U.S. v. Laws
| Decision Date | 09 December 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 82-1679,82-1679 |
| Citation | 808 F.2d 92 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Glenston P. LAWS, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Criminal Action No. 81-00244).
Michael S. Frisch, Washington, D.C., appointed by this Court, for appellant.
David E. Sellinger, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Stanley S. Harris, U.S. Atty. at the time the brief was filed, and Michael W. Farrell and C. Madison Brewer, Asst. U.S. Attys., Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before ROBINSON, MIKVA and SCALIA, * Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III.
Once again we are called upon to assess the constitutional sufficiency of affidavits to support the issuance of a search warrant. The instant appeal is from convictions following denial of a motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the warrant. Analyzing the affidavits in light of the applicable case-law, we hold that they pass constitutional muster, and consequently that the evidence was properly admitted at trial. We accordingly affirm the convictions.
Officer William E. Larman, of the Metropolitan Police Department's Narcotics Branch, executed search warrants in two rooms at a Holiday Inn in northeast Washington, D.C. Cocaine and related paraphernalia found in one of the rooms led to the arrest and indictment of Glenston P. Laws, the appellant, who was registered as the occupant of that room. Laws moved to suppress the use of this evidence on the ground that two affidavits purporting to underpin the warrants failed to establish probable cause, and consequently that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. 1 The motion was denied and, at a trial on stipulated facts, Laws was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute 2 and possession of narcotics paraphernalia. 3
On appeal, Laws challenges only the sufficiency of the affidavits, insisting that probable cause was not shown. He claims that informants' tips which the affidavits incorporated were unreliable, and that the information communicated by the affidavits was stale and lacking in specificity. We address these contentions in turn.
To demonstrate probable cause to search premises, an affidavit must set forth facts sufficient to induce a reasonably prudent person to believe that a search thereof will uncover evidence of a crime. 4 An affidavit predicated upon an informant's tip has been regarded as vulnerable because the tip is hearsay, 5 which, like all hearsay, is susceptible to special concerns of perception and veracity. 6 If the tip is to serve as a basis for a finding of probable cause, the The Supreme Court has not left this constitutionally-required evaluation unguided. In the 1960's, in Aguilar v. Texas 10 and Spinelli v. United States, 11 the Court outlined inquiries to be made by an issuing magistrate in ascertaining whether a tip has overcome the presumed untrustworthiness of hearsay. The Court's more recent decisions, particularly Illinois v. Gates, 12 have substantially recast the probable cause analysis appropriate in this area.
"neutral and detached magistrate" 7 issuing the warrant must have substantial reason to believe that nonetheless the hearsay is reliable. 8 Without that determination, the magistrate would cede his duty to gauge probable cause to the informant and the possibly overzealous law-enforcement officer. 9
In Aguilar, a drug prosecution, the Court ruled that a tip-based warrant could not survive Fourth Amendment scrutiny without judicial consideration of the hearsay problems of perception and veracity. 13 Speaking to the first concern, the Court held that "the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that narcotics were where he claimed they were." 14 This requirement, aptly termed the "basis of knowledge," 15 called for some description of the informant's means of perception: Did he see, hear, touch or smell the criminal activity or contraband? As for the second concern--veracity--the Court held that the affiant must also present to the magistrate information shoring up the conclusion "that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed, ... was credible, or his information reliable." 16 The Aguilar affidavit, which stated only that the affiants had "received reliable information from a credible person" and "believed that narcotics ... [were] being kept at the [designated] premises," 17 failed in both respects. 18
In Spinelli, the Court addressed the question whether corroborative information gathered by police could cure a tip that failed to meet Aguilar 's double demand. 19
The Court ruled that while supplemental information could possibly vitalize a deficient tip, 20 it did not do so in Spinelli. The effort to corroborate yielded nothing explaining how the informant came by his information or otherwise elevating the tip above a "casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation," 21 nor did it cast an "aura of suspicion" over otherwise innocent behavior. 22 Later cases applied the two-pronged test of Aguilar and Spinelli, weighing and sometimes debating the significance of particular circumstances to the demands for perception and veracity. 23
Recently, in Illinois v. Gates, 24 the Court abandoned a strict, mechanical adherence to the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test of informant reliability, and eliminated the need to satisfy distinctly and fully the test's double demands. 25 Gates held that an informant's basis of knowledge and his or her veracity should not be understood as "entirely separate and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case." 26 Rather, these two elements are to be taken only as "relevant considerations in the totality of circumstances analysis that traditionally has guided probable cause determinations." 27 The Court eluciated:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair The Court deemed the totality-of-circumstances standard better suited to the practical task of gauging probable cause, which "requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity." 29
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a "substantial basis for ... concluding" that probable cause existed. 28
The Gates Court also emphasized the importance of independent police work corroborating the details of an informant's tip. 30 This sort of confirmation may bolster the reliability of the hearsay, and thus increase the likelihood of demonstrating probable cause; in particular cases, it could even be decisive: "It is enough, for purposes of assessing probable cause, that 'corroboration through other sources of information reduce[d] the chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale,' thus providing 'a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.' " 31 The Court observed that its decisions utilizing a totality-of-circumstances analysis have consistently acknowledged the value of police corroboration in making the probable cause determination. 32
The Gates Court ruled that probable cause was made out by an anonymous letter indicating that a husband-wife team was currently violating state drug laws and planning future criminal activities, 33 as supplemented by information obtained through an independent police investigation. 34 The Court noted that this information suggested that the Gates were involved in drug trafficking, 35 and thus corroborated the The Gates Court further held that the accuracy of the informant-communicated details of the Gates' forthcoming trip to Florida made it likely that the informant had access to reliable information, including dependable information on illegality. 40 And while the Court recognized that the letter and the subsequent corroboration might not clearly establish the informant's basis of knowledge, it felt that they did make it sufficiently probable that the informant had obtained his information "from the Gateses or someone they trusted." 41 Given the anonymous letter, the corroborating police investigation, and reasonable inferences, the Court concluded that the magistrate had a substantial basis for making a finding of probable cause. 42
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Griffin
...of the informant's basis of knowledge may compensate for a less than conclusive demonstration of his credibility." United States v. Laws , 808 F.2d 92, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Thus, "even if we entertain some doubt as to an informant's motives, his explicit and detailed description of alleged......
-
People v. Terrones
...... California Constitution article I, section 28, subdivision (d) (Proposition 8), requires us to apply federal constitutional law to determine whether evidence should be excluded for offenses committed after June 9, 1982. (People v. Long ...Laws (D.C.Cir.1986) 808 F.2d 92, 103; see also U.S. v. Yarbrough (9th Cir.1988) 852 F.2d 1522, 1533 [interlocking tips from different confidential ......
-
U.S. v. Dawkins
...the task turns in large part on independent police work corroborating the details of the informant's charge. See United States v. Laws, 808 F.2d 92, 97 (D.C.Cir.1986). In some circumstances, it may be enough that law enforcement officers confirm the tip's innocent details, for "seemingly in......
-
U.S. v. Edelin
...should look to a variety of factors, such as whether the informants have proven "credible in other instances," United States v. Laws, 808 F.2d 92, 100 (D.C.Cir. 1986), and whether there is corroboration of the facts by the police. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 241-42, 103 S.Ct. 2317; Unite......