Hill v. Watts, 85-1517
| Citation | 803 F.2d 713 |
| Decision Date | 14 October 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-1517,85-1517 |
| Parties | Unpublished Disposition NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth Circuit. Lillie R. HILL, Administratrix of the Estate of Michael T. Hill, Deceased, as Administratrix, and on her own behalf, and as Guardian on behalf of Michael T. Hill's minor sons, Marquis Maurice Suber and Antoine Suber, Appellant, v. Sam WATTS, officially, The Fountain Inn Police Department, The Town of Fountain Inn, a municipal corporation, Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit) |
Fletcher N. Smith, Jr. for appellant.
James D. Brice (Frank H. Gibbes, III, Rainey, Britton, Gibbes & Clarkson, P.A., Baety O. Gross, Paul E. Gault, Jr., Gross and Gault, T. Travis Medlock, Attorney General, Kenneth P. Woodington, Senior Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellees.
Before RUSSELL, HALL and ERVIN, Circuit Judges.
Lillie R. Hill appeals from judgments entered in favor of appellees Sam Watts, the Town of Fountain Inn and the State of South Carolina. Appellant brought suit in the district court claiming damages under 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988 (1982) for alleged deprivations of constitutional rights 1 and challenging the constitutionality of S.C. Code Ann. Sec. 17-13-20 (1976). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees. We affirm.
This suit arises out of the fatal shooting of Michael T. Hill in October 1981 by Sam Watts, a police officer for the Town of Fountain Inn, South Carolina. While on patrol, Officer Watts encountered Hill and, after a verbal confrontation, attempted to arrest Hill for disorderly conduct. Hill resisted and a fight ensued. At some point, Hill fled. Believing that Hill had assaulted him with the intent to kill, Officer Watts sought to apprehend Hill as a fleeing felon, shooting Hill twice in the back as he fled. 2
These same events gave rise to a prior suit. Hill v. Watts, No. 82-50-14 (D.S.C. Feb. 10, 1983), aff'd, No. 83-1078 (4th Cir. Jan. 6, 1984). In the prior suit, Lillie Hill, Michael Hill's mother, sued as administratrix of his estate, claiming damages under 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1983, 1985 and 1988 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights. As defendants, she named Officer Watts, in his individual and official capacities; W.K. Jordan, individually and in his official capacity as the Chief of Police of the Town of Fountain Inn; the Fountain Inn Police Department; and the Town of Fountain Inn. The district court dismissed Jordan as a defendant and granted summary judgment in favor of the police department and the town. After a trial on the issue of whether Officer Watts had violated Sec. 1983, the jury returned a verdict in his favor. On appeal, this court affirmed. Hill v. Watts, No. 83-1078 (4th Cir. Jan. 6, 1984).
Subsequently, Lillie Hill brought the present suit. As defendants, she named Officer Watts, individually and officially, 3 the Fountain Inn Police Department, 4 the Town of Fountain Inn and the State of South Carolina. 5 Again, she sued on behalf of Michael Hill's estate, as administratrix, under Sec. 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights. In addition, she sued in her individual capacity under Sec. 1983 for the deprivation of her constitutional right, as a parent, to the continued association with her child, Michael Hill. As their guardian ad litem, she also sued under Sec. 1983 on behalf of Michael Hill's alleged, minor, illegitimate children, marquis and Antoine Suber, for the deprivation of their constitutional right to continued association with their parent, Michael Hill. Finally, the complaint challenged the constitutionality of S.C. Code Ann. Sec. 17-13-20 (1976), which authorizes the use of deadly force to apprehend a suspected fleeing felon. 6
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants based primarily on principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel, concluding that the prior suit precluded recovery in the present suit. Hill v. Watts, No. 85-371-14 . This appeal followed.
In both the prior suit and the present suit, Mrs. Hill sued as administratrix of Michael Hill's estate for violations of Sec. 1983. However, Sec. 1983 does not specify what remedies are available under such a claim. When Sec. 1983 is thus "deficient," Sec. 1988 provides that "suitable remedies" are governed by state law unless inconsistent with the constitution and federal laws. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 587 (1978). Pursuant to this scheme, Mrs. Hill sought remedies in both suits under South Carolina law. In the present suit, she sought remedies under South Carolina's Wrongful Death Act, S.C. Code Ann. Secs. 15-51-10 to -60 (1976), for the wrongful killing of Michael Hill and under South Carolina's survival statute, S.C. Code Ann. Sec. 15-5-90 (1976), for injuries suffered by Michael Hill before his death. The district court found that she had litigated an identical claim in the prior suit and, thus, that Mrs. Hill's claims as administratrix in the present suit were barred by res judicata. We agree.
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment rendered in a prior suit bars another suit by the same parties or their privies on claims that were or could have been raised in the prior suit. See Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1974); Adkins v. Allstate Insurance Company, 729 F.2d 974, 976 (4th Cir.1984). Res judicata is applicable to Sec. 1983 actions. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). Thus, if Mrs. Hill sued as administratrix in the prior suit under Sec. 1983 pursuing wrongful death and survival remedies, such a claim is barred in the present suit.
Mrs. Hill concedes that she pursued a survival remedy in the prior suit. The survival remedy in the present suit, therefore, is barred. She argues, however, that a wrongful death remedy was not pursued in the prior suit and is not barred. To support her position, she relies on South Carolina law.
South Carolina favors separate suits for wrongful death and survival claims arising out of the same events. Accordingly, res judicata does not bar a suit for wrongful death when a survival claim has been brought in a prior suit. See Deaton v. Gay Trucking, 275 F. Supp. 750, 753 (D.S.C. 1967) (applying South Carolina law and citing Bennett v. Spartanburg Railway, Gas and Electric Company, 97 S.C. 27, 81 S.E. 189 (1914). But see Restatement (Second) of Judgments Sec. 47 (1982) ( contrary rule). In effect, Mrs. Hill argues that not only did she not pursue a wrongful death remedy in the prior suit, she could not have pursued such a remedy.
We reject her arguments. Initially, we note that South Carolina's rules of res judicata are not applicable to this case. Whether a suit in the federal courts, pursuant to federal Question jurisdiction, is barred by a like, prior suit is a question of federal law. See Roach v. Teamsters, 595 F.2d 446, 448 n.3 (8th Cir.1979); Aerojet-General Corporation v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 715 (5th Cir.1975). In contrast, state law governs whether a federal suit is barred by a prior state suit. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. at 95. Thus, federal rules of res judicata govern this case. Furthermore, we conclude that Mrs. Hill pursued a wrongful death remedy in the prior suit, as well as a survival remedy. The complaint stated that Michael Hill had lost "future earnings" and claimed damages for his "wrongful death." Moreover, the jury was instructed on wrongful death damages. Accordingly, the wrongful death remedy in the present suit is barred by res judicata. 7 We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Officer Watts and the Town of Fountain Inn on Mrs. Hill's claims as administratrix under Sec. 1983.
The district court granted summary judgment against Mrs. Hill individually on her claim under Sec. 1983 for the deprivation of her right to continued association with Michael Hill. Applying South Carolina law pursuant to Sec. 1988, the district court apparently reasoned that Mrs. Hill's only remedy was that afforded by South Carolina's wrongful death act. A parent cannot recover under the act if children of the deceased are living. See S.C. Code Ann. Sec. 15-51-20 (1976). Because Michael Hill allegedly had living children, the district court concluded that Mrs. Hill could not recover under the wrongful death act and, thus, could not recover under Sec. 1983. We agree that Mrs. Hill may not maintain her individual claim in the present suit, but we base our decision on grounds different from those of the district court.
Mrs. Hill argues that she should be allowed to maintain her individual claim notwithstanding South Carolina law. First, she asserts that she has a constitutional right, as a parent, to the continued association with her child, Michael Hill. Furthermore, she notes that federal law, under Sec. 1983, provides for recovery by individuals for the deprivation of their constitutional rights. Assuming that the application of South Carolina's wrongful death act pursuant to Sec. 1988 precludes recovery by her under Sec. 1983 for the deprivation of her right to continued association, she argues that South Carolina law is, therefore, inconsistent with federal law. Because Sec. 1988 provides that state law is inapplicable when inconsistent with federal law, she concludes that South Carolina's wrongful death act is inapplicable in governing her remedy under Sec. 1983. Instead, she argues that federal law controls, which should be interpreted to allow her claim. We recognize that there is authority for her position. See, e.g., Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1242-53 (7th Cir.1984). However, because we find...
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