State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dole

Decision Date18 September 1986
Docket NumberNos. 84-1301,84-1459,s. 84-1301
Parties, 55 USLW 2186 STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Petitioners, v. Elizabeth DOLE, Secretary of the Department of Transportation, et al., Respondents. AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, Petitioner, v. Elizabeth DOLE, Secretary of the Department of Transportation; the Department of Transportation; Diane Steed, Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Respondents. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Elizabeth DOLE, Secretary of the Department of Transportation; the Department of Transportation; Diane Steed, Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Respondents. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, Petitioner, v. Elizabeth DOLE, Secretary of the Department of Transportation; the Department of Transportation; Diane Steed, Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Respondents. The STATE OF NEW YORK, Robert Abrams, Attorney General of the State of New York, James P. Corcoran, Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York and the New York State Department of Insurance, Petitioners, v. Elizabeth DOLE, Secretary of the Department of Transportation, et al., Respondents. to 84-1462.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

James F. Fitzpatrick, with whom Michael N. Sohn, John M. Quinn, Merrick B. Garland and Charles A. Taylor, III, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for petitioners, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., et al. in Nos. 84-1301, 84-1459 and 84-1460.

Melvin Goldberg, with whom Robert Abrams, Peter Bienstock, Paul M. Glickman and Daniel D. Kaplan, New York City, were on the brief, for petitioners, The State of N.Y., et al. in No. 84-1462.

Robert H. Myers, Jr., Washington, D.C., was on the brief, for petitioner, Nat. Ass'n of Ins. Com'rs in No. 84-1461.

Douglas Letter, Atty., Dept. of Justice, with whom Richard K. Willard, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Kenneth N. Weinstein, Deputy Asst. Gen. Counsel, Dept. of Transp., Frank Berndt, Chief Counsel, Nat. Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Paul Blankenstein, Atty., Dept. of Justice and Stephen P. Wood, Atty., Nat. Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for respondents in Nos. 84-1301, 84-1459, 84-1460, 84-1461 and 84-1462.

Christopher D. Coppin, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of N.M., Albuquerque, N.M., was on the brief, for amicus curiae, The State of N.M. urging reversal in Nos. 84-1301, 84-1459, 84-1460 and 84-1461.

Philip R. Collins, Washington, D.C., was on the brief, for amicus curiae, Automotive Occupant Protection Ass'n urging reversal in Nos. 84-1301, 84-1459, 84-1460 and 84-1461.

Debbie M. Zuckerman was on the brief, for amicus curiae, Epilepsy Foundation of America, urging reversal in Nos. 84-1301, 84-1459, 84-1460 and 84-1461.

Dennis J. Barbour, Roanoke, Va., was on the brief, for amicus curiae, American Academy of Pediatrics, et al. urging reversal in Nos. 84-1301, 84-1459, 84-1460 and 84-1461.

Jerris Leonard, Washington, D.C., was on the brief, for amicus curiae, Conference of Ins. Legislators urging reversal in Nos. 84-1301, 84-1459, 84-1460 and 84-1461.

Before MIKVA, SCALIA and STARR, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge STARR.

Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by Circuit Judge MIKVA.

STARR, Circuit Judge:

These consolidated cases bring us once more into the long-standing controversy over the Department of Transportation's regulations with respect to "passive restraints" in automobiles. Unlike its most recent predecessor, the rule at issue requires the phased-in installation of automatic (i.e., passive) protection devices in new cars manufactured for sale in the United States beginning September 1986. 1 The rule, however, contains a provision under which the Secretary of Transportation will rescind the requirement if, by April 1, 1989, States covering two-thirds of the Nation's population enact mandatory safety belt usage laws. This provision is challenged by all petitioners 2 as both contrary to the applicable statute and as arbitrary and capricious. While joining in this common attack, the State of New York mounts a separate challenge to the Secretary's decision not to adopt certain alternative standards in the final regulation.

We hold that the attack upon the rescission feature of the regulation is not ripe for judicial review. We also hold that New York's separate challenge, while ripe, fails on the merits.

I

In response to high death tolls on our Nation's highways, Congress enacted the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (the Safety Act), 15 U.S.C. Secs. 1381 et seq. (1982). The Safety Act was intended "to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents." Id. Sec. 1381. To that end, the statute directed the Secretary to "establish by order appropriate Federal motor vehicle safety standards" that are "practicable, [and] meet the need for motor vehicle safety...." Id. Sec. 1392(a).

Under this broad mandate, the Department in 1967 promulgated Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208, which required installation of manual safety belts in all cars. 32 Fed.Reg. 2408, 2415 (1967) (Standard 208). Two years later, however, the Department initiated consideration of automatic or passive occupant protection technology since the level of safety belt usage was quite low. As a result of this inquiry, the Department in 1972 adopted an amendment to Standard 208 requiring "complete passive protection" on automobiles manufactured after August 15, 1975. 37 Fed.Reg. 3911 (1972). Standard 208 was subsequently reconsidered and modified a number of times. 3 Ultimately, it was amended to require the phasing-in of passive restraints beginning with the 1982 automobile model year. 42 Fed.Reg. 34,289 (1977). This Modified Standard 208 was upheld on review by this Court. See Pacific Legal Foundation v. Department of Transportation, 593 F.2d 1338 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 830, 100 S.Ct. 57, 62 L.Ed.2d 38 (1979).

In February 1981, the Department reopened the rulemaking that had produced Modified Standard 208. 46 Fed.Reg. 12,033 (1981). Two months later, it postponed the date on which phase-in of passive restraints was to begin, 46 Fed.Reg. 21,172 (1981), and proposed the possible rescission of the entire standard, id. at 21,205. Following a comment period and public hearings, the Department concluded that a reliable basis no longer existed on which to conclude that the passive restraint requirements would have significant safety benefits. In view of the substantial costs of implementing the requirement and the lack of a viable alternative, the agency simply rescinded the standard. 46 Fed.Reg. 53,419 (1981). This action was overturned by this court in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Department of Transportation, 680 F.2d 206 (D.C.Cir.1982). The Supreme Court vacated our judgment, but agreed that the agency's action was arbitrary and capricious. The matter was remanded to the Secretary for further consideration. See Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 2873, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983) (State Farm ).

It is the Secretary's determination upon reconsideration that is now before us. After suspending the effective date of Modified Standard 208 for one year, 48 Fed.Reg. 39,908 (1983), the Department issued a notice of proposed rulemaking and requested comments regarding what action it should take with respect to passive restraints, 48 Fed.Reg. 48,622 (1983). 4 Following the close of the comment period, the Department issued a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking to gather additional comments. 49 Fed.Reg. 20,460 (1984). 5 On July 17, 1984, the Department published its final rule amending Modified Standard 208 to require passive restraints. 49 Fed.Reg. 28,962 (1984) (codified at 49 C.F.R. Sec. 571.208 (1984)) (Final Rule). The Final Rule can be satisfied in several ways, including airbags, enhanced padding of the automobile interior, and [ ] either detachable or non-detachable automatic belts. During the first few years after the standard takes effect, the Final Rule creates special incentives for installation of passive protection systems other than automatic belts. Specifically, for each car in which an airbag or passive interior system is installed, the manufacturer will be given credit for an extra one-half automobile toward its percentage requirement. Id. at 29,000.

The Final Rule requires the phasing-in of passive occupant protection in all passenger cars beginning September 1, 1986. Id. at 28,963. But there is another feature of the Final Rule which has drawn the petitioners' attack. The passive restraint requirements embodied in the new standard will be rescinded if by April 1, 1989, two-thirds of the population of the United States is covered by mandatory usage laws (MULs) which meet certain specified conditions. Id. 6 It is this "trap door" provision, as petitioners colorfully put it, that provides the focal point of the various challenges before us. To exacerbate matters, as petitioners see it, the Final Rule further provides that the Secretary will consider waiving the minimum requirements for States that had "substantially complying" MULs in place prior to August 1, 1984. Id. at 28,999. The automatic occupant protection requirement will be rescinded immediately upon the Secretary's determination that the requisite two-thirds population level is reached. 7

II

We first address the ripeness issues raised by the Secretary. After setting forth some general principles to guide our...

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