Dringer v. Receiver of Erie Ry.

• Citation: 8 A. 811,42 N.J.E. 573
• Parties: DRINGER v. RECEIVER OF ERIE RY.
• Decision Date: 26 April 1887
• Court: New Jersey Court of Chancery

8 A. 811

42 N.J.E. 573

DRINGER

v. RECEIVER OF ERIE RY.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

April 26, 1887.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

On hearing on demurrer.

Cortlandt Parker, for demurrant.

William Prall and Thomas N. McCarter, for complainant.

VAN FLEET, V. C. The defendant demurs to the complainant's bill, for want of equity, and the question which this condition of the pleading presents is whether, taking every fact set forth in the bill to be true, a case is made which entitles the complainant to the relief he asks? The object of the bill is to obtain relief against a decree entered in this court on the mandate of the court of errors and appeals. This relief is asked on the ground of fraud; the charge of the complainant being that the decree against which he seeks relief was procured by fraud, and that, if there had been no fraud, there would have been no decree. The decree assailed was made in a suit brought by the present defendant against the present complainant.

Hugh J. Jewett, in 1876, as receiver of the Erie Railway, brought a suit in this court, against Sigmond Dringer, to recover the value of a large quantity of waste material, which it was alleged Dringer had obtained by fraud. Dringer was accused of having obtained from the employes of the receiver, under pretense of purchases, large quantities of waste material, far beyond the amounts actually purchased, and also, that, under the pretense of purchasing one class of material, he had possessed himself of another class, superior in quality and value to that actually purchased, thus defrauding the receiver both in the weights and value of the material obtained. Dringer, by his answer, denied all the frauds charged against him, and this court, on the final hearing of that cause, although entertaining painful doubts touching the honesty and fairness of many of the transactions charged to have been fraudulent, felt constrained, for the want of a sure conviction of the truth of the evidence mainly relied on to establish the fact of fraud, to dismiss the complainant's bill. Jewett v. Bowman, 29 N. J. Eq. 174. On appeal the decree of this court was reversed, the court of errors and appeals being unanimously of opinion that the frauds charged against Dringer were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Jewett v. Dringer, 30 N. J. Eq. 291. It is the decree which was made to carry this decision into effect that is assailed by the bill now on trial.

The court of errors and appeals, in its opinion, declared that the frauds charged were established by six different and distinct classes of proof. As the frauds on which the present bill rests consist in a charge that a certain book was fraudulently altered after it was received in evidence, thus making it furnish forged evidence of fraud, and that the effect of certain other evidence was so artfully and ingeniously misrepresented, on the argument before the court of errors and appeals, as to constitute a fraud on the court, it becomes necessary to state these different classes of proof in some detail, in order that it may be seen whether or not the decree in question is the direct product of the frauds alleged, and has no other foundation; for, I take it to be entirely clear that, unless the bill shows plainly and distinctly that, but for the frauds alleged, there would have been no decree,—in other words, that the frauds alleged produced the decree,—the complainant has no case. These different classes of proof will be stated in the order in which they appear in the opinion of the court.

The first class consisted of evidence, showing, that Dringer had on hand, when this court took possession by the appointment of a receiver, of the waste material found in his possession, over 4,000,000 of pounds of material, in excess of the quantity that his books showed that he had purchased.

The second class consisted of Dringer's acts and declarations. The court found, as facts satisfactorily proved, that Dringer had given bribes to the receiver's employes; that he was habitually present at Susquehanna when his material was weighed and loaded, and that he assisted both in weighing and loading it; that he sometimes had his material loaded at night, or out of business hours; that when at Susquehanna he put up at the house of the weigh-master, with the members of whose family he was on very intimate terms, and to some of whom he made presents; and that, in talking of his business relations with the receiver, he boasted that he was in with the right parties; they were his friends and would stand by him.

The third class consisted of evidence showing the size of the loads which were loaded for Dringer at Susquehanna, and the quality of the material of which his loads consisted.

The fourth class demonstrated to the satisfaction of the court that, although material of the same kind was sent to Dringer from both Jersey City and Susquehanna, and in cars of the same capacity, yet that it was almost icvariably the fact that the cars sent from Susquehanna contained a much less quantity of material than those sent to him from Jersey City.

I will describe the fifth in the language of the opinion of the court. It "is made up of several specific instances wherein the weights of car-loads, as set down in the vouchers from Susquehanna, are shown to be less than the true weights, ascertained by Dringer, by reweighing the loads for himself, when received by him at Paterson. These instances are found in a small weight-book kept by Dringer, which, after being offered and marked as an exhibit, before the vice-chancellor, appears to have been mislaid, so that the instances themselves were not brought to his notice in the argument before him."

The sixth and last class consisted of evidence showing that almost invariably car-loads of materials sent to Dringer contained a less quantity of material than cars of the same capacity, containing the same kind of material sent to other persons. The court, in epitomizing the evidence of this class, say that, "in August, 1875, twenty car-loads were sent to Dringer at Paterson, and three car-loads to a party at Jersey City. The average weight of Dringer's loads, as put down in the vouchers, is 19,210 pounds. The average weight of the others is 24,675 pounds,—a difference in Dringer's favor on each load of about two and a half tons." And the court, in giving another example furnished by this class of the evidence, say that, between March 5, 1875, and February 24, 1876, "there were sent to Dringer from the same shop one hundred and ninety-two loads, of which the average weight of each load, as set down in the vouchers, is 19,301 pounds. During the same period there were sent from the same shop, to other parties in Jersey City and Paterson, twenty-nine loads, of an average weight to each load of 24,916 pounds,—a difference in Dringer's favor on each of the one hundred and ninety-two loads of 5,615 pounds, or something over two and a half tons per load." The court were of opinion that this last class of the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt the fact of fraud, both in the weights and the quality of the goods.

These are the facts on which the decree assailed rests. Whether or not the evidence in support of them is sufficient to demonstrate their truth, or whether it has been rightly or wrongly understood or interpreted,—in short, whether these facts are true or false,—are questions with which this court has nothing whatever to do. They have been found to be true by the court of errors and appeals, and that finding must be accepted by this court as an unimpeachable finalty. The judgments of the court of errors and appeals cannot be reviewed by this court. The position of the two tribunals towards each other is directly the reverse. That court has authority to review and reverse the judgments of this court; but the only thing this court can do respecting the judgments of that court is to carry them into effect. That court not being a court of final process, a judgment pronounced by it, in a cause taken up by appeal from this court, is sent here to be carried into effect. And this court, in performing that duty, is required to confine itself strictly within its allotted sphere. It must not attempt in any way to evade, impede, or defeat the command of the superior tribunal. Jewett v. Dringer, 31 N. J. Eq. 586. And so rigorous is the rule in this regard that, if this court gives effect to the judgment actually pronounced by the court of errors and appeals, but not to the judgment entered on its record,—the judgment having been erroneously entered,—the action of this court will be reversed. As recently expounded, this is the rule which governs in such cases: "Like those of all other judicial tribunals, the records of this court, [namely the court of errors and appeals,] kept under its own supervision, must be taken as the infallible exponent of its mind, and as, in every respect, being correct. It is not alterable except under its own authority." Tuttle v. Qilmore, 42 N. J. Eq.—7 Atl. Rep. 859.

This court has, however, an original, inherent, and independent jurisdiction to give relief against fraud, whether it be perpetrated by means of a contract or a judgment or decree. While it has no power to sit in judgment on the lawful acts of other tribunals, and no jurisdiction to try their acts, to see whether they, in the exercise of their rightful powers, have committed errors, either of law or fact, yet its power to give relief against a judgment or decree which has been procured by fraud, whether it be the sentence of a tribunal standing above or below it, is beyond all question. Boulton v. Scott, 3 N. J. Eq. 231; Reeves v. Cooper, 12 N. J. Eq. 223; Tomkins v. Tomkins, 11 N. J. Eq. 515; Stratton v. Allen, 16 N. J. Eq. 229; Doughty v. Doughty, 27 N. J. Eq. 318.

As already stated, the decree in question is assailed on two grounds: First, it is alleged that a certain piece of documentary proof, put in...