Nally v. Ghosh, 14–3426.

Decision Date24 August 2015
Docket NumberNo. 14–3426.,14–3426.
PartiesWilliam NALLY, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Parthasarathi GHOSH, et al., Defendants–Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

William Nally, Joliet, IL, pro se.

Before POSNER, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

POSNER, Circuit Judge.

The plaintiff is an inmate of Stateville prison in Illinois. His suit, filed in October 2013 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claims that the prison's medical staff was deliberately indifferent to the results of blood tests, administered over a period of more than five years, that indicated that he was either diabetic or prediabetic, or had progressed from prediabetic to diabetic during the period. There were eleven such tests in all. The first was in May 2005 and showed a glucose count of 121 mg/dl (milligrams per deciliter). The second, in March 2007, showed a count of 118. The third, seven months later, showed a count of 114. But the count in the fourth test, in February of the following year, was 200, and subsequent tests yielded counts of 160, 136, 137, 162, 124, 141, and 222. Nally alleges that not until the last of these tests was conducted, late in 2010, did he learn that his blood glucose counts were dangerously high—that he was either diabetic or en route to becoming diabetic. The district court, however, dismissed the suit as time-barred.

We need to distinguish between two types of glucose blood test—fasting and random. See National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases, “Diagnosis of Diabetes and Prediabetes,” http://diabetes.niddk.nih.gov/dm/pubs/diagnosis/ (visited August 5, 2015, as were the other websites cited in this opinion); National Institute of Health, “Comparing Diabetes Blood Tests,” www.niddk.nih.gov/health-information/health-topics/diagnostic-tests/comparing-tests-diabetes-prediabetes/Documents/Comparing_ Tests_for_DM_Chart_Only_508.pdf. The fasting test is administered at least 8 hours after a patient last ate, and for that test a glucose count of 100 to 125 means the patient is prediabetic and above 125 means that probably he's diabetic. In a random test (called “random” because it doesn't control for when the patient last ate), a score below 140 is normal, 140 to 199 is prediabetic, and 200 or higher means the patient has diabetes. Id.; National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases, supra, “How Are Diabetes and Prediabetes Diagnosed?”; Cleveland Clinic, “Diabetes–Prevention: How is Prediabetes Diagnosed?” http://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/diseases_conditions/hic_Diabetes_Basics/hic_Understanding_Pre–Diabetes.

Unfortunately, we know only what type of test the plaintiff took in May 2005—it was a random test and his glucose count, 121, was normal. But the counts in five of the eleven tests were abnormal (141, 160, 162, 200, 222) even if all the tests were random tests; if the three tests in which his glucose counts were 124, 136, and 137 happen to have been fasting tests, then eight of the eleven test results were abnormal.

Yet apparently Nally was not told by anyone on the prison staff that he was either diabetic or prediabetic. Whichever he was he required treatment but appears not to have received any. A prediabetic often can avoid or delay becoming diabetic by cutting his sugar intake in accordance with advice from a nutritionist, by dieting, and by increased exercise or other physical activity. Most people don't know the sugar content of the foods they eat, or that, for example, eating a lot of fruit at one time can overload the pancreas with sugar even though fruit is usually and rightly believed to be healthful. A diagnosis of prediabetes is a wake-up call to take measures to head off becoming diabetic. For the medical staff of a prison to know that an inmate is diabetic or prediabetic, yet not tell him, let alone do nothing to treat his condition, is, therefore, to be reckless (a synonym for deliberately indifferent): that is, to know there is a grave risk, to be able to do something about the risk at no danger or great cost to oneself, yet to do nothing. Deliberate indifference to a prison inmate's serious health problems is of course actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The district judge dismissed the suit as untimely on two grounds: because the defendant had known that he was diabetic or prediabetic in 2007, so that the two-year statute of limitations applicable to section 1983 suits brought in Illinois had expired before he sued (which remember was not until 2013), and because in any event he had sued more than two years after learning in November 2010 that his glucose counts were abnormal. These grounds for dismissal were erroneous.

The defendant now knows that he was diabetic or prediabetic in 2007, but there is no indication that he learned this until November 2010. True, he alleges that in 2009 his eyesight began to deteriorate rapidly and he suffered excruciating leg cramps and numbness in his left foot—all of which are possible symptoms of diabetes. Michael Dansinger, “High Blood Sugar, Diabetes, and Your Body,” WebMD (September 3, 2014), www.webmd.com/ diabetes /how-sugar-affects-diabetes?page=2. Yet he may not have known that these were possible symptoms of diabetes —or indeed that he was diabetic or prediabetic, for the symptoms first occurred in 2009 and as far as appears it was not until November 2010 that he learned that the defendants' failure to take any action in response to his abnormal glucose blood counts was the cause, or a likely cause, of the symptoms. The statute of limitations in federal tort suits starts to run when a person knows that he is injured and knows what caused his injury. United States v. Kubrick, ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • United States v. Jennings
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • 16 Junio 2017
  • Yang v. Watson
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana
    • 18 Noviembre 2021
  • McGhee v. Suliene, 15-cv-258-bbc
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Wisconsin
    • 11 Marzo 2016
    ...the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has found that court assistance in recruiting counsel is appropriate. Nally v. Ghosh, 799 F.3d 756, 758-59 (7th Cir. 2015); Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 784-85 (7th Cir.2015); Henderson v. Ghosh, 755 F.3d 559, 566 (7th Cir. 2014). Now that th......
  • Yang v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Wisconsin
    • 7 Diciembre 2021
    ...court to examine ‘the facts of conviction and the statutory definition of prior offense' for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).”); Yang, 799 F.3d at 756. For that reason, there would be no basis for Yang's trial attorney to seek to introduce evidence related to the specific facts of his predic......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT