Wright v. Southern Ry. Co.

• Citation: 80 F. 260
• Parties: WRIGHT v. SOUTHERN RY. CO. et al.
• Decision Date: 30 April 1897
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

80 F. 260

WRIGHT v. SOUTHERN RY. CO. et al.

United States Circuit Court, W.D. North Carolina.

April 30, 1897

B. F Long and L. S. Overmon, for plaintiff.

Charles Price, G. F. Bason, and L. C. Caldwell, for defendants.

DICK District Judge.

(A civil action to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's intestate by reason of the negligence of the defendant companies. At the close of the plaintiff's case, the counsel of defendants declined to introduce evidence in defense, and made a motion to the court for an instruction to the jury to render a verdict for the defendants on the issues of fact submitted to them. This motion is, in substance, a demurrer to the evidence, and admits the truth of the matters of fact shown by the testimony. As there is no conflict in the evidence of plaintiff, the question of negligence on the part of the defendants is a matter of law to be determined by the court.

The arguments of counsel were elaborate and forcible. Many authorities were cited, and diversities and conflicts of decisions were pointed out and commented upon. The diversities of many of these decisions resulted from the peculiar facts in each particular case. Notwithstanding the confusion in cases involving the liability of railroad companies to employes for injuries caused by the negligence of other employes, there are some principles well settled by numerous decisions of the state and federal courts. A person who enters into the service of a railway company impliedly assumes the risks and hazards usually incident to such employment, including liability to injury caused by the negligence of a fellow servant; and that he will exercise ordinary care to protect himself from obvious danger and injury while engaged in his employment. A railway company, as employer, impliedly engages with an employe that the place in which he is to work and the tools and machinery which are furnished him shall be reasonably proper and safe, and be kept in such condition during the time of employment, and that he shall be associated with suitable, competent, and sufficient fellow servants. A failure to properly discharge these obligations and duties renders the company liable for any injury resulting therefrom to an employe who may be injured without any contributory negligence on his part. This is a positive obligation on the company, and must be fully performed. If the company intrusts the performance of these special duties to an employe, who fails, by negligence or otherwise, to discharge them properly, he is a representative of the company, and not a fellow servant of another employe who may sustain consequent injury. When a railway company has once complied with its positive and implied obligations to its employes, and then exercises due care and diligence in such matters, it is not responsible for subsequent defects unless it has had actual or constructive knowledge of such defects and reasonable opportunity to supply the proper remedy. Constructive knowledge will be implied if defects are obvious to ordinary inspection, or have existed for an unreasonable time. There are separate and distinctive departments in railway service in which employes are engaged in different lines of employment, but in this case it is not necessary to consider questions of law as to the relations of employes engaged in these separate and distinct departments, as all the parties connected with the occurrence causing the injury were engaged in the department for the safe, prompt, and successful operation of the business of the railway company in the transportation of freights and passengers.

There are some differences of decision between the supreme court of this state and the supreme court of the United States as to the complex and unsatisfactory doctrines of fellow servants which have so frequently been subjects of discussion in the courts and in state legislatures. The counsel of plaintiff earnestly insisted that the contract of employment between the plaintiff's intestate and the defendant company was made and the service was rendered in this state, and that the construction of the terms of the contract and the legal implication arising from the employment should be in accordance with the laws of this state, where the cause of action arose. In Railroad Co., v. Baugh, 149 U.S 368, 13 Sup.Ct. 914, the court expressly decided that the question is not one of local law, to be settled by the decisions of the highest court of the state in which the cause of action arises; but is one of general law, to be determined by reference to all of the authorities, and a consideration of the principles underlying the relations of master and servant. In Finley v. Railroad Co., 59 F. 419, I attempted to distinguish the facts and principles involved in the case on trial from those presented in Railroad Co. v. Baugh, and follow the decision of the supreme court of this state in Mason v. Railroad Co., 111 N.C. 482, 16 S.E. 698. The circuit court of appeals overruled my views of the law of the case. Railroad Co. v. Finley, 12 C.C.A. 595, 63 F. 228. I now feel constrained to strictly observe the positive decisions of United States appellate courts, clearly expressed in learned and elaborate opinions.

The facts in the case now before us on trial are few and simple as there is no conflict, and...