Hotmar v. Lowell H. Listrom & Co., Inc.
| Decision Date | 07 January 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-2359,84-2359 |
| Citation | 808 F.2d 1384 |
| Parties | , Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,052 O.J. HOTMAR and Nellie Hotmar, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. LOWELL H. LISTROM & COMPANY, INC. and Joe J. Brown, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Susan K. McKee-Pavlica of Curfman, Harris, Stallings & Snow (Brian G. Grace, with her on the brief), Wichita, Kan., for plaintiffs-appellants.
James A. Walker, Triplett, Woolf & Garretson, Wichita, Kan., for defendants-appellees.
Before MOORE, ANDERSON and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
O.J. Hotmar and his wife, Nellie, brought suit against their broker, Joe J. Brown, and his employer, Lowell H. Listrom & Company, alleging churning and a breach of fiduciary duty with respect to their stock portfolio during the period from November 1, 1977, through November 30, 1979. At trial, the plaintiffs called two witnesses, Joe J. Brown, one of the defendants, and O.J. Hotmar, one of the plaintiffs, and rested their case. The defendants then moved for a directed verdict under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). The district court granted this motion, believing that the plaintiffs had failed to make a prima facie showing of either churning or breach of fiduciary duty, and entered judgment for the defendants. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.
"Churning" is defined as "excessive trading by a broker disproportionate to the size of the account involved in order to generate commissions," and is deemed a violation of Sec. 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 78j(b), which prohibits any manipulative or deceptive device in the purchase or sale of any security in interstate commerce. See Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168 (10th Cir.1974). Under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 78j(b) and S.E.C. Rule 10b-5, a broker may be held liable for violation of federal securities laws once an investor proves that: (1) the trading in his account was excessive in the light of his investment objectives; (2) the broker in question exercised control over the trading in the account; and (3) the broker acted with an intent to defraud or with willful and reckless disregard for the investor's interests. Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 637 F.2d 318, 324 (5th Cir.1981); see also, e.g., Tiernan v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., Inc., 719 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1983); Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 821 (9th Cir.1980).
As stated, the plaintiffs called only two witnesses, O.J. Hotmar, the investor, and Joe J. Brown, the stockbroker. In his comments from the bench, the district court analyzed their testimony carefully and concluded that plaintiffs had failed to make a prima facie case of either churning or breach of fiduciary duty. We are in general accord with the analysis made by the district court.
At the outset it should be noted that we are dealing here with a so-called non-discretionary account, i.e., one where the investor must give prior approval to all transactions. In the case of a discretionary account, which is not the present case, the broker has formal discretionary authority to buy and sell stocks, and hence his control is quite clear. However, even though there be a non-discretionary account, the broker may still exercise control over the account. Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc., 619 F.2d 814, 821 (9th Cir.1980); Newburger, Loeb & Co., Inc. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1055, 98 S.Ct. 769, 54 L.Ed.2d 782 (1978); Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251 (4th Cir.1975). Such control, though not formal, may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances.
In the instant case, all transactions were with the prior approval of Hotmar. Although Hotmar sought, and obtained, advice from Brown, it was Hotmar's decision to buy or sell. On many occasions Hotmar followed Brown's advice. On other occasions, Hotmar rejected Brown's advice, and acted on his own evaluation of the matter. Although Hotmar had only a high school education, he had been heavily involved in the stock market for nearly 20 years. He visited with Brown in the latter's offices almost daily. Hotmar's own testimony indicates quite clearly that he was not a babe in the woods, but, on the contrary, was a knowledgeable, if not a wise investor. All things considered, evidence of "control" by Brown over the account is, in our view, lacking. 1
Hotmar also had the burden of proving that trading in his account was excessive. In churning cases, excessive trading is measured in the light of the investor's objectives. See, e.g., Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 711 F.2d 1361, 1368 (7th Cir.1983); Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d 673, 676 (9th Cir.1982); Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 258 (4th Cir.1975). Where the goals of the investor are aggressive it is easier to conclude that the trading was not excessive. In the instant case, Hotmar had experienced severe losses in the years preceding the time period with which we are here concerned, i.e., 1977 to 1979, and Hotmar himself testified that he went back in the market prepared to take risks and hopefully recoup his prior losses. Accordingly, he dealt in, and knew he was dealing in, speculative stocks, rather than conservative, blue-chip stocks. A traditional method of showing excessive trading in an account is by presenting an expert who will testify to such items as the "turnover rate" and the "in and out trading" in a particular account. Hotmar called no such expert, and although such does not in itself defeat his claim, he did proceed at some risk by not presenting such type of testimony. Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., supra at 1369. In sum, we fail to see that the plaintiffs presented any real evidence of excessiveness.
Also, Hotmar had the burden of establishing, prima facie, scienter on the part of Brown. Our study of the matter leads us to conclude that Hotmar did not meet this burden of proof either. There is no question that...
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