Hosna v. Groose
| Decision Date | 04 April 1996 |
| Docket Number | 95-1328 and 95-1329,94-3686,94-3649,94-3579,94-3580,Nos. 94-3578,s. 94-3578 |
| Parties | Joseph Frank HOSNA, Appellee, v. Michael GROOSE; David Dormire; Jon W. Kirk; Daniel Kempker; Robert Acree, Appellants. Kelly NEAL, Appellee, v. Michael GROOSE; Gerald Bommell; Jack Kirk, Appellants. Max D. MILLER, Appellee, v. Michael GROOSE; David Dormire; Dick Moore; Steve Long; Gerald Bommell; Jack Kirk, Appellants. Joseph Frank HOSNA, Appellant, v. Michael GROOSE; David Dormire; Jon W. Kirk; Daniel Kempker; Robert Acree, Appellees. Donald E. MILLER, Appellant, v. Michael GROOSE; Jon W. Kirk; David Dormire; Gerald Bommell; Daniel Kempker; Betty Jaeger; John Doe; Robert Faith; James Eberle, Appellees. Kelly NEAL, Appellant, v. Mike GROOSE; Gerald Bommell; Jack Kirk, Appellees. Max D. MILLER, Appellant, v. Michael GROOSE; David Dormire; Dick Moore; Steve Long; Gerald Bommell; Jack Kirk, Appellees. Donald E. MILLER, Appellee, v. Michael GROOSE; Jon W. Kirk; David Dormire; Gerald Bommell; Daniel Kempker; Betty Jaeger, Appellants, John Doe, Robert Faith, Appellant, James Eberle, Defendant. Robert Don ARNOLD, Appellee, v. Dick MOORE; Gail Hughes; Steve Long; Michael Groose, Appellants. Robert Don ARNOLD, Appellant, v. Dick MOORE; Gail Hughes; Steve Long; Michael Groose, Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri; Scott Wright, Judge.
Geoffrey Preckshot, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), Jefferson City, MO, for Appellants.
Diane M. Breneman, Kansas City, MO, argued (William S. Ohlemeyer, on the brief), for Appellees.
Before MAGILL, GOODWIN, * and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Joseph Hosna, Donald Miller, Kelly Neal, Max D. Miller, and Robert Arnold (the Inmates) are prisoners housed in Missouri's Jefferson City Correctional Center's (JCCC) administrative segregation unit. 1 They brought separate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions against JCCC officials, seeking damages and injunctive relief for alleged equal protection violations because they enjoyed fewer privileges than inmates housed in protective custody. The district court consolidated the cases and denied damages, but granted partial injunctive relief. JCCC officials appeal the district court's grant of partial injunctive relief, and the Inmates cross-appeal the denial of full injunctive relief. Because we hold that no equal protection violation occurred, we reverse the district court's grant of partial injunctive relief.
JCCC is a maximum security prison housing approximately 2000 of Missouri's most dangerous criminals. Prisoners are assigned to three housing categories: general population, protective custody, and administrative segregation. General population allows inmates the greatest number of privileges. Inmates in general population may have food, changes of clothing, televisions, and radios in their cells, and are allowed to attend group religious services, work, visit the law library, attend classes, eat in a cafeteria, have telephone access, have recreation with others, and go to the canteen frequently. Inmates in protective custody have much the same privileges as general population inmates, but for their safety live in a communal setting completely segregated from the general population inmates. Protective custody inmates have canteen privileges twice per week.
Administrative segregation is the most restrictive confinement setting. For their own and others' safety, inmates in administrative segregation are housed in individual cells and kept separate from all other inmates at all times. Administrative segregation inmates have very few privileges. To reduce the likelihood of weapons being created or hidden, the type and amount of personal property permitted to administrative segregation inmates is severely limited. To reduce the possibility of danger by or to administrative segregation inmates, the inmates are allowed out of their cells only three hours per week for recreation. When out of their cells, inmates are handcuffed and escorted by guards. Inmates may not attend classes, religious services, or group recreational activities, they cannot work or visit the law library, they do not have telephone access for personal calls, their visitation privileges are more restrictive than that enjoyed by other inmates, and they have canteen privileges only twice per month.
Inmates are assigned to administrative segregation for a variety of reasons, including discipline, restraint of dangerous inmates and those prone to escape, medical quarantine, and additional security for inmates who would be unsafe in protective custody. The Inmates bringing this action are housed in administrative segregation by their own request, because they felt unsafe in both general population and protective custody. 2 They filed this lawsuit, arguing that they should be accorded the same privileges as inmates in protective custody, because they are in administrative segregation for their own safety rather than for disciplinary reasons. 3 The Inmates sought a variety of injunctive relief, including that they be allowed to have a greater array and quantity of personal possessions in their cells.
The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge for an evidentiary hearing. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Following the hearing, the magistrate judge determined that the JCCC officials had not violated the Inmates' right to equal protection, and recommended that all relief be denied. Assuming that the Inmates held in administrative segregation for their own safety were similarly situated to inmates in protective custody, the magistrate judge concluded that the limitations placed on the Inmates in administrative segregation were rationally related to legitimate penological interests. The magistrate judge found that
there is a direct correlation between the amount of property possessed and danger. Through testimony, the parties revealed that virtually any item possessed can be fashioned into a weapon. Defendants showed ropes made out of paper bed sheets, handcuff keys made from plastic silverware, and "stickers" made from any type of metal or plastic, including disposable razors and food cans, and other instruments, used to stab and cut people. Typewriters, television sets and radios have been disassembled and used as weapons and devices to jam door locks. Inmates have been able to manufacture brass knuckles and zip-guns. Knives are made from razor blades and wood. Cloth and paper bags of any kind can be used as "Cadillacs," a means to transport weapons or other items from one cell to another. With a little ingenuity, any item can be dangerous and threaten security. Even if an inmate did not use the item of property to manufacture a weapon, another inmate could obtain the property from that inmate and manufacture a weapon to use against others. Furthermore, the more property contained in a cell, the more difficult it is to search for contraband which might be used as a weapon, key or device to jam a lock. The prison has a duty to protect not only the inmates, but also the guards. The more property that is allowed, the harder it is to provide security for everyone.
Report & Recommendation of Aug. 23, 1993, at 7.
The magistrate judge rejected the Inmates' contention that restrictions on their property were irrational because they were victims, rather than aggressors. The magistrate judge found that the Inmates "are all dangerous individuals who have been convicted of serious offenses involving violence." Id. at 8. 4 The magistrate judge also found that
Plaintiffs demonstrated they had been able to work within the system to obtain dangerous items such as shards of glass, soda and tuna cans, bug spray, caustic cleaning supplies, razor blades, marbles, a variety of metal objects and food stuffs.
Id. at 10. 5
The magistrate judge concluded that Id.
Upon de novo review of the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation, the district court accepted the magistrate judge's findings of fact, and held that the defendants were not liable for money damages because they had not violated a well-established constitutional right. The district court rejected, however, the magistrate judge's conclusion of law that no equal protection violation had occurred due to the limitations on the Inmates' in-cell property privileges. The district court held that certain of the limitations imposed on the no-contact inmates are not justified by safety or security concerns or are an exaggerated response to such concerns. These no-contact protective custody inmates are not being punished; therefore, all reasonable efforts should be made to treat them on an equal basis with other protective custody inmates, if such efforts will not threaten the security or safety of the institution.
Order of Jan. 26, 1994, at 3-4. The district court remanded the case to the magistrate judge to determine appropriate injunctive relief.
After a second hearing, the magistrate judge recommended the grant of injunctive relief to meet some of the Inmates' requests. The magistrate judge first recommended that the frequency of the Inmates' access to the canteen be increased from once every two weeks to once every ten days. The magistrate judge also recommended that the Inmates be allowed to have the same quantity and type of food stuffs, stationary, and certain personal hygiene products as prisoners in protective custody. This included, for example, an increase in the number of Slim Jims from 0 to 6, bags of cookies from 1 to 5, fried pies from 1 to 6, and tubes of...
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