Arnold v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 30 May 1882 |
| Citation | 3 Ky.L.Rptr. 784,80 Ky. 300 |
| Parties | Arnold v. The Commonwealth. |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
1. The power of a court to punish in a summary way for contempt is as ancient as proceedings in court.
2. The circuit court had the power under section 3 article 27, chapter 29, General Statutes, to cause a jury to be summoned at once.
3. And the jury had the power to fine and imprison appellant in their discretion for obstructing and hindering the court from the discharge of its duties.
4. No indictment was necessary.
5. The replevin bond bears interest under the statute.
APPEAL FROM JESSAMINE CIRCUIT COURT.
P. B THOMPSON FOR APPELLANT.
1. The rule against appellant was in violation of article 4, section 5, of the constitution, which requires that the process shall be in the name of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
2. There should have been an indictment. (Section 13, article 13, Constitution.)
3. It was error for the replevin bond to bear interest.
P. W HARDIN, ATTORNEY GENERAL, FOR APPELLEE.
1. The statute does not require an indictment in this class of cases.
2. Section 8, article 17, chapter 29 does require an indictment before proceeding against persons violating it, but in this case it is not provided for, nor is it necessary.
In August, 1880, during the progress of a trial in the Jessamine circuit court, under an indictment against James H. Arnold for murder, the appellant, Isaac H. Arnold, with force and arms, and in open court, obstructed the proceedings in the case, and was committed to the jail of Jessamine county to await the action of the grand jury. On the next day a rule was issued against the appellant, requiring him to show cause why he should not be fined and imprisoned, or both, at the discretion of a jury, for the contempt of hindering and obstructing the court and its proceedings by forcibly assaulting the attorney for the Commonwealth while engaged in open court in the discharge of his official duties.
The appellant appeared, pleaded not guilty, and the jury empaneled to try the issue said he was guilty, and fixed his punishment by a fine of $1,000, and imprisonment for 12 months. After going to jail he replevied the fine as authorized by the statute, and, execution having issued on the replevin bond, upon a written notice to the attorney for the Commonwealth, he moved to quash the replevin bond and the execution--
First. Because the rule issued was in violation of article 4, section 5, of the constitution, not being in the name of and by the authority of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and against the peace and dignity of the same.
Second. The judgment is void under article 13, section 13, of the constitution, because no indictment was found by the grand jury against him.
Third. Because the replevin bond is made to bear interest.
As to the first ground relied on, it is sufficient to say that a mere rule for contempt or orders emanating from a court during the progress of a trial are not required to issue in the name of the Commonwealth, and we are aware of no law, constitutional or otherwise, requiring such proceedings to show anything more, so far as the style of the proceeding is concerned, than that it was issued by authority of the court in which the proceedings are to be had, and against the party required to answer. The solution of the entire question depends, however, upon the disposition made of the second objection urged by counsel, viz: that the appellant should have been first indicted by a grand jury of the county where the offense was committed. That the assault made upon the attorney for the commonwealth was an offense at the common law cannot be denied, but we do not understand that this is the gravamen of the offense, but it consists in the contempt offered the court by making the assault during the progress of the trial.
It is conceded that the court has the inherent power to punish by fine and imprisonment for such a contempt, and it might be added the legislature has no power to take from a court the power to protect itself against such flagrant contempts as was offered the court in this particular case; and to sanction the exercise of such legislative action would, in effect, defeat the administration of justice,...
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