Stanton v. Louisville & N.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 30 January 1891
• Citation: 91 Ala. 382,8 So. 798
• Parties: STANTON v. LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

8 So. 798

91 Ala. 382

STANTON v. LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO.

Supreme Court of Alabama

January 30, 1891

Appeal from circuit court, Escambia county; JOHN P. HUBBARD, Judge.

Action by W. W. Stanton against the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company for damages to plaintiff's buggy and harness. The first count of the complaint sought to recover damages for the destruction and injury to his horse, buggy, and harness occasioned by the alleged negligence and omissions of duty by the employes of the defendant corporation. The second count was in the following language: "The plaintiff also claims of the defendant three hundred dollars damages, for that whereas, on, to-wit, the 15th day of March, 1889, the plaintiff, riding in his buggy, traveling on the public dirt road approaching its crossing of the track of said Louisville & Nashville Railroad, at or near the Pensacola junction depot, or Flomaton, in Escambia county and state of Alabama found trains of said railroad company standing on the track of said railroad across said public crossing, completely blockading and stopping up said public road crossing, so that plaintiff could not pass over said road at said public crossing with his said mare and buggy; and although the agent or employes of said railroad company at said point were requested to remove said trains from across said public road crossing, yet they failed and omitted for a half-hour or more to remove said trains so that plaintiff could pass over said crossing with his said mare and buggy, and proceed on his journey, and was thus delayed by the negligence of defendant and when said trains were at length removed, before he could drive or travel more than thirty or fifty yards over and past said railroad track on his journey, a running train of said defendant approached and came up at said public crossing, and although he was endeavoring to hold his said mare, said train so frightened her that she broke loose from plaintiff, and ran away with his said buggy and harness, and destroyed said buggy and harness, and greatly injured said mare, and put plaintiff to great trouble and inconvenience and expense in following up and repossessing his said mare; wherefore he says that, by the negligence and omissions of the duties of defendant's agents or employes, he is injured, and has sustained damages to the amount," etc. The defendant interposed demurrers to both counts of the complaint. The court overruled the demurrer to the first count, but sustained it as to the second. Upon the evidence adduced, the court, at the request of the defendant in writing, gave the general affirmative charge in favor of the defendant, and the plaintiff duly excepted. There was verdict and judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff brings this appeal.

J W. Posey, for appellant.

J. M. Falkner, for appellee.

COLEMAN J.

All pleadings must be as brief as is consistent with perspicuity and the presentation of the facts or matter to be put in issue in an intelligible form. No objection can be allowed for defect in form, if facts are so presented that a material issue in law or fact can be taken by the adverse party. Code § 2664. In the case of Railroad Co. v. Thompson, 62 Ala. 494, the complaint contained two counts, neither of which averred any special acts or omissions as constituting negligence. Each contained the general averment that the injury complained of was the result of the negligence or want of skill of defendant's employes in the management or running of said train, locomotive, cars, etc. It was held the complaint was sufficient. In Railway Co. v. Lazarus, the averment in the complaint was that "the engine was so negligently operated by defendant's agents that plaintiff's cow was killed, and that said cow was killed on account of said negligence." This was held to be sufficient, on the ground that any averment which shows that the negligence of the defendant either caused or reasonably contributed to the injury complained of, or that the injury resulted from such negligence is sufficient. 88 Ala. 456, 6 South. Rep. 877. Notwithstanding the liberal construction given to section 2664 of the Code, and applied to pleadings, if the facts averred prima facie show the damages claimed were not the natural consequences of the negligence complained of, or were too remote to be held as the cause of the damage, such pleadings are demurrable, although the complaint ends with the general averment that the injury complained of was the result of such...