbar misalignment prior to impact may not support a defense unless the misalignment is due to some factor other than equipment failure or defect. After an extensive examination of the language of the Act and its legislative history, a panel of the D.C. Circuit concluded that section 2 was intended only to prescribe mandatory safety equipment. Lewis, 711 F.2d at 244-45. The court held:

"[T]he scope of section 2 is confined to the requirement that railroad cars be 'equipped' with automatic couplers that can be operated without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars.... The predicate for liability under section 2 is the failure to provide equipment that functions as the statute commands." Id. at 251.

Our examination of the FSAA and its legislative history leads us to agree that the FSAA is equipment oriented and "does not address operating procedures." Id. at 245; see also Conarty, 35 S.Ct. at 786. This suggests that drawbar misalignment should be a defense to failure to couple in instances where the misalignment which causes the noncoupling does not reflect defective or failed equipment.

Some courts holding essentially that any misalignment that prevents coupling is a violation apparently assume that proper equipment ordinarily cannot be moved so far out of line that it fails to couple. See, e.g., Clark, 728 F.2d at 312-13 (couplers "out of alignment beyond the normal play" will not couple automatically); Hallada, 69 N.W.2d at 680; Buskirk v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 103 Ill.App.3d 414, 59 Ill.Dec. 125, 431 N.E.2d 410, 412, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 910, 103 S.Ct. 217, 74 L.Ed.2d 173 (1982). Whether or not a...

To continue reading

Request your trial
57 cases
  • State v. Messelt
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin
    • June 23, 1994
    ...which tend to show deceit during voir dire are not barred by [Fed.Rule of Evid. 606(b) ]."), See also, Maldonado v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 798 F.2d 764, 770 (5th Cir.1986), and Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 524-26 (9th In this case, both Relyea and Walsted testified that during voir......
  • United States v. Sampson
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Massachusetts
    • October 20, 2011
    ...(Alito, J.)); but see Hard v. Burlington Northern Railroad, 812 F.2d 482, 485 (9th Cir.1987) (citing Maldonado v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 798 F.2d 764, 770 (5th Cir.1986)). Sampson did not generally press this issue and, following the court's comments, C was not questioned specificall......
  • Marshall v. Hendricks
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey)
    • June 23, 2000
    ...States v. Griek, 920 F.2d 840 (11th Cir.1991); Haeberle v. Texas Int'l Airlines, 739 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1984); Maldonado v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 798 F.2d 764 (5th Cir.1986); United States v. Kepreos, 759 F.2d 961 (1st Cir. In Griek, for example, after a criminal defendant was found gu......
  • Harris v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • July 9, 2021
    ...during deliberations.' Attridge v. Cencorp Div. of Dover Techs. Int'l, Inc., 836 F.2d 113, 116 (2d Cir. 1987); Maldonado v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 798 F.2d 764 (5th Cir. 1986)."The plaintiffs misconceive the distinction, under Alabama law, between 'extraneous facts,' the consideration of which ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT