Hebner v. Great Northern Railway Company
| Citation | 80 N.W. 1128,78 Minn. 289 |
| Decision Date | 08 December 1899 |
| Docket Number | 11,845 - (129) |
| Parties | D. H. HEBNER v. GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY |
| Court | Supreme Court of Minnesota (US) |
Action in the district court for Ramsey county to recover $15,000 damages for libel. The case was tried before Otis, J., who directed a verdict in favor of defendant; and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, plaintiff appealed. Affirmed.
Libel -- Record of Railway Employee -- Publication.
Defendant railroad company kept a book in which was written a record of each of its employees, and, if discharged, for what reason. Against plaintiff's name in this book, and under the heading of "Remarks," appeared the words "Dismissed; insolent and abusive to company's patrons." The only publication of the words was that when plaintiff applied to the superintendent of telegraphs for what is called a "service card," the book was brought to the office, and read by one clerk in the presence of another and the superintendent and the plaintiff, that the card might be filled out. This was done, and the card, as filled, and on which appeared the derogatory words, was signed by the superintendent, and then handed to plaintiff. The record was kept for the information of those whose business it was to employ men for defendant's service. Held, as a question of law, that the communication was of a privileged character, and made upon a privileged occasion; the prima facie effect thereof being to overcome and rebut the quality or element of malice, and to cast upon plaintiff, in an action for libel, the necessity of showing malice in fact.
Privileged Communication.
A communication, to be privileged, must be made upon a proper occasion, from a proper motive, and must be based upon reasonable or probable cause. When so made in good faith, the law does not imply malice from the communication itself, as in the ordinary case of libel. Actual malice must be proved, before there can be a recovery, and in the absence of such proof the plaintiff cannot recover.
Malice -- Want of Probable Cause.
Held, in the case at bar, that the evidence failed to show want of probable cause, such as would justify a reasonably prudent man in making the entry, and that the fact of malice, essential to plaintiff's recovery, was not established.
T. J. McDermott and S. L. Pierce, for appellant.
C. Wellington, for respondent.
Action for libel, and at the conclusion of the trial a verdict was directed and returned in favor of the defendant corporation.
Plaintiff had been in its employ at Browns Valley, as a telegraph operator and station agent, for about four years prior to the alleged publication, and was then discharged. As was the custom of defendant with all of its employees, a record of plaintiff's service, and the reason for his discharge, was kept in the general office, and from the record it appeared that he had been insolent and abusive to the patrons of defendant company. It was also the custom of the company to issue, on the request of any person who had left its employ, what was known as a "service card," in which appeared a part of this record, and such a card was issued to plaintiff. It was signed by the superintendent of the defendant's telegraph lines, and under the heading of "Remarks" were the words: "Dismissed; insolent and abusive to company's patrons." It was held below that there had been a sufficient publication of these words by reading the written record in the presence of clerks in the superintendent's office when plaintiff applied for his service card, and also that they were libelous on their face, if untrue; and it is conceded on this appeal that the only question to be determined is whether the evidence adduced at the trial would have warranted the jury in finding that the defendant, when publishing these words of and concerning plaintiff, was actuated by malice, or did otherwise than a reasonably prudent man would have done under the same circumstances.
It was undisputed that the object of the defendant in keeping a record of each of its employees, and, in case men had been discharged, for what reason, is that those having to employ may be properly advised of the qualifications or disqualifications of all who have theretofore been in the defendant's service. The absolute propriety and necessity of having this information, where it is accessible to those whose work it is to select the hundreds of men capable of properly performing arduous and responsible duties in connection with defendant's business as a common carrier, is obvious. It was also undisputed at the trial that the real purpose of the service card is to assist men to obtain employment when going from one company to another, although such a card might prove a very serious obstacle to securing a new position when presented by a man discharged for cause or supposed cause, because the reason for such discharge would be stated. It is also beyond question that such a card may or may not be shown by one seeking employment, for this is a matter optional with the holder.
It stands conceded that this was a highly-privileged communication, and that, in the absence of express malice on its part, there could be no recovery as against defendant. It was made upon a subject-matter in which the person communicating it had a deep interest, as well as a duty to perform, and was made to a person having a corresponding interest and duty. If one of defendant's servants had demonstrated his unfitness for a position held by him, it was for its interest, as well as for the interest of the public that steps should be taken which would render the servant qualified and capable, or that he be dismissed. It would not only be for the interest of the company to remedy the evil, and to act so as to stop all future complaints, but it would be a matter of duty to the public. The record was made in one of the books of the corporation, kept for its own information, and the only publication complained of was when the record was communicated by one of the clerks employed by defendant in the office of...
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