80 S.E. 608 (S.C. 1914), Kendrick v. Northwestern R. Co. of South Carolina
|Citation:||80 S.E. 608, 96 S.C. 339|
|Opinion Judge:||GARY, C.J.|
|Party Name:||KENDRICK v. NORTHWESTERN R. CO. OF SOUTH CAROLINA.|
|Attorney:||Lee & Moise and Purdy & Bland, all of Sumter, for appellant. Geo. D. Levy and J. H. Clifton, both of Sumter, for respondent.|
|Case Date:||January 12, 1914|
|Court:||Supreme Court of South Carolina|
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Sumter County; Ernest Gary, Judge.
"To be officially reported."
Action by Gabriel R. Kendrick against the Northwestern Railroad Company of South Carolina. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appeals. Affirmed.
The complaint contains two causes of action for compensatory and punitive damages, alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff, through the wrongful acts of the defendant, whereby he suffered injuries resulting in the loss of his arm. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, on the first cause of action, for $1,500 actual damages, and for the defendant, on the second cause of action.
[96 S.C. 340] The defendant appealed upon two exceptions, the first of which assigns error on the part of his honor, the presiding judge, in refusing to charge the defendant's request that the complaint does not allege that either of the injuries therein mentioned was caused by the lack of skill, or by the incompetency of the engineer. His honor, the circuit judge, stated to the jury that it was of no use for him to tell them what the plaintiff alleged in his complaint; that he was going to give them the complaint in order that they might read it and see for themselves what it contained. The allegations of the complaint were not indefinite or uncertain, and the precise nature of the charge was apparent. Therefore it was only necessary for the presiding judge to allow the jurors to read the complaint in order that they might see for themselves what it contained. So that, even if there was error, it was not prejudicial.
The second exception was as follows: "Because his honor, the presiding judge, erred in charging the jury as follows, viz.: 'But if he was injured through the negligence of the defendant in not furnishing him a reasonably safe appliance, or reasonably safe way to get on top of the car, and he was injured in attempting to get to his place where he belonged, where he was required to go, and as a result the handhold gave way and he was precipitated to the ground and injured in that way, that would be...
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