Brooks v. New Hampshire Supreme Court

• Decision Date: 04 March 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-2129,95-2129
• Parties: Troy E. BROOKS, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. NEW HAMPSHIRE SUPREME COURT, et al., Defendants, Appellees. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 633

80 F.3d 633

Troy E. BROOKS, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. NEW HAMPSHIRE SUPREME COURT, et al., Defendants, Appellees.

No. 95-2129.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard March 4, 1996.

Decided April 8, 1996.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire; Hon. Steven J. McAuliffe, U.S. District Judge.

Philip T. Cobbin, Canaan, NH, for appellant.

Stephen J. Judge, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Concord, NH, with whom Jeffrey R. Howard, Attorney General, was on brief, for appellees.

Before SELYA, Circuit Judge, CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge, and STAHL, Circuit Judge.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

Balancing responsibility between federal and state governments in a republic that assigns interlocking sovereignty to each often requires federal courts to walk an unsteady tightrope. From a federal court's perspective, this special sort of judicial funambulism always must proceed in the spirit of cooperative federalism tempered, however, by the need to avoid the pitfalls inherent in blind deference to state autonomy.

The case at hand implicates the division of responsibilities between federal and state judicial systems but does not require us to walk a very high wire. We need only tread on solid ground, previously paved by the United States Supreme Court, and apply the Court's teachings to the peculiar factual and legal terrain that underlies this appeal. Because that exercise persuades us that the district court performed its task in step with the principles enunciated by the Court, we affirm the order from which the plaintiff appeals.

I. BACKGROUND

We supply a thumbnail sketch of the relevant facts. In 1992, plaintiff-appellant Troy E. Brooks and Erica Bodwell, a member of the New Hampshire bar, engaged in an intimate relationship during a period when Bodwell was separated from her husband. Bodwell became pregnant. She obtained a divorce in late 1992, but the final decree made no provision for her unborn child.

Bodwell gave birth to a son in February of 1993 and subsequently initiated a paternity suit against Brooks in which she maintained that he was the boy's biological father. Brooks acknowledged paternity and the court entered a provisional order covering matters such as support, custody, and visitation.

Shortly thereafter, Bodwell reconciled with her ex-husband, moved to discontinue the paternity action, and, relying on the fact that the child was conceived while she was still married, sought refuge in the presumption of legitimacy. Brooks objected to the proposed dismissal of the paternity suit and set out to confirm his legal status as the boy's father. After numerous skirmishes concerning paternity (not relevant here), Brooks filed complaints with the New Hampshire Supreme Court Professional Conduct Committee (the Committee) against three attorneys, including Erica Bodwell, accusing them of flouting various ethical canons in their handling of the paternity suit. The Committee dismissed the complaints after conducting an investigation.

Brooks then sought to put to use in the paternity suit both the fact that a disciplinary complaint had been instituted against Erica Bodwell and certain evidence to which he became privy during the course of the Committee's investigation. His efforts were thwarted by a rule prohibiting the disclosure of knowledge obtained during the course of attorney disciplinary proceedings. See N.H.Sup.Ct.R. 37(17)(a) (1984). ¹ Brooks retorted by filing a pro se petition in the New Hampshire Supreme Court (the NHSC) in which he contended that Rule 37(17)(a) abridged his First Amendment right to free speech and asked that the rule be invalidated.

On March 23, 1995, the NHSC agreed to entertain Brooks' petition. The court scheduled briefing and oral argument (with the proviso that all matters connected with the proceeding remain confidential). Brooks then retained counsel, Philip Cobbin, who filed a brief on his behalf. The court accepted the case on a paper record once Brooks and his attorney refused to participate in oral arguments behind closed doors. The case has yet to be decided.

After the matter had been taken under advisement, Brooks, acting as his own attorney, sued the members of the NHSC and of the Committee (and others, for good measure, including the state bar association) in New Hampshire's federal district court. His complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief aimed at halting the enforcement of Rule 37(17)(a). In what amounted to anticipatory disregard of that rule, he attached a copy of the NHSC's order (agreeing to entertain his petition, but only in camera) to his federal court complaint. Attorney Cobbin subsequently entered an appearance for Brooks in the federal court and moved for a preliminary injunction designed (a) to freeze the paternity suit until the federal court had ruled on Brooks' constitutional claim, (b) to force the NHSC to dismiss Brooks' petition without prejudice, and (c) to prevent that court from exercising its contempt powers under Rule 37(17)(g) against Brooks. Without requesting the district court to seal the record, Attorney Cobbin included in the motion a copy of a brief filed in the confidential proceeding. Not surprisingly, the NHSC promptly directed the Committee to determine whether the lawyer had violated Rule 37(17)(a).

The district court refused to issue a preliminary injunction. The court reasoned that the proceeding pending in the NHSC called into play the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971); that Brooks' claim implicated an important state interest, namely, the administration of the attorney disciplinary system; that Brooks could obtain a full and fair hearing on his federal constitutional claim before the state tribunal; and that, therefore, the Younger doctrine disabled the district court from granting the requested relief. This appeal ensued. ²

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Technically, this is an appeal from the denial of a preliminary injunction, ³ and therefore the lower court's decision--assuming that it applied the appropriate legal standard--ordinarily must stand unless the appellant demonstrates an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Weaver v. Henderson, 984 F.2d 11, 12-13 (1st Cir.1993). If Younger applies, however, abstention is mandatory, see Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816 n. 22, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1246 n. 22, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976); Trust & Investment Advisers, Inc. v. Hogsett, 43 F.3d 290, 293-94 (7th Cir.1994); Fresh Int'l Corp. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 805 F.2d 1353, 1356 n. 2 (9th Cir.1986), and we must review de novo the essentially legal determination of whether the requirements for abstention have been met. See, e.g., Trust & Investment Advisers, 43 F.3d at 294; Kenneally v. Lungren, 967 F.2d 329, 331 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1054, 113 S.Ct. 979, 122 L.Ed.2d 133 (1993); Traughber v. Beauchane, 760 F.2d 673, 675-76 (6th Cir.1985). ⁴ That standard supervenes the abuse of discretion inquiry, and applies foursquare even though we are reviewing the district court's denial of injunctive relief. See Fieger v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 740, 743 (6th Cir.1996) (exercising de novo review in kindred circumstances); Goldie's Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Court, 739 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir.1984) (similar).

This usurpation of the customary standard of review does not create an awkward anomaly. The primary integer in the preliminary injunction calculus is the plaintiff's probability of success on the merits. See, e.g., Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Guilbert, 934 F.2d 4, 5 (1st Cir.1991). ⁵ This means, of course, that the plaintiff must show a likelihood of succeeding in the pending proceeding. When Younger applies, the district court must refrain from reaching the merits of the plaintiff's claims and, thus, there is no real possibility--let alone a likelihood--that the plaintiff will succeed in his action. A fortiori, there can be no abuse of discretion in refusing to grant preliminary injunctive relief.

III. ANALYSIS

Against this backdrop, we turn to a consideration of whether Younger abstention is appropriate in this case. Our analysis unfolds in four layers.

A.

The Younger doctrine welds principles of federalism and comity into a fulcrum that can then be used to achieve a proper balance between sensitive federal and state interests. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 44, 91 S.Ct. at 750. Based on these principles, the Younger Court articulated the federal judiciary's obligation to refrain from adjudicating the merits of federal claims where to do so would needlessly inject federal courts into ongoing state criminal prosecutions. See id. Doctrinal evolution over the next quarter-century brought other types of ongoing state proceedings, including civil actions and administrative adjudications, within the ambit of Younger abstention. See, e.g., New Orleans Public Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 367-68, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 2517-18, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989); Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627, 106 S.Ct. 2718, 2722, 91 L.Ed.2d 512 (1986).

Perhaps the most revealing elucidation of the balance that the Younger Court wished to achieve is found in Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982). There the New Jersey Ethics Committee instituted a disciplinary proceeding against a defense lawyer who, during a criminal trial, had made statements vilifying the judicial system. See id. at 428, 102 S.Ct. at 2519. The lawyer sued in federal court to block the disciplinary proceeding on the ground that the standards of professional conduct relied upon by the committee abridged his First Amendment rights. The district court abstained, concluding that the lawyer could raise his claims in the disciplinary proceeding and on subsequent judicial review. The Third Circuit reversed...