Johnson v. McNeil, Kno-01-776.
Decision Date | 21 June 2002 |
Docket Number | No. Kno-01-776.,Kno-01-776. |
Citation | 800 A.2d 702,2002 ME 99 |
Parties | Deborah J. Ames JOHNSON v. William McNEIL Jr. et al |
Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Randal E. Watkinson (orally), Strout & Payson, Rockland, for appellant.
Frederick M. Newcomb, III (orally), Newcomb, Reynolds & Wells, PA, Rockland, for appellees.
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, ALEXANDER, CALKINS, and LEVY JJ.
[¶ 1] Deborah J. Ames Johnson appeals from a summary judgment entered in the Superior Court (Knox County, Marden, J.) in favor of William McNeil Jr. and Eric McNeil. The Superior Court concluded that Johnson could not proceed with a mortgage foreclosure action against the McNeils because the statute of limitations barred a suit on the underlying note. Because we agree with Johnson's contention that a real estate mortgagee is not precluded from foreclosing on a mortgage deed even though a separate action on the note evidencing the debt is barred, and because the undisputed facts in this case establish that Johnson is entitled to a summary judgment on her foreclosure, we vacate the judgment and remand for entry of a judgment of foreclosure in favor of Johnson.
[¶ 2] In October of 2000, pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. §§ 6321-6325 (Supp.2001), Johnson brought a claim against Movita Horton, f/k/a Movita McNeil, William McNeil Jr., and Eric McNeil (collectively, the "McNeils"), seeking to foreclose her mortgage on a parcel located on Matinicus Island.1 The McNeils answered the complaint, pled affirmative defenses, and counterclaimed for a judgment declaring that Johnson's foreclosure claim was time barred and that Eric McNeil was the true record owner. Both parties asserted that they were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law and moved for a summary judgment.
[¶ 3] The M.R. Civ. P. 56(h) statements filed by the parties establish the following undisputed facts: In October of 1980, William McNeil and Horton purchased an interest in real estate on Matinicus Island from Johnson. As consideration for the conveyance, William and Horton executed and delivered to Johnson a promissory note in the principal amount of $1232.59, with a thirteen and one-half percent (13.5%) interest rate. The note calls for monthly installment payments of $18.75, and payment in full within ten years. No payment on the note was ever made.
[¶ 4] The note was secured by a real estate mortgage on the Matinicus Island property. The mortgage deed, which was properly recorded, was dated and acknowledged on October 31, 1980. The mortgage deed states that it secures a promissory note "bearing even date" made out for an amount equal to $1232.59.
[¶ 5] The mortgage deed's defeasance clause states in pertinent part:
Provided [n]evertheless, that if [the grantors] pay to the [grantee] the sum of [$1232.59] with interest thereon at the rate set forth in a certain promissory note of even date herewith and secured hereby, all in accordance with the provisions of said note ... then this Deed, as also one certain promissory note bearing even date with these presents, given by the [grantors] to the [grantee] to pay the sum and interest at the time aforesaid, shall be void, otherwise shall remain in full force.
[¶ 6] One year prior to the commencement of this suit, William McNeil transferred the mortgaged real estate to his son Eric McNeil.
[¶ 7] Based on these facts the Superior Court entered a summary judgment in favor of the McNeils, reasoning that, because the limitations period for the enforcement of the note had expired, Johnson is barred from bringing this action to foreclose the mortgage. Johnson's appeal followed the entry of the judgment.
[¶ 8] On appeal from a summary judgment, we consider only the portions of the record referred to and the material facts set forth in the Rule 56(h) statements "to determine whether `there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the successful party was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Levine v. R.B.K. Caly Corp., 2001 ME 77, ¶ 4, 770 A.2d 653, 655 (quoting Handy Boat Serv., Inc. v. Prof'l Servs., Inc., 1998 ME 134, ¶ 16, 711 A.2d 1306, 1310). We examine these facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Johnson v. Carleton, 2001 ME 12, ¶ 11, 765 A.2d 571, 575.
[¶ 9] Both parties concede that an action on the note is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See 11 M.R.S.A. § 3-1118(1) (1995) ( ). Johnson, however, contends that she, as a mortgagee, may bring a civil foreclosure action pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. §§ 6321-6325, even though an action on the note evidencing the debt that the mortgage secures is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. We agree.
[¶ 10] Maine follows the title theory of mortgages. See First Auburn Trust Co. v. Buck, 137 Me. 172, 173, 16 A.2d 258, 260 (1940) ( ). A mortgage is "a conditional conveyance vesting the legal title in the mortgagee," with only the equity of redemption remaining in the mortgagor. Martel v. Bearce, 311 A.2d 540, 543 (Me.1973).
[¶ 11] Gilman v. Wills, 66 Me. 273, 275 (1877).
[¶ 12] In Joy v. Adams, 26 Me. 330, 332-33 (1846), we decided the same issue presented in this case. In Joy, the mortgagor gave the mortgagee a mortgage to secure three separate promissory notes. Id. at 332. After the death of the mortgagee, the mortgagee's executrix attempted to foreclose on the mortgage due to the debtor's default on the three notes. Id. The limitations period for actions on the notes had expired. Id. Even though the mortgagor could not be held liable in a suit on the notes, we concluded that the mortgagee's executrix could still foreclose on the mortgage by taking possession of the collateral and holding it until the debt was paid, or if the debt was not paid within the expiration of the redemption period, by keeping the property in satisfaction of the debt. Id. at 333.
[¶ 13] Thus, the running of the period of limitations during which the provisions of the note may be enforced does not eliminate the existence of the debt obligation itself, nor does it abrogate the mortgage securing the debt or affect the foreclosure remedies available to the mortgagee. Id. See also NELSON & WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 16.11, at 572 (2002) ( ...
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...the portions of the record referred to and the material facts set forth in the parties' Rule 56(h) statements. See e.g., Johnson v. McNeil, 2002 ME 99, ¶ 8, 800 A.2d 702. II. Town of Kennebunkport's Motion for Summary Judgment on Count I of its Counterclaim. The Town's Motion for Summary Ju......
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Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport
...the portions of the record referred to and the material facts set forth in the parties' Rule 56(h) statements. See e.g., Johnson v. McNeil, 2002 ME 99, ¶ 8, 800 A.2d 702. II. Town of Kennebunkport's Motion for Summary Judgment on Count I of its Counterclaim. The Town's Motion for Summary Ju......
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Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport
...the portions of the record referred to and the material facts set forth in the parties' Rule 56(h) statements. See e.g., Johnson v. McNeil, 2002 ME 99, ¶ 8, 800 A.2d 702. II. Town of Kennebunkport's Motion for Summary Judgment on Count I of its Counterclaim. The Town's Motion for Summary Ju......
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Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport
...only the portions of the record referred to and the material facts set forth in the parties' Rule 56(h) statements. See e.g., Johnson v. McNeil, 2002 ME 99, ¶ 8, 800 A.2d II. Town of Kennebunkport's Motion for Summary Judgment on Count I of its Counterclaim. The Town's Motion for Summary Ju......