Underwood v. State, 4D00-4160.

Citation801 So.2d 200
Decision Date05 December 2001
Docket NumberNo. 4D00-4160.,4D00-4160.
PartiesJames UNDERWOOD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Florida (US)

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Ian Seldin, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Consuelo Maingot, Assistant Attorney General, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

TAYLOR, J.

Appellant James Underwood challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized after a stop for obstructing traffic under section 316.2045(1), Florida Statutes. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the facts do not support a finding of probable cause for the traffic stop and reverse the order denying suppression of the evidence.

On August 11, 2000, Broward Sheriffs Deputy Arthur Perry was on routine patrol traveling north on Southwest 5th Avenue in Dania Beach, when he came upon a white Toyota stopped in the middle of the street. The street was very narrow with no divider lines. A grocery store was on one side of the street and a motel was on the opposite side. At the time, there were no other vehicles on the roadway. The deputy observed a man standing in the street beside the Toyota. The unidentified man fled in a westerly direction when the deputy's vehicle approached. As the deputy drove up behind the Toyota, he had to slow down but not come to a complete stop. The Toyota moved on, continuing north on Southwest 5th Avenue, then east on West Dania Beach Boulevard. The officer activated his emergency lights and siren and followed the car until it stopped within a few blocks. According to the deputy, his sole purpose for stopping the vehicle was to issue the driver a citation for obstructing the roadway, under section 316.2045(1), Florida Statutes.

When the deputy approached the car on the driver's side, he saw the driver chewing a substance. He could see a white substance on the driver's tongue when he spoke. Based on his experience, the deputy recognized the substance as crack cocaine. He seized the substance, which field tested positive for cocaine, and arrested the driver. The driver, the appellant herein, was charged by information with possession of cocaine and tampering with evidence. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence.

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, both sides agreed that the sole issue was whether the officer had probable cause for the traffic stop.1 After hearing the officer's testimony and argument of counsel, the trial court determined that the deputy had probable cause to believe that appellant violated the obstruction of traffic statute. The court denied the motion to suppress, and appellant pled no contest to the charges, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion.

A reviewing court must accept the trial court's findings of fact in an order on a motion to suppress, so long as those findings are supported by the record. However, a suppression order that turns on an issue of law is reviewed by a de novo standard of review. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)

; Porter v. State, 765 So.2d 76, 77 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). In this case, the facts are undisputed and the issue before us is one of law: whether the facts support a finding that the deputy had probable cause to believe that appellant committed a traffic violation. If the deputy had probable cause to believe that a traffic infraction had occurred, then his stop of appellant's car was permissible under Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) and Holland v. State, 696 So.2d 757 (Fla.1997).

Section 316.2045, Florida Statutes, is entitled, "Obstruction of public streets, highways, and roads," and provides in pertinent part the following:

It is unlawful for any person or persons willfully to obstruct the free, convenient and normal use of any public street, highway, or road by impeding, hindering, stifling, retarding, or restraining traffic or passage thereon, by standing or approaching motor vehicles thereon, or by endangering the safe movement of vehicles or pedestrians traveling thereon....

Appellant argues that the undisputed facts show that he did not willfully obstruct or hinder the free flow of traffic within the meaning of the statute. Citing Thunderbird Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Reed, 571 So.2d 1341 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), he contends that the statute's use of the word "willfully" implies "an intentional act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk of such magnitude as to render it probable that harm would follow." Appellant asserts that his conduct in momentarily stopping...

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4 cases
  • Tercero v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • August 22, 2007
    ...conclusions de novo. See Martin v. State, 921 So.2d 697, 698 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 935 So.2d 2 (Fla.2006); Underwood v. State, 801 So.2d 200, 202 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).2 Appellant does not dispute the facts leading to discovery of the contraband in this case. Rather, he argues that, ......
  • Mitchell v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • December 30, 2009
    ...violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Since there are no facts in dispute, we review the legal issue de novo. Underwood v. State, 801 So.2d 200, 202 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). "Chapter 934 protects against unauthorized interception of oral, wire, or electronic communications" and is "strictly......
  • Errickson v. State, 4D02-2754.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • October 8, 2003
    ...record; however, a suppression order that turns on an issue of law is reviewed by a de novo standard of review." Underwood v. State, 801 So.2d 200, 202 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). The Florida Supreme Court explained that there are three levels of police-citizen encounters in Popple v. State, 626 S......
  • Lopez v. State, 4D00-1842.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • December 5, 2001

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