Martin v. Brady

Decision Date13 August 2002
Docket Number(SC 16583)
Citation802 A.2d 814,261 Conn. 372
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesANTHONY R. MARTIN v. JAMES BRADY ET AL.

Borden, Norcott, Katz, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.

Norman A. Pattis, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Eliot Prescott, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Jane R. Rosenberg, assistant attorney general, for the appellees (defendants).

Opinion

NORCOTT, J.

The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether the defendant state police officers are immune from suit by virtue of statutory, personal immunity under General Statutes § 4-1651 and, therefore, are not liable to the plaintiff for their alleged acts of misconduct. The plaintiff, Anthony R. Martin, claims that the defendants, State Troopers James Brady, Andre Joyner and Thomas Inglis and Detective Jeff Correia, violated his state constitutional rights while searching his property and seizing him for arrest. The plaintiff initially contended that he is entitled to bring this action against the defendants because his claim arises from a violation of his rights under article first, §§ 7 and 9, of the constitution of Connecticut,2 and is authorized by General Statutes § 4-142 (2)3 and Binette v. Sabo, 244 Conn. 23, 710 A.2d 688 (1998).

As the case was decided in the Appellate Court, it concerned whether the plaintiff's complaint was sufficient to withstand the defendants' jurisdictional challenge on sovereign immunity grounds. Martin v. Brady, 64 Conn. App. 433, 436, 780 A.2d 961 (2001). The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal on sovereign immunity grounds. Id., 442. We then granted the plaintiff's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: "Whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that Binette v. Sabo, [supra, 244 Conn. 23], does not permit the plaintiff's tort action because (1) the defendants are protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity and (2) the facts are not sufficiently egregious?" Martin v. Brady, 258 Conn. 919, 782 A.2d 1244 (2001). Although the defendants' brief addressed the certified question, at oral argument before this court the defendants conceded that, in the plaintiff's complaint, properly construed, he sued them in their individual, rather than their official, capacities, and that, therefore, Binette v. Sabo, supra, 23, was inapplicable. The defendants further conceded, therefore, that the only jurisdictional question remaining was whether they were protected by the statutory, personal immunity provided by § 4-165. We decide the present case, therefore, on that basis.

The defendants claim that they are immune from suit pursuant to the statutory immunity provided by § 4-165. We agree that the defendants are statutorily immune from suit, and we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court on this alternate ground. The record reveals the following facts and procedural history. The plaintiff, who was a resident of Florida, was convicted of criminal mischief in that state. Following that conviction, he came to Connecticut, where he has owned a home for the past fifty years. Florida considered him a fugitive and initiated extradition proceedings against him. Pursuant to those proceedings, the court issued an extradition arrest warrant and the defendants attempted to locate and arrest the plaintiff.

In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that, during the defendants' attempts to locate and arrest him, they searched his home on two separate occasions, once without a warrant and once pursuant to a warrant fraudulently obtained; they executed a false affidavit that was the basis on which the search warrant was obtained; they destroyed the plaintiff's property; and they physically assaulted him. The plaintiff claims that such actions constituted a deprivation of his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures of his person and property, and a denial of procedural and substantive due process. He further alleged that, as a result of the defendants' conduct, he suffered economic loss and emotional distress.

The defendants moved to dismiss the action against them, contending that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff's claims were barred by sovereign immunity, statutory immunity, and by his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and rendered judgment accordingly.

Thereafter, the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that under Binette v. Sabo, supra, 244 Conn. 23, a claim alleging a constitutional violation is a claim "upon which suit otherwise is authorized by law" within the meaning of § 4-142 and, therefore, falls within one of the exceptions to the requirement to file suit with the claims commissioner. Martin v. Brady, supra, 64 Conn. App. 438. Therefore, in the plaintiff's view, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, concluding that the plaintiff's claims were barred by sovereign immunity and, furthermore, that the facts alleged were not sufficiently egregious to state a cause of action under Binette. Id., 433. Having concluded that sovereign immunity barred the plaintiff's claim, the Appellate Court did not reach the issue of whether the plaintiff's claim was barred by statutory immunity pursuant to § 4-165. Following our grant of certification, the plaintiff appealed to this court.

We begin by setting forth the relevant standard of review that guides our decision in the present case. "[T]he doctrine of [statutory] immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss. . . . When a [trial] court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light. . . . Because this case comes to us on a threshold [statutory] immunity issue, pursuant to a motion to dismiss . . . we do not pass on whether the complaint was legally sufficient to state a cause of action.... In the posture of this case, we examine the pleadings to decide if the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts . . . with respect to personal immunity under § 4-165, to support a conclusion that the defendant[s] [were] acting outside the scope of [their] employment or wilfully or maliciously." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Antinerella v. Rioux, 229 Conn. 479, 489, 642 A.2d 699 (1994). The question before us, therefore, is whether the facts as alleged in the pleadings, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss on the ground of statutory immunity. The complaint alleged that the defendants committed three separate instances of misconduct. The plaintiff claimed that one or more of the defendants: (1) forcibly entered the plaintiff's home without a search warrant, striking and pushing him to the floor after he submitted to arrest; (2) searched his home pursuant to a search warrant obtained pursuant to a false affidavit; and (3) during that search, smashed windows and broke down doors. The complaint explicitly alleged that at all times each of the defendants acted under color of law and that each defendant was being sued in his individual capacity.

We conclude that the plaintiff's claims as alleged in the complaint are barred by the statutory immunity provided for in § 4-165. Section 4-165 provides in relevant part: "No state officer or employee shall be personally liable for damage or injury, not wanton, reckless or malicious, caused in the discharge of his duties or within the scope of his employment. . . ." We conclude that the plaintiff has alleged conduct on the part of the defendants that fell within the scope of their employment, and that the allegations were insufficient to allege either wantonness, recklessness or malice.

In order to determine if a state actor's conduct is caused in the discharge of his or her duties or within the granted statutory authority, it is necessary to examine the nature of the alleged conduct and its relationship to the duties incidental to the employment. In Antinerella v. Rioux, supra, 229 Conn. 499, we held that the high sheriff's discharge of the plaintiff, although pursuant to the authority granted to the high sheriff by then General Statutes (Rev. to 1991) § 6-45,4 was actually wrongful conduct because it was conducted in furtherance of an illegal fee splitting scheme and, as such, was a misuse of the authority granted to him. We explained therein that "the defendant's misuse of his authority was personal to him and was not primarily employer rooted or reasonably incidental to the performance of employment duties.... The defendant's alleged conduct was not designed to advance any interest of his employer, the state, and did not serve any legitimate state interest. Rather, the defendant's alleged actions were motivated by purely personal considerations entirely extraneous to his employer's interest." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

Furthermore, in Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134, 174, 749 A.2d 1147 (2000), we determined that the defendants, individuals employed by the state department of children and families, had acted beyond the scope of their employment when acting "solely . . . to justify their own prior unjustified conduct, and not to carry out the government policy with which they were entrusted. . . ." The plaintiffs in Shay alleged that "the defendants' conclusion that neglect and abuse of the [plaintiffs'] children had been confirmed was without foundation, unreasonable, arbitrary, wilful, wanton, reckless and malicious, and designed to vindicate and legiti[mize] their handling of the [plaintiffs'] case which was, from the outset,...

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