Jennings v. Carson

• Citation: 2 L.Ed. 531,8 U.S. 2,4 Cranch 2
• Parties: JENNINGS v. CARSON
• Decision Date: 01 February 1807
• Court: United States Supreme Court

8 U.S. 2 4 Cranch 2 2 L.Ed. 531 JENNINGS v. CARSON. February Term, 1807

THIS was an appeal from the sentence of the circuit court for the district of Pennsylvania, in a cause civil and maritime, in which Jennings was the libellant, and Carson the respondent; the former claiming to be owner of the sloop George and cargo, captured, in the year 1778, by the American privateer Addition, commanded by Moses Griffin, of which the respondent, Carson, was part owner, and which was libelled and condemned, on the 31st of October, 1778, as lawful prize, by the court of admiralty for the state of New-Jersey; from which sentence of condemnation there was an appeal to the continental court of appeals, established under authority of the old congress, where the sentence of condemnation was, on the 23d of December, 1780, reversed, and restitution ordered, but never obtained. In the mean time, however, the vessel and cargo had been sold by the marshal of the state court of admiralty, for paper money, under an order of the court contained in the sentence of condemnation, and it did not appear what had been done with that money. No measures were taken to enforce the decree of restitution during the old confederation.

On the 19th of May, 1790, after the adoption of the present constitution of the United States, Jennings filed his libel in the district court for the district of Pennsylvania, alleging that he was a subject of the States

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General of the United Provinces, an inhabitant and domiciled at the island of St. Eustatius, and owner of the sloop George and her cargo, at the time of capture bound to the port of Egg-Harbour in the United States, and consigned to A. and G. Caldwell; in the prosecution of which voyage she was illegally captured by the privateer Addition, owned in part by the respondent, Carson, and praying process for arresting Carson, to answer, &c. A supplemental libel was filed, setting forth the proceedings against the vessel in the court of admiralty of New-Jersey; the sentence of condemnation; the appeal; the reversal of that sentence, and the order of restitution.

Neither the original nor supplemental libel prayed any specific or general relief, other than process for arresting Carson, so that he should appear to answer the libellant 'in his said complaint, of the wrongs and injuries aforesaid, according to the resolutions of the continental congress, the laws of the United States, and of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the laws and usages of nations in this behalf practised, used, and established.'

Carson, being taken upon the writ of arrest, appeared and filed his plea and answer, averring the sloop George to have been the property of a subject of the king of Great, Britain, at the time of capture, and employed in carrying goods to the British army and navy; that the goods were imported directly or indirectly from Great Britain or Ireland, contrary to the regulations of congress and the law of nations; the king of Great Britain then being at war with the United States.

It admits that Carson was the owner of one-third of the privateer. It admits the capture, the condemnation, and sale, the appeal and reversal, and the order of restitution, but denies that any part of the proceeds of the sale ever came to the hands of the owners of the privateer, or either of them, but remained in the hands of the marshal of the court of admiralty of New-Jersey, who alone is answerable for the same. It avers, that Griffin, the commander of the privateer, had probable cause for

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making the capture, and therefore the owners are not liable.

It denies the jurisdiction of the district court of Pennsylvania to take cognizance of the question, the same belonging exclusively to the court of admiralty of the state of New-Jersey, and to the court of appeals established by the continental congress. It denies the jurisdiction of the court as a prize court in any case, and especially in cases of capture made during the British war, and avers that it has no authority to carry into effect a decree of either of those courts established under the old government.

After filing his plea and answer, Carson died, and Jennings filed a petition, suggesting the death of Carson, and charging his executors with assets, and praying that the suit may stand revived against them; upon which a citation issued, and the executors appeared and answered generally by a reference to the answer and plea of their testator, and further pleaded, that by the law maritime, the law of the land, and the laws and ordinances of the United States, they, as executors, are not liable to be proceeded against in that court for the several matters set forth in the libel, for that they are not answerable for the wrongs and offences, or the pretended wrongs and offences of their testator; and also, for that courts maritime have not authority to intermeddle with the estates and effects, real or personal, of deceased persons, or to give relief against the same, or to seize or take the same effects or estates in execution, or to imprison the bodies of executors for the default of the testator.

To these pleas and answers there were general replications.

On the 30th of March, 1792, the judge of the district court gave an opinion in favour of its jurisdiction in general cases as a prize court; but on the 21st of September, 1793, he dismissed the libel, on the ground that the district court was not competent to compel the execution of a decree of the late continental court of

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appeals.^* This sentence was affirmed in the circuit court on the 11th of April, 1798, but was reversed by this court at February term, 1799, so far as the same

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decreed that the district court had not jurisdiction to carry into effect the decree of the court of appeals, and the cause was remanded to the district court for further

'The sale of the vessel and cargo at vendue, and the monies being received by the marshal of the court, in whose hands it is said they now remain in depreciated paper, not having been distributed to and among the captors, and of course the respondents, or their testator, received no part thereof, and therefore they allege that the marshal only is chargeable to the libellant, and not the respondents or the testator. They insist that there was probable cause of seizure, and therefore the captors are not answerable in damages. They also plead in abatement to the jurisdiction of the court, because they assert that the subject of prize or no prize belongs to the admiralty of New-Jersey, and not to this court, which has no cognizance of the question; nor has it power to effectuate its judgment against executors. On the part of the executors particularly, an answer was put in denying their being chargeable for the torts of the testator, which, as well as their consequences, die with his person. But on an explanation on the behalf of the libellant, that he claimed no damages for the tort, merely as a tort, but sought for restitution of his property only, the point was abandoned by the advocates for the respondents.

'The libellant, to repel this defence, and denying, in the usual form, the facts as stated, sets forth the reversal of the judgment of the court of New-Jersey, by the decree of the court of appeals of the United States, the 23d of December, 1780, which contains a direction to the latter court to make restitution of the property, with costs, but not damages. They also join issue on the point of jurisdiction, and distinguish between a suit commenced in the lifetime of the testator, and one brought in the first instance against the executors.

'Five points were made by the advocates of the respondents; 1. The tort dying with the person. 2d. The jurisdiction of this court is not competent, as it is not a prize court. 3d. and 4th. If a prize court, yet, as the cause originally attached in the court of New-Jersey, that was the only court in which the consequences were cognizable, and alone competent to effectuate the decree of the court of appeals. 5th. A capture with probable cause is not a subject of action for damages.

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proceedings; the respondent being at liberty to contend before that court, as matter of defence to the merits, or to the form of proceedings, that the libel should first

'The first point being waived, brings the question to the competency of jurisdiction, which in order, as well as necessity, should be the first point considered, because, if the court has no jurisdiction, it is nugatory to inquire into the merits of the cause. On this point, as it first struck me, I confess I had doubts. The account given by Lord Mansfield of the arrangement of the court of admiralty in England, as detailed in the case of Lindo & Rodney, produced hesitation, and my respect for the opinion of that great character, as well as the arguments of the advocates in the present cause, induced a deliberate consideration of the subject. The division of the court of admiralty into two sides, prize and instance, was new to me, and it is allowed not to have been generally known, if at all, by the common lawyers in England, before that case was determined. In this country it never was known, nor does it appear that any new commission was ever transmitted to the colonial judge of the admiralty from Great Britain before the revolution, in cases of wars between that kingdom and its enemies. I have traced from records and other authentic information, the proceedings of the admiralty court of Pennsylvania, for a period exceeding fifty years, and I have the best reason for believing that the practice in other colonies was similar. In all the proceedings, the prize suits are called suits civil and maritime. During the late war, when we assumed and effected our independence, the proceedings were unaltered in this point. I do not find that there is any such distinction in any other nation, except it should be found in Holland, and of this I...