Woodrick v. Hungerford, 85-2567

• Decision Date: 01 October 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-2567,85-2567
• Citation: 800 F.2d 1413
• Parties: Andrew J. WOODRICK, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Captain Peter B. HUNGERFORD, U.S.A.F., et al., Respondents-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 1413

800 F.2d 1413

Andrew J. WOODRICK, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Captain Peter B. HUNGERFORD, U.S.A.F., et al., Respondents-Appellants.

No. 85-2567.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 1, 1986.

John P. Schnitker, Atty., Appellate Staff, John F. Cordes, Atty., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Major James M. Kinsella, Gen. Litigation Div., Office of The Judge Advocate Gen., Washington, D.C., for respondents-appellants.

John M. Economidy, San Antonio, Tex., for petitioner-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before GEE, POLITZ, and GARWOOD, Circuit Judges.

GEE, Circuit Judge:

In the spring of 1980, Andrew Woodrick, a student at Memphis State University, discussed with representatives of the on-campus Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps (AFROTC) program the possibility of his entering that program with the ultimate goal of earning an officer's commission and his wings as a pilot. In 1980, as a result of these discussions, Woodrick underwent a Department of Defense physical examination for the purpose of determining whether he was medically qualified for entry into a pilot training program upon receiving a commission. That examination determined that he was so qualified, and specifically found that he had passed the color vision test.

Woodrick then applied for and was accepted into the two-year AFROTC program. In September 1981 he executed three documents: (1) an AFROTC contract; (2) an enlistment/reenlistment document; and (3) a statement of understanding. The contract required Woodrick to enter a professional officer course as a cadet in ROTC and to accept a commission in the Air Force Reserve upon receipt of his baccalaureate degree and completion of the AFROTC commissioning requirements. The contract noted that Woodrick was designated a "line officer" candidate, with a planned commissioning date of May 1983, and that he was qualified to be a pilot candidate.

Under the enlistment document, Woodrick enlisted in the Air Force Reserve for a minimum of six years, and the statement of understanding provided that he could be ordered to active duty in his enlisted grade for a period of two years if he was

discontinued from the AFROTC professional officer course for any of the following reasons:

(1) Indifference to training,

(2) Disciplinary reasons,

(3) Breach or anticipatory breach of the terms of the contractual agreement,

(4) Declining to accept a commission.

Pursuant to his contractual obligations, Woodrick took an oath as an enlisted man in the Air Force Reserve, enrolled in the AFROTC unit at Memphis State as a cadet in the fall semester of 1981, and was paid a monthly stipend as his ROTC contract provided. The 1981-82 school year apparently went by without any problems.

In October 1982, during the fall semester of his senior year (and second and final year of AFROTC), Woodrick underwent a precommissioning physical. The report of that examination stated that Woodrick failed the color vision test, which, if true, disqualified him from flying. Woodrick was advised, however, that he was not medically disqualified from flying until the physical had been reviewed by the Surgeon General's office at the Headquarters Air Training Command. That office requested that an Air Force flight surgeon re-evaluate his color vision and that Woodrick retake the test.

Woodrick, however, upon learning the results of his physical, stopped attending AFROTC classes and did not retake the color vision test. On January 6, 1983, an investigation was ordered to determine if Woodrick should be expelled from AFROTC for cause, that is, his failure to attend classes. Woodrick was advised of the possible consequences of the investigation (including possible call to active duty as an enlisted man), and given the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and present evidence on his own behalf. The investigating officers concluded their task with a recommendation that Woodrick be expelled from AFROTC for breach of his contract. The ROTC commander concurred, and Woodrick was dropped from the unit. Woodrick was then ordered to active duty, in enlisted status, effective May 31, 1984.

Woodrick did not report for duty on that date and was declared AWOL. After failing to appear for duty within 30 days, he was classified a deserter. On March 21, 1985, Woodrick was arrested at his home in Nashville by two off-duty civilian police officers who recovered a federal bounty for their efforts. He was handed over to military authorities and transported to Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio.

Woodrick was kept in detention for 18 days, and then released from confinement but ordered to report to 3731st Personnel Processing Squadron, an administrative holding unit at Lackland. On advice of civilian counsel, Woodrick refused military pay to avoid a constructive enlistment. Woodrick's commanding officer proceeded with charges of desertion against Woodrick under Article 85 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. Sec. 885, ordering an investigation into the desertion charges and requesting findings as to whether prosecution of Woodrick before a court-martial was warranted. In the meantime, Woodrick was examined by two Air Force opthamologists, both of whom concluded that Woodrick was indeed color-blind, that this defect was likely a congenital one and therefore in existence at the time of his initial examination and later enlistement, and that it was too severe to be waived for pilot qualification purposes.

On April 10, 1985, the day following that of his assignment to the 3731st Squadron, Woodrick's civilian counsel ¹ filed a habeas petition in the district court in San Antonio, requesting that Woodrick's enlistment contracts with the Air Force be rescinded on grounds of either fraudulent inducement or mutual mistake and that the Air Force be ordered to grant him an honorable discharge. The government answered the petition and moved to dismiss on the grounds that Woodrick had failed to exhaust his available remedies and that his contract claims were without merit. Woodrick then applied for a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent from proceeding with the pre court-martial investigation pending disposition of his petition.

The district court referred the matter to a United States Magistrate, who found that the Air Force's statement (on the basis of the preliminary physical in 1980) that Woodrick was medically qualified to be a pilot candidate was a material misrepresentation of fact upon which Woodrick justifiably relied in executing his enlistment agreements and thus that Woodrick's military contracts were subject to rescission. Since the initial contracts were void, the Magistrate reasoned, Woodrick had not enlisted and the Air Force was without jurisdiction over him. The Magistrate recommended that Woodrick's habeas petition be granted.

The district court, after a de novo review, accepted the Magistrate's findings and recommendations and denied the Air Force's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court reasoned that its interference with the court-martial proceeding was proper, given that that proceeding could not determine the merits of Woodrick's contractual claims.

The court then heard the contractual issues, with the Air Force declining to present evidence on grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction. The order did not, however, require an honorable discharge for Woodrick, presumably because if his initial contracts were void, Woodrick's status never changed and there was no occasion for him to be discharged. The Air Force appeals.

It is important at the outset to understand precisely what relief Woodrick seeks through his habeas application. His petition sought only rescission of the AFROTC and enlistment contracts and his separation, not intervention in the court-martial. Woodrick later filed a motion for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the court-martial proceeding pending a resolution of his contractual claims, but this motion became moot when the Air Force agreed to stay that proceeding pending disposition of the habeas petition.

The parties unnecessarily expend a great deal of energy debating Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 95 S.Ct. 1300, 43 L.Ed.2d 591 (1975) and the requirements for intervention in a court-martial by a civilian court. The issue here, however, is one of timing: whether the court erred in granting Woodrick's requested relief--rescission of his enlistment contracts and separation from the Air Force--before he had exhausted his intraservice remedies. The court-martial proceeding is immaterial to that question.

This distinction is significant: although the federal courts have habeas corpus jurisdiction over claims of unlawful detention by members of the military, Peavy v. Warner, 493 F.2d 748, 749 (5th Cir.1974), the standard of review varies with the military decision or action complained of. Id. Habeas corpus review of courts-martial is limited to questions of jurisdiction and to the severely limited function of determining whether the military has given fair consideration to petitioners' claims, Id., whereas claims that enlistment contracts have been breached or are invalid are decided under traditional canons of contract law. Id. at 750; Ferrell v. Secretary of Defense, 662 F.2d 1179, 1181 (5th Cir.1981); Peavy v. Warner, supra, 493 F.2d at 750; Shelton v. Brunson, 465 F.2d 144, 147 (5th Cir.1972). It is clear that exhaustion of administrative remedies is required before a civilian federal court can intervene in the proceedings of a court-martial, Schlesinger v. Councilman, supra, 420 U.S. at 758, 95 S.Ct. at 1313. It is not so clear under our precedents that such an exhaustion of administrative remedies must precede the invocation of the Great Writ to rescind an enlistment contract.

We have never directly...