Nelson v. Greater Gadsden Housing Authority
| Decision Date | 15 April 1976 |
| Citation | 802 F.2d 405 |
| Parties | Brenda NELSON, Joseph Johnson, Priscilla D. Adams, Angelia V. Elliott, Georgia Middleton, Marion R. Richardson, Alfred Lovelace, Teresa Posey, Marilee Dee Swindler Tenants of the GGHA Who Supplied or Supply Their Own Gas (250 UNITS) Since |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
William D. Russell, Jr., Dortch, Wright & Russell, Gadsden, Ala., for defendants-appellants, cross-appellees.
Abigail Turner, Mobile, Ala., for Brenda Nelson.
Jeff Sacher, Tuscaloosa, Ala., James S. Sledge, Gadsden, Ala., for remaining plaintiffs-appellees, cross-appellants.
Robert L. Wiggins, Jr., Edward Still, Birmingham, Ala., for amici curiae: Edward Still, Susan W. Reeves, Robert L. Wiggins, Jr., Jack Drake, Larry Menefee, and Gregory Stein.
David B. Bryson, Nat. Housing Law Project, Berkeley, Cal., for amicus curiae: Nat. Housing Law Project.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.
Before RONEY, Chief Judge, CLARK, Circuit Judge, and DOYLE *, Senior District Judge.
This is an appeal from an order granting injunctive relief and money damages in a class action proceeding involving utility allowances to tenants in a public housing complex. Although the plaintiffs did not have a private remedy under the federal housing statutes, as held by a recent decision in this Court, the judgment of the district court is affirmed under the pendent state law claims.
The plaintiffs (Nelson) filed complaints in the district court alleging causes of action based on 42 U.S.C.A. Secs. 1437 et seq., (the Housing Act) and section 1983, and state law claims based on breach of contract. At issue were utility allowances which the defendants (Greater Gadsden) were required to give Nelson pursuant to regulations of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). After a hearing on preliminary injunction, the district court enjoined Greater Gadsden to immediately implement a revised utility allowance schedule, to make annual adjustments in compliance with 24 C.F.R. Sec. 865.477 (1983), and to comply with all applicable HUD regulations codified at 24 C.F.R. Secs. 865.470--.482 (1983). The defendants thereafter adjusted the allowances twice. There has been no appeal from the injunction.
This left for the district court the plaintiffs' entitlement to compensatory damages, attorney's fees, and expenses. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court awarded damages, attorney's fees, and other expenses. 606 F.Supp. 948. Although it is unclear what decision the court made on the section 1983 claims, it plainly did not decide the claim of a private remedy under the so-called Brooke Amendment. We interpret the judgment for damages to rest solely on the state law contract claims. It is now clear in this Circuit that tenants in Federal Public Housing have neither a section 1983 cause of action nor an implied private right of action to enforce the rent provisions of the Brooke Amendment. Brown v. Housing Authority of City of McRae, 784 F.2d 1533 (11th Cir.1986); cf. Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authority, 771 F.2d 833 (4th Cir.1985), cert. granted, --- U.S. ---, 106 S.Ct. 848, 88 L.Ed.2d 889 (1986); contra Samuels v. District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184 (D.C.Cir.1985); Beckham v. New York City Housing Authority, 755 F.2d 1074 (2d Cir.1985).
Two major points are made by the appellant housing authority: First, since there was no valid federal claim, the district court erred in retaining pendent jurisdiction of the state claims; second, the district court incorrectly decided the state law breach of contract issue.
Federal courts should permit the adjudication of pendent state claims in conjunction with federal claims between the same parties if the claims derive from a common nucleus of operative facts and a plaintiff would normally be expected to try them in one proceeding. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). A federal court may retain pendent jurisdiction over a state claim which is barred by the state period of limitations, even though all federal claims have been dismissed. Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir.1982). See also Emory v. Peeler, 756 F.2d 1547 (11th Cir.1985); L.A. Draper & Sons v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 735 F.2d 414 (11th Cir.1984); Quality Foods de Centro, S.A. v. Latin American Agribusiness Development Corporation, S.A., 711 F.2d 989 (11th Cir.1983). This suit was originally filed on April 15, 1982, and a dismissal would bar many of Nelson's claims due to the Alabama statute of limitations.
The power to exercise pendent jurisdiction is discretionary and the factors to be considered are judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants. United Mine Workers, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139. In determining whether pendent jurisdiction should be exercised over a state claim which has no independent federal jurisdictional basis, the court should look to two factors. The "court must have jurisdiction over a substantial federal claim and the federal and state claims must derive from a 'common nucleus of operative fact.' " L.A. Draper & Sons v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 735 F.2d at 427 (citations omitted).
The jurisdictional question is not whether the federal claims are decided to be without merit, but whether they are frivolous. Jurisdiction to entertain state claims is determined on the pleadings. Id. The recently decided case of Brown noted that the federal issue involved here was one of first impression in this Court. 784 F.2d at 1536. As noted above, the issue has been considered in three other circuits with differing results. The Supreme Court has apparently decided to resolve the conflict by granting certiorari in Wright, supra. The plaintiffs alleged a substantial federal claim.
The federal and state claims clearly derive from a common nucleus of operative fact. They alleged separate means of redressing a common wrong. Nelson sought to force Greater Gadsden to comply with applicable regulations regarding utility allowances. To achieve this end, claims were brought on alternative grounds. The fact that the allowable damages flowing from the alternative claims may be different does not alter the common elements of the claims. Because the federal claims were substantial and the state claims arose from a common nucleus of operative fact, the district court did not abuse its discretion in exercising jurisdiction over the pendent state claims.
The district court granted summary judgment to plaintiffs based on its finding that Greater Gadsden had breached its lease with the plaintiff tenants. Greater Gadsden challenges the findings upon which this decision was based.
Greater Gadsden makes several challenges. First, Greater Gadsden contends that the trial judge did not have competent evidence upon which to make the specified findings on the lease agreements. A copy of the lease agreement was entered in the record as an exhibit to "Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" filed April 10, 1984. Greater Gadsden did not object to the use of the attached lease agreement in the district court proceedings, and cannot object now. See Davis v. Howard, 561 F.2d 565, 570 (5th Cir.1977); Auto Drive-Away Co. of Hialeah, Inc. v. ICC, 360 F.2d 446 (5th Cir.1966); Lawson v. American Motorists Ins. Corp., 217 F.2d 724, 726 (5th Cir.1954); Wright, Miller & Kane, 10A Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil 2d, section 2722 (1983).
Greater Gadsden challenges the district court's finding that $25.50, $29.00, and $36.50 accurately represent the "amount of lawful allowance" for the period from June 1983 through February 1984, because they were not agreed upon. The district court found that the attorneys for all parties had gathered the data necessary to compute what the allowances should have been from January 1979 through February 1983. The court then adopted HUD's interpretation of what constitutes a reasonable utility allowance under the Brooke Amendment and HUD's implementing regulations. Greater Gadsden challenges neither the propriety of this procedure nor the accuracy of the calculations. The district court's calculations were based on data agreed to by all parties, about which there was no genuine issue of fact.
The closest question in the case is whether the lease agreement requires Greater Gadsden to comply with the HUD regulations. Greater Gadsden concedes that it was not in compliance with HUD regulations concerning the allowance for utility usage at the time this suit was filed. The section of the lease at issue reads as follows:
4. OBLIGATIONS OF LANDLORD:
Landlord agrees:
(B) To comply with the requirements of applicable regulations of the Department of Housing and Urban Development and local building codes and housing codes materially affecting health and safety Although both parties contend this provision is unambiguous, each interprets its terms differently. This issue is controlled by the law of the State of Alabama....
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