State v. Jenkins

• Decision Date: 25 June 2002
• Docket Number: AC22200
• Citation: 800 A.2d 1200
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. BENJAMIN JENKINS22200 THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v BENJAMIN JENKINS

No. AC 22200

THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

Argued April 1, 2002

June 25, 2002

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Hartmere, Fasano, Js.)

Felix Esposito, for the appellant (defendant).

Timothy J. Sugrue, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and James G. Clark, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Foti, Bishop and Shea, Js.

Opinion

Foti, J.

The defendant, Benjamin Jenkins, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of murder in violation of General Statutes 53a54a (a) ¹ and 53a-8, ² and two counts of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes 53a-59 (a) (5). ³ The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of ninety years incarceration. On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the court improperly denied his requests to dismiss his attorney and (2) prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of a fair trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. In the early evening hours of December 21, 1998, several individuals were congregated on the sidewalk in front of a package store in New Haven. The defendant apparently had had a disagreement with someone who he believed was standing in that vicinity. The defendant, carrying a firearm and accompanied by another man, suddenly approached the group on foot. He raised his firearm and showered the group with gunfire. ⁴ As people began to flee, bullets struck Lamont Coleman, George Kimpson and Marcus Warner. Coleman and Kimpson sustained serious physical injuries as a result of the shooting; Warner, whom the defendant shot in the head, subsequently died as a result of his injuries.

After the shooting, the defendant and his accomplice fled the immediate scene on foot. Police were dispatched to the shooting scene. As one officer in a vehicle responded within minutes, the defendant's vehicle sped by. ⁵ The officer activated his vehicle's overhead lights, but the operator of the defendant's vehicle did not stop. Despite the fact that the officer took note of the vehicle's license plate number, he did not engage in a protracted, high-speed pursuit of the vehicle and eventually lost sight of it. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary to resolve the issues on appeal.

I.

The defendant first claims that the court, in violation of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution ⁶ and article first, 8, of the constitution of Connecticut, ⁷ improperly denied his oral and written motions to dismiss his counsel. We disagree.

The following additional facts are relevant to the defendant's claim. During the course of the trial, Thomas Conroy, an attorney and special public defender, represented the defendant. The record reflects that on January 19, 2000, during a hearing on a motion for bond reduction before Judge Fasano, the defendant interrupted the proceeding and personally addressed the court. The defendant stated: ''I want to talk to you because it ain't coming out the way that I really want you to hear it.'' The defendant complained that Conroy was misstating his criminal record. He further informed the court that he wanted to clear his name and that ''I'm not gettin' no help, you know what I mean, as far as legally, you know what I mean.'' The defendant did not make a motion to dismiss his counsel, and the court took no action as to those statements.

By way of a handwritten letter, dated January 30, 2000, addressed to the court, the defendant requested that the court appoint a special public defender to represent him. He also stated: ''My present public defender is not providing the legal representation I need in this serious case I've been accused of. I need someone thoroughly equipped to help me in this matter.'' (Emphasis in original.) Judge Fasano treated the defendant's letter as a motion to dismiss counsel and conducted a hearing on the motion on March 1, 2000.

The court asked the defendant why he desired a different attorney to represent him. The defendant replied: ''I don't know nothing about when the trial is approaching, but I've been wanting to fire the man since I first--the second time meeting him. I mean he's totally--he's not representing me. I don't even--it don't even seem like he even went to school to be a lawyer cause he don't do nothing.'' The defendant made non-specific allegations as to Conroy's preparation of his defense, what he perceived to be Conroy's lackluster performance, and a poor relationship between himself and Conroy. The defendant clearly indicated his desire not to be represented by Conroy. Conroy represented that he was working with an investigator and that his investigation would be complete by the time of trial. The defendant complained that the investigator lacked knowledge of the case and was not helping the defense.

In a memorandum of decision, Judge Fasano denied the defendant's motion to dismiss counsel. The court recognized the defendant's displeasure with Conroy, but noted that ''[the defendant] has not provided the court with any legitimate basis or specific reason to grant his motion . . . other than general comments regarding his view of the representation to this point.'' The court noted Conroy's trial experience, his efforts to that point in the proceedings and concluded: ''A change of counsel at this point would be a disservice to the defendant and is simply uncalled for under the circumstances here.''

On May 12, 2000, the parties appeared before Judge Hartmere to conduct jury selection. Conroy informed the court that he had received a notice from the statewide grievance committee that the defendant had filed a complaint against him. Conroy indicated that despite the complaint, he did not know of a reason to discontinue his representation of the defendant. The court responded to that representation by informing the defendant that Conroy was a capable and experienced trial attorney. The court further informed the defendant that the case now was in the trial phase and that the court would not countenance any delay in the proceedings.

The defendant responded to the court's remarks by indicating that he was displeased that Conroy had waived the defendant's right to a probable cause hearing. Despite the fact that on March 30, 1999, before Judge Fasano, the defendant waived his right to a probable cause hearing, he stated on May 12, 2000, that he did not want to do so. The court reminded the defendant that the decision to waive the hearing was a common and tactical legal decision made by Conroy on the defendant's behalf. The court explained that the defendant had agreed with that decision at the time that it was made and that the court would not revisit the issue. The defendant argued that he did not feel comfortable with Conroy's representation and that he had the right to be represented ''the way I want to be represented.'' The court thereafter stated: ''Mr. Conroy has been appointed a special public defender for you. You don't get to choose your attorney in terms of special public defenders. Mr. Conroy says there is no conflict. I will accept his representation . . . that he can represent you ably, and he is a very competent trial attorney, which I've said. So, we are going to continue.''

On May 16, 2000, Conroy informed the court that the defendant again wanted personally to address it to convey his displeasure with the manner in which Conroy had been participating in the jury selection process. The defendant told the court that Conroy did not want his assistance and that he was not communicating with him. He also told the court that he had been trying to retain private counsel, but that it was costly to do so. The court told the defendant: ''You're not in the process of getting a lawyer; you have a lawyer, and you're on trial.'' The court informed the defendant that Conroy had been asking legally appropriate questions during the voir dire process and that the court did not understand the defendant's complaint. The court stated: ''I don't know what in the world you're talking about . . . .'' The defendant stated: ''I'm seeing it from a different angle. It's my life, and I feel I'm not getting the representation that I need . . . .'' The court reiterated that Conroy had been performing in a satisfactory manner during the jury selection process and that it would proceed with the trial.

The defendant now claims that Judge Fasano improperly denied his written motion to dismiss counsel and that Judge Hartmere improperly denied his oral requests to dismiss counsel. We begin our analysis of the defendant's claims by setting forth the general standards on which to review them.

''Our state and federal constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to assistance of counsel. U.S. Const., amend. VI; Conn. Const., art. I, 8.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Webb, 238 Conn. 389, 417, 680 A.2d 147 (1996). ''The United States Supreme Court has definitively held that due process requires that the accused have the assistance of counsel for his defense.... Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 28, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1972). The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. . . . Id., 31.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cohens, 62 Conn. App. 345, 353, 773 A.2d 363, cert. denied, 256 Conn. 918, 774 A.2d 139 (2001). ''This state has had a long history of recognizing the significance of the right to counsel, even before that right attained federal constitutional importance.'' State v. Stoddard, 206 Conn. 157, 164, 537 A.2d 446 (1988).

''The standard when reviewing a denial of a request for alternate counsel . . . is whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining that a factual basis did not exist for...