Thomas v. Delaware, L. & W.R. Co.
Decision Date | 01 September 1881 |
Parties | THOMAS, Adm'x, etc., v. THE DELAWARE, LACKAWANNA & WESTERN R. CO. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
Spriggs & Mathews, for plaintiff.
J. D Kernan, for defendant.
WALLACE D.J.
The points raised by the defendant on its motion for a new trial are not well taken.
The instructions to the jury fully and correctly presented the law of the case. The plaintiff's intestate was killed while crossing the railroad track of the defendant at a private crossing where he had a right to be, and in regard to which the defendant was charged with the duty of exercising reasonable care for the protection of those entitled to use it. The evidence authorized the jury to find that the defendant was guilty of negligence in running its special train at a furious rate of speed across a crossing which it had obstructed by its freight cars, so that the view of an approaching train was intercepted, without ringing the engine bell or making other signal of approach. The deceased was not a trespasser, or mere licensee, in the use of the crossing. He had as much right there as the defendant had. The crossing was a private road, which existed before the railroad was constructed, for the use of the farm which the railroad divided, and for the use of tenants and the factory. The land of the defendant was servient to the easement which this road constituted. The rights and obligations of the deceased and the defendant, the one towards the other, were the same as though its crossing were a public highway, except the defendant was not required to make the statutory highway signals.
The jury were instructed that, although there was no statutory obligation on the part of the defendant to ring a bell upon approaching this crossing, they might find it was negligence to omit this when running at a high rate of speed, at a time when the view of the train was so far obstructed by the cars which had been permitted to remain upon the side-track as to render the use of the crossing peculiarly hazardous. The jury were also instructed that the defendants ordinarily had the right to maintain such a rate of speed as it might think proper, but that the condition of the crossing, for which the defendant was responsible, might impose some restrictions upon this right, and, under the circumstances, the jury might predicate negligence upon excessive speed. Upon all the facts it was left to the jury to determine whether the defendant failed to observe that measure of care which would be incumbent upon a prudent and intelligent individual under like circumstances. These instructions were as favorable as the defendant had any right to insist.
Railroad corporations may ordinarily maintain such rate of speed with their trains as they see fit. They may even permit their officers to enjoy the luxury of special trains, and dash over their roads with a single car almost noiselessly and at lightning speed. They may use their side-tracks near the intersection of highways or private roads for the storing of empty cars. While these things may not be agreeable to the general public, they are, nevertheless, within the privileges with which railroad corporations have been invested; and the public have no right to complain, because they are legitimately within these privileges. But when these privileges come in collision with the rights of those who use the highways or private roads to cross the railroad, they must five way; because, as to these persons, the railroad corporation is under the obligation of exercising reasonable care to prevent injury.
What is reasonable care, or, conversely, what omission of precaution is negligence, can only be defined by general propositions the application of which must depend upon the circumstances of the particular case.
In Continental Improvement Co. v. Stead, 95 U.S. 161, it is stated that travelers upon a highway which crosses a railroad, and the railroad company, have mutual and reciprocal duties and...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
West v. Northern Pacific Railway Company
... ... unnusual rate of speed. Beanstrom v. Northern Pacific. R ... Co., 48 N.W. 778; Thomas v. Delaware, etc. Ry. Co., 8 F ... Where ... the use of either the sense of ... ...
-
Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Lynn
... ... 509; ... Ferguson v. Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. (1885), ... 63 Wis. 145, 23 N.W. 123; Thomas v. Delaware, ... etc., R. Co. (1881), 8 F. 729; Farrell v ... Erie R. Co. (1905), 138 F ... ...
-
Czech v. Great Northern Railway Company
... ... E. Latham, J. J. Wooley and J. C. Tarbox, for ... respondent ... Thomas ... v. Delaware, 8 F. 729; Cordell v. New York, 70 ... N.Y. 119; Chicago v. Sanders, 154 Ill ... ...
-
Willis v. Pennsylvania R. Co.
...7 Craft v. Northern Pacific R. Co., C. C., 62 F. 735, 739; Robinson v. New York Central R. Co., C.C., 9 F. 877, 878; Thomas v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., C.C., 8 F. 729, 731; but see Hauss v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co., 6 Cir., 105 F. 733, 736. Cf. Moore, Facts, Sections 1117, 1109; 8 A.L.R. 796,......