U.S. v. Staula

Citation80 F.3d 596
Decision Date05 March 1996
Docket NumberNo. 95-1882,95-1882
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Stephen J. STAULA, Defendant, Appellant. . Heard
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts; Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, U.S. District Judge.

Martin K. Leppo, Randolph, MA, for appellant.

Todd E. Newhouse, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, was on brief, Boston, MA, for appellee.

Before SELYA, STAHL and LYNCH, Circuit Judges.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

A federal grand jury charged defendant-appellant Stephen J. Staula, in relevant part, with being a felon in possession of a firearm (count 1) and ammunition (count 2), and with receiving a stolen firearm (count 3). See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), (j). Following a five-day trial, the petit jury convicted the appellant on all three counts. 1 The court imposed an incarcerative sentence.

In this appeal, Staula labors to convince us that the district court thrice erred in denying his motions to (i) dismiss the indictment for want of a speedy trial, (ii) suppress evidence, and (iii) direct judgment of acquittal. We are not persuaded that any error occurred.

I Background

We sketch the facts in the light most hospitable to the jury's verdict. See United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 711 (1st Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1063, 113 S.Ct. 1005, 122 L.Ed.2d 154 (1993).

During the early evening of September 13, 1993, officer David Tyrie of the Hanover police department stopped a pickup truck for patent violations of the state motor vehicle code. See Mass.Gen.L. ch. 90, § 6 (requiring, inter alia, a front license plate on every commercial vehicle); id. § 7 (requiring, inter alia, operable brake lights). The appellant proved to be the driver and registered owner of the ill-equipped vehicle. A female companion named Myriah Morse, later to become Staula's wife, occupied the passenger's seat.

Tyrie testified that he smelled burnt marijuana when he first approached the driver's side window to demand a registration certificate and operator's license. He then retreated to his cruiser with the documents and called for backup. After two other officers arrived, Tyrie revisited the vehicle and inquired whether the occupants had been smoking marijuana. He also asked whether they had any marijuana in the truck. Both Staula and Morse answered the queries in the negative.

Apparently unconvinced by these disclaimers and by Morse's volunteered statement that she recently had burned incense in the vehicle, Tyrie sought the appellant's consent to search the truck. After having been rebuffed, he ordered the appellant to alight, searched the driver's side of the cab (discovering no contraband), directed Morse to alight, searched the other side of the cab, and found two bags of marijuana behind the passenger's seat. Arrests followed all around.

Prior to impounding the vehicle, Tyrie conducted a standard inventory search and discovered a fully loaded handgun (which had been reported as stolen in November of 1992) and a box of ammunition behind the passenger's seat. The gun and ammunition were located within inches of the marijuana, and within easy reach of the driver. The weapon's hammer was cocked.

At trial, the appellant built his defense around the assertion that he lacked any knowledge of the drugs and weaponry. To this end, he presented the testimony of a friend, Ralph Nason, who claimed that he purchased the marijuana and, in a separate transaction, accepted the gun and ammunition from an acquaintance; borrowed the pickup truck from Staula on Saturday, September 11; placed the described articles in the vehicle; and then drove to New Hampshire. Nason supposedly remained there (with the truck and the contraband) until Sunday evening. He claims to have returned the truck to the appellant on Monday (only minutes before Tyrie made the traffic stop).

II Analysis
A. The Speedy Trial Act

The appellant's principal claim is that the prosecution did not bring him to trial within the time frame prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (the Act), and concomitantly, that the district court therefore should have dismissed the indictment. In this case, the speedy trial claim involves a straight question of law engendering de novo review. See United States v. Rodriguez, 63 F.3d 1159, 1162 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 681, 133 L.Ed.2d 529 (1995); see also United States v. Gallo, 20 F.3d 7, 11 (1st Cir.1994) (explaining that pure questions of law demand plenary appellate review).

The baseline premise of the Act is its requirement, embodied in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1), that a defendant is entitled to be tried within seventy days of his indictment or initial appearance before a judicial officer (whichever first occurs). See United States v. Hastings, 847 F.2d 920, 924 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 925, 109 S.Ct. 308, 102 L.Ed.2d 327 (1988). The premise cannot be taken literally, however, for the Act contemplates that certain periods of time will be excluded from the computation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h). An inquiring court therefore must follow a two-step process. First, the court must do the basic mathematics and determine the aggregate time elapsed awaiting trial. Second, it must determine how many days should be excluded from that ultimate sum. See United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1193 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2714, 129 L.Ed.2d 840 (1994).

Here, the salient dates and events are essentially undisputed. The speedy trial clock began to tick on October 26, 1994 (the date of arraignment). See id. (describing date of inception of speedy trial period). The clock stopped ticking on March 16, 1995 (the date on which the appellant filed his motion to dismiss under the Act). See United States v. Connor, 926 F.2d 81, 84 (1st Cir.1991) (holding that "a motion for dismissal [under the Act] is effective only for periods of time which antedate the filing of the motion"). Excluding March 16, see Rodriguez, 63 F.3d at 1163-64 (reiterating that the date on which a motion is filed is not counted), the aggregate period amounts to 140 days.

We now take the second step in the pavane. This step begins and ends with the appellant's motion to suppress. The appellant served this motion on November 17, 1994, and simultaneously requested an evidentiary hearing. The government filed an opposition. The magistrate judge assigned to hear pending motions reserved the suppression motion for the district judge. On March 22, 1995, Judge Tauro discussed the motion with counsel but made no ruling. On the day trial began (April 18, 1995), the judge denied the motion from the bench without convening an evidentiary hearing. He also denied the motion to dismiss primarily on the basis that the period between the filing of the suppression motion (November 17, 1994) and what he termed the "preliminary hearing" thereon (March 22, 1995) constituted excludable time under the Act.

The appellant challenges this ruling. He contends that the brief exchange on March 22 did not comprise a "hearing" for purposes of the Act. The point is significant because the Act provides that delay connected with a pending pretrial motion, "from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion," is excludable. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F). For motions that require a hearing, 2 this subsection excludes the time between the filing of the motion and the hearing on that motion, even if the delay is overlong, inexplicable, or unreasonable. See Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 329-30, 106 S.Ct. 1871, 1876-77, 90 L.Ed.2d 299 (1986); United States v. Johnson, 29 F.3d 940, 942-43 (5th Cir.1994); United States v. Clymer, 25 F.3d 824, 830-31 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Noone, 913 F.2d 20, 27 n. 10 (1st Cir.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 906, 111 S.Ct. 1686, 114 L.Ed.2d 81 (1991). Thus, if the March 22 encounter comprises a hearing within the purview of the Act, the district court appropriately excluded all the time accrued after November 17, 1994.

The Act itself does not define the term "hearing," and the case law on this point is relatively sparse. It is clear, however, that due process rarely demands full evidentiary hearings, see Doyle v. Secretary of HHS, 848 F.2d 296, 302 (1st Cir.1988) (collecting cases), and we are confident that something less than a full evidentiary hearing will suffice to engage the gears of § 3161(h)(1)(F). Two recent Fifth Circuit cases are instructive. In United States v. Tannehill, 49 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 167, 133 L.Ed.2d 109 (1995), the court declared that, at a minimum, "the term includes a situation in which the district court hears argument of counsel and considers [those arguments] prior to making its ruling." Id. at 1053. Utilizing this standard, the court held that a discussion of the merits of the defendant's motion at the outset of trial constituted a hearing for purposes of the Act. See id.

In United States v. Grosz, 76 F.3d 1318 (5th Cir.1996), a brief exchange concerning a pending motion occurred between the district court and counsel for the government (in which defense counsel, although present, did not play a part). See id. at 1322-23. Applying the Tannehill standard, the panel found this abbreviated colloquy to be a hearing within the purview of the Act. See id. at 1324-25. The court said that a hearing occurs whenever the district judge discusses the merits of a motion with counsel for the party against whom the ruling on the motion is ultimately rendered. See id.

In the case at hand, the trial court heard arguments put forward by the appellant's counsel in open court, on the record; questioned him; and gave him the opportunity to highlight salient facts. The court then gave the prosecutor a...

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