Norton v. Snapper Power Equipment, Div. of Fuqua Industries, Inc.

Citation806 F.2d 1545
Decision Date05 January 1987
Docket NumberNo. 86-3128,86-3128
Parties, 6 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1119, Prod.Liab.Rep.(CCH)P 11,268 James L. NORTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. SNAPPER POWER EQUIPMENT, a DIVISION OF FUQUA INDUSTRIES, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

Charles E. Davis, Wooten, Honeywell, Kest & Martinez, Orlando, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant, cross-appellee.

Thomas M. Burke, Rumberger, Kirk, Caldwell, Cabaniss & Burke, Sharon Lee Stedman, Orlando, Fla., for defendant-appellee, cross-appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before CLARK, EDMONDSON and KEITH *, Circuit Judges.

CLARK, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff James L. Norton was injured while using a riding lawn mower manufactured by defendant Snapper Power Equipment. The issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict to Snapper on Norton's strict liability claim. We reverse.

FACTS

Norton was, and still is, in the commercial lawn mowing business. He bought a Snapper riding mower in July 1981. On January 24, 1983, Norton was using this mower to clear leaves from a yard which was adjacent to a creek. At the end of his third circular route through the yard, he drove up an incline, traveling in the direction away from the creek. Norton testified that as he reached the top of the incline, approximately six feet from the creek, the mower began to slide backwards toward the creek. Norton says he applied the brakes, but he continued to slide backwards. The lawn mower, with Norton still aboard, crashed into the creek. Norton testified that he kept both hands on the handlebars until the impact of the mower hitting the water knocked him off the seat. It is undisputed that, at some point during this crash, Norton's hand was caught in the lawn mower's blades, thereby amputating four of his fingers. It is not known, however, precisely how the injury occurred. According to Norton, he scrambled to the other bank of the creek after the crash, and only then noticed his injury.

Norton filed suit in Florida state court alleging that the lawn mower was unreasonably dangerous, and therefore defective, because it did not have a "dead man" control or automatic blade stop device. Snapper removed the action to the Middle District of Florida on September 24, 1984. The jury trial began on January 13, 1986.

At the close of plaintiff's case, and again at the close of all evidence, Snapper moved for a directed verdict. The court dismissed Norton's negligence and warranty claims, but left the strict liability "defect" claim for the jury. The jury returned a verdict for Norton, holding Snapper liable for 80% of the injuries. 1

Immediately after dismissing the jury, the district court indicated that it would enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict:

THE COURT: All right. Gentlemen, I allowed this case to go to the jury reserving a ruling on the motions prior to submission to the jury. The court at this time must give a judgment notwithstanding the verdict of the jury for the defense. The court cannot allow this case to proceed under any of the present law in this case. The court finds that the jury could not have considered in 1981 that the equipment used in the normal course of the equipment as it was designed could have had a defect which was the legal cause of this injury, and that the injury was caused of course by a turnover of the equipment and there is not sufficient evidence presented which a jury could find that there was an inherent defect in the product at that time. So the court must overturn the jury's verdict and render the jury verdict, render a verdict for the defendant in this case.

Record, Vol. 7 at 496. The court entered judgment for Snapper on January 27, 1986. Norton moved for entry of judgment in his favor pursuant to the jury verdict, but this was denied without further opinion. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Norton raises procedural and substantive objections to the judgment notwithstanding the verdict. First, Norton complains that the district court improperly entered the judgment notwithstanding the verdict sua sponte, and without having expressly reserved his ruling on the motions for directed verdict. Second, Norton contends there was sufficient evidence presented to the jury to support a finding that the lawn mower was defective and that the defect caused his injury.

I. Procedural Objections To The Judgment Notwithstanding The Verdict.

Norton's first procedural objection is that the district court announced the judgment notwithstanding the verdict sua sponte. Norton cites Johnson v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 344 U.S. 48, 73 S.Ct. 125, 97 L.Ed. 77 (1952), and Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 67 S.Ct. 752, 91 L.Ed. 849 (1947), for the proposition that a judgment notwithstanding can be entered only upon a specific motion by the losing party.

Norton's reliance on these cases is misplaced. In Johnson and Cone, the Supreme Court held that an appellate court was without power to enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict absent a timely motion by the losing party after trial. Such action by an appellate court deprives the trial court of the choice between entering judgment notwithstanding the verdict and granting a new trial. The trial court, having heard all of the evidence, is in a better position to make such a decision. Cone, 330 U.S. at 215-16, 67 S.Ct. at 755. The issue in Cone and Johnson was the balance of authority between appellate and trial courts. These cases certainly do not hold that a motion is a pre-requisite to a timely judgment notwithstanding the verdict entered by the trial court. See First Safe Deposit National Bank v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 337 F.2d 743, 746 (1st Cir.1964). After the district court announced its ruling, Norton was free to make a motion for new trial. Thus, Norton was not prejudiced by the district court's sua sponte ruling. See Shaw v. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 249 F.2d 434, 439 (7th Cir.1957) (district court could enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict sua sponte where plaintiff's ability to move for a new trial was not adversely affected).

Moreover, reversing the trial court on these grounds would be senseless. As noted in First Safe Deposit, supra, the district court "could have asked the defendant to file an immediate Rule 50(b) motion, and have acted upon it. To say that it could not, instead, act on the reserved pre-verdict motion, would be to insist upon form over substance." 337 F.2d at 746 (footnote omitted).

Norton's second procedural objection is that the district court did not expressly state that it was reserving its ruling on Snapper's motion for a directed verdict. As noted previously, the court directed a verdict on Norton's negligence and warranty claims, but allowed the strict liability claim to go to the jury. Norton's argument is without merit. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b) states that "[w]henever a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion." Given the clear language of this rule, it is unnecessary for the district court to expressly reserve its ruling on a motion for directed verdict. Snapper's counsel raised the causation and defect issues in his oral motion for directed verdict at the close of evidence. When the court allowed these questions to go to the jury, Norton was on notice that these issues could be the subject of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

II. Substantive Objections To Judgment Notwithstanding The Verdict.

The test for granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is the same as the test for granting a directed verdict. The court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and should grant the judgment notwithstanding the verdict only where the evidence so strongly and favorably points in favor of the moving party that reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary verdict. The district court cannot reweigh the evidence. Jackson v. Magnolia Brokerage Co., 742 F.2d 1305, 1307 (11th Cir.1984).

The issues in this case were: (1) whether the failure to install "dead man" devices rendered the 1981 Snapper mower "defective;" and (2) if the lawn mower was defective, whether the lack of a "dead man" control caused Norton's injury. Snapper claims there was little or no evidence to support the jury's verdict for Norton on either issue.

A. Defectiveness of the Lawn Mower.

The Florida Supreme Court has adopted the doctrine of strict liability as stated by the American Law Institute Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 402A. See West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So.2d 80, 87 (Fla.1976). Section 402A provides:

"(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or the consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if

"(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and

"(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.

"(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although

"(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and

"(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller."

Id. at 84. The Florida Supreme Court has elaborated somewhat on the language of 402A:

The term "unreasonably dangerous" more accurately depicts liability of a manufacturer or supplier in that it balances the likelihood and gravity of potential injury...

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