Wood v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co.

Citation8 N.W. 214,51 Wis. 196
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin
Decision Date08 February 1881
PartiesWOOD v. CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & ST. PAUL RY. CO.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from circuit court, Crawford county.

Hazelton & Provis, for respondent.

John W. Cary and Thomas & Fuller, for appellant.

ORTON, J.

There was considerable conflict of evidence as to the origin of the fire which consumed the warehouse and the goods of the plaintiff therein. The evidence on this point was entirely circumstantial, and involved to some extent the credibility of witnesses, and at best falls short of proving with absolute certainty the origin of the fire; but we cannot say that the jury were not warranted in believing, from evidence making it strongly probable, that it originated from a kerosene lamp on a bracket attached to a window-casing in the telegraph office of the depot building, and left burning after midnight during the absence of all persons from the building. This question having been disposed of by the jury in their first finding, that the fire did originate from this kerosene lamp, there was still another question of equal if not of much greater importance, whether the defendant company was guilty of a want of ordinary care in so placing and leaving said lamp. The form of this question, which the jury answered in the affirmative, was as follows: “Was the leaving of a kerosene lamp burning in the office of the depot building such an act of carelessness, with reference to its liability to communicate fire, as would prevent a man of ordinary prudence, in the care of his own property, from having so left a lamp burning?” This question made the carelessness, or want of common care, of the defendant depend upon one act only, and that was the leaving of a lamp burning in the office of the depot building;” but it was materially qualified by the words, “with reference to its liability to communicate fire.”

This qualification opened to the jury a very wide field of necessary inquiry, and made their answer depend upon their finding many other facts besides the mere leaving of a lamp burning in the office of the depot building,” upon which other facts depended, and from which necessarily and naturally would follow this general conclusion, that the lamp was liable to communicate fire. Whether a burning kerosene lamp is liable to communicate fire depends altogether upon-- First, what kind of a lamp it was in material and construction; second, where and in what manner it was placed with reference to its proximity to any other burning material to which it could or would be likely to communicate fire; third, its exposure to currents of air or otherwise; fourth, the quantity and quality of the kerosene oil or other burning fluid in the lamp, and its liability or probability of explosion or otherwise. There was not a particle of evidence in respect to these important particulars upon which the jury could base even an opinion that this lamp was of such a character, as to position, construction, quantity or quality of oil it contained, or in any other respects, that it was “liable to communicate fire.” It is true that the jury found that the fire originated from the lamp, and without any very certain evidence that it did, and entirely from circumstantial evidence, and that confined to mere appearances, and the observation of some of the witnesses that the fire was first seen in the room, or that part of the building, where the lamp was left burning. This, to say the least, was not very conclusive evidence even of that fact, and yet the jury found from that fact alone that the defendant company was guilty of the want of ordinary care in leaving the lamp burning in that room, without a single other fact upon which such a finding could be predicated.

When the plaintiff's evidence was closed the learned circuit judge said, in the presence of the jury and the parties: “That on a certain night, between 12 and 1 o'clock, the night operator left the office and left a lamp burning; that the witnesses who first saw the fire say that it presented itself in the southeast corner of the building, which is the quarter where the telegraph office was, and the quarter where the lamp was left burning, and a lamp was left burning by a window that is in the partition between the waiting room and the operator's room. Now, that is the whole testimony. That is all there is. There is no testimony on the subject of danger of kerosene at that time, or the quality of kerosene used at that time, or the tendency of kerosene when left burning to explode in a...

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8 cases
  • Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Erickson
    • United States
    • Nebraska Supreme Court
    • 5 de junho de 1894
    ...Co., 44 Wis. 410; Ladd v. New Bedford R. Co., 119 Mass. 412; Steffin v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 46 Wis. 259; Wood v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 51 Wis. 196; Chappell v. Oregon, 36 Wis. 145; Payne Forty-second & Grand St. R. Co., 40 S.Ct. [N. Y.], 8; Smith v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 4......
  • Harris v. Cameron
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • 2 de fevereiro de 1892
    ...on the part of the defendant. The act or fact must be such that negligence can be directly and logically inferred from it. Wood v. Railway Co., 51 Wis. 196, 8 N. W. Rep. 214. The defendant's negligence must be proved, and cannot be presumed. Chamberlain v. Railway Co., 7 Wis. 367;Steffen v.......
  • Logan v. Freerks
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • 22 de abril de 1905
    ...Co., 7 Gray, 94; Nichols v. Munsel, 115 Mass. 567; Morrison v. Clarke, 7 Cush. 213; Brown v. King, 5 Metc. 173; Wood v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 51 Wis. 201, 8 N.W. 214; v. Railway Co., 46 Wis. 262; Lockwood v. Chicago & N.W. Railway Co., 55 Wis. 63, 12 N.W. 401. In dealing with his cl......
  • Lothrop v. Thayer
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 12 de janeiro de 1885
    ... ... 385. Williams v ... Jones, 3 H. & C. 256, 602. See Wood v ... Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul Railway, 51 Wis ... 196, 8 N.W ... ...
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