State v. Williams

• Decision Date: 08 October 1987
• Docket Number: No. 6275,6275
• Citation: 166 Ariz. 132,800 P.2d 1240
• Parties: STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Ronald Turney WILLIAMS, Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Page 1240

800 P.2d 1240

166 Ariz. 132

STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Ronald Turney WILLIAMS, Appellant.

No. 6275.

Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc.

Oct. 8, 1987.

Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration Denied Dec. 4, 1990.

Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by William J. Schafer III, Barbara A. Jarrett, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee.

Terrance L. Britt, Wheeling, W. Va., and Olliphant and Cook by S. Alan Cook, Phoenix, for appellant.

FELDMAN, Vice Chief Justice.

A jury convicted Ronald Turney Williams of first degree murder and first degree burglary. Williams was sentenced to death for the murder conviction and to an aggravated term of fourteen years for the burglary conviction. His appeal to this court is automatic pursuant to Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 5(3) and A.R.S. § 13-4031 (Supp.1986).

I. FACTS

John Bunchek, an elderly Scottsdale resident, was shot to death on March 12, 1981. Just prior to the shooting, a white male had knocked on the Buncheks' door and inquired whether their next-door neighbors, Mr. and Mrs. Tancos, were home. Mrs. Bunchek told the suspect that she had seen Mrs. Tancos leave a few minutes earlier. Mrs. Bunchek's suspicions were aroused when she observed the suspect walking toward the Tancos residence. When Mr. Bunchek returned home a few minutes later, Mrs. Bunchek asked him to walk next door and check on the situation. Mrs. Bunchek went to the Tancos residence herself after her husband failed to return. She found Mr. Bunchek lying face down on the family room floor. He had been shot in the chest and later died from the wound.

Several small items were taken from the Tancos residence during the burglary. The record does not indicate whether any of the items ultimately were recovered. None of the items were found in Williams's possession, nor were any traced to him.

Four of the Buncheks' neighbors, Brenda Wood, William Koranda, and Alan and Elizabeth Tautkus, saw a suspect in their neighborhood on March 12. Mrs. Bunchek, Wood, and Koranda all talked with the suspect face-to-face. Alan and Elizabeth Tautkus saw the suspect for approximately five seconds as they were driving past him in their car.

Wood and Mr. and Mrs. Tautkus provided descriptions of the suspect to a police artist. Their descriptions resulted in a composite drawing that was printed in local newspapers on March 13. Lynn Walsh, Williams's roommate, saw the drawing in a newspaper and mentioned to James McClaskey and Cheryl Le Duc, Williams's other roommates, that the drawing looked like Williams. McClaskey subsequently called Silent Witness and reported their suspicions.

Meanwhile, Williams had taken all of his belongings and left Scottsdale on March 12. He had not said anything to his roommates about leaving. He was arrested in New York City on June 8, 1981, following a shoot-out with FBI agents.

Williams initially was represented by an attorney appointed by the Maricopa County Public Defender's Office. During pretrial proceedings, however, Williams requested that he be allowed to represent himself. Williams based his request primarily on his inability to work with or agree on defense tactics with his attorney. The trial court initially denied Williams's request, and the public defender's office substituted a more experienced attorney. Once again, however, the attorney-client relationship allegedly broke down, and Williams made another motion requesting the court to recognize his constitutional right to act as his own counsel. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); 2 W. LaFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.5, at 42-53 (1984). After a hearing in which he explained the pitfalls of self-representation, the trial judge granted Williams's motion. As urged by the judge, Williams agreed to allow a public defender to continue as "advisory counsel."

The state's case against Williams was based primarily on circumstantial evidence. For example, Williams's gun fired the bullet that killed Bunchek; a footprint left on the Tancoses' door matched the tread marks of a type of athletic shoe owned by Williams when he lived in Scottsdale; and Williams left Arizona without telling anyone where he was going. In addition, an FBI agent testified that in response to his query, "What about the old man in Scottsdale," Williams replied, "If [I] hadn't been framed ¹ in the first place, it would never have happened." Finally, Mrs. Tautkus's identification testimony placed Williams near the crime scene on March 12.

Williams testified in his own defense. He alleged that McClaskey and someone named Bobby had borrowed his gun and committed the crime. He testified that he left Arizona because he was wanted in West Virginia and was afraid of being investigated in Arizona. Williams called numerous witnesses to attempt to cast doubt on the state's version of events. For example, Wood and Koranda both testified that Williams was not the man they had seen in Bunchek's neighborhood on March 12. Ultimately, however, the jury concluded that the state had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

The trial judge ordered two psychological evaluations for inclusion in the presentence report and held a mitigation and aggravation hearing pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-703 (Supp.1986). The court found no mitigating circumstances and two aggravating circumstances: that Williams had two prior convictions for which life imprisonment could be imposed, and that Williams murdered Mr. Bunchek for pecuniary gain. A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(1), (5). The judge therefore sentenced Williams to death. See A.R.S. § 13-703(E).

II. DISCUSSION

Williams raises a host of constitutional issues, ranging from alleged due process violations to the constitutionality of Arizona's death penalty statutes. We address each argument in turn.

A. Pretrial Identification

1. The Issue

At a pretrial deposition requested and personally conducted by Williams, Mrs. Tautkus identified Williams as the man she had seen in Bunchek's neighborhood on March 12. At trial, Mrs. Tautkus recounted her pretrial identification and again identified Williams as the suspect.

Although Williams requested the Tautkus deposition, he now argues that the trial court violated his due process rights by admitting Mrs. Tautkus's identification testimony. Mrs. Tautkus's identification should have been ruled inadmissible, Williams argues, because the circumstances surrounding her deposition created a "substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S.Ct. 967, 971, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968); see also Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972).

We begin our consideration of Williams's argument by recounting the circumstances leading up to and surrounding the Tautkus deposition. We then turn our attention to the scope of the due process protection claimed by Williams.

2. Facts

Police investigators asked Wood, Koranda, Mr. and Mrs. Tautkus, and Mrs. Bunchek to look at a six-person photospread within thirty days of Mr. Bunchek's death. None of the five correctly identified Williams's photo. Consequently, the state did not list Wood, Koranda, or either of the Tautkuses as trial witnesses. ² Williams, however, contacted each of these persons in preparation for his defense.

Before trial began, the public defender's office interviewed Wood and deposed Koranda. Wood and Koranda were shown various pictures of Williams, but neither could identify him as the man they had talked with on March 12, 1981. At trial, Wood and Koranda were called as defense witnesses, testifying that Williams was not the man they had talked with the day of the murder.

Williams also contacted Mr. and Mrs. Tautkus before his trial. When they refused to cooperate, Williams requested the court to subpoena them for depositions. Williams also requested that he personally be allowed to depose the Tautkuses in civilian clothes. The court ordered the depositions but denied Williams's motion to appear in civilian clothes.

The depositions took place on August 28, 1983, approximately two years and five months after the Tautkuses had seen the suspect in their neighborhood. Aside from the initial photospread, the depositions were the Tautkuses' first opportunity to identify Williams; neither the state nor Williams had attempted a pretrial lineup or other identification procedure.

When Mr. and Mrs. Tautkus arrived at the courthouse for their depositions, Richard Mesh, Williams's advisory counsel, introduced himself and explained that he was responsible for the subpoenas requiring their presence. According to Mesh's trial testimony, Mr. and Mrs. Tautkus refused to shake his hand and Mrs. Tautkus stated that "she didn't want any part of this ... wasn't going to testify and ... wasn't going to help the defense in any way...." Trial Transcript (TT), Jan. 19, 1984, at 18-19. Mesh responded that he would obtain a court order compelling Mrs. Tautkus to testify if necessary. Id. at 19. Mrs. Tautkus responded that she was not going to do anything to help that "son of a bitch" [Williams]. Id. at 19, 26. A shouting match apparently ensued, with Mr. Tautkus stepping in to defend his wife. Id. at 19-20.

At this point, Mr. Turoff, the prosecuting attorney, intervened. He introduced himself to Mr. and Mrs. Tautkus and attempted to calm them, telling them that the witnesses were there to help "determine the accuracy of the information ... in the police report and [to see if] ... they could identify [Williams] as being the fellow ... they had seen in their neighborhood on the day that Mr. Bunchek had been shot." Id. at 21. Significantly, Turoff added that he did not know personally whether Williams had done the shooting and that he only wanted Mr. and Mrs. Tautkus "to truthfully testify what they knew, what they could say." He expressly admonished them not to make any prejudgments. Id.

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