Brumfield v. Cain

• Decision Date: 16 December 2015
• Docket Number: No. 12–30256.,12–30256.
• Citation: 808 F.3d 1041
• Parties: Kevan BRUMFIELD, Petitioner–Appellee v. Burl CAIN, WARDEN, Louisiana State Penitentiary, Respondent–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

808 F.3d 1041

Kevan BRUMFIELD, Petitioner–Appellee

v.Burl CAIN, WARDEN, Louisiana State Penitentiary, Respondent–Appellant.

No. 12–30256.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Dec. 16, 2015.

Michael Brian Desanctis, Amir H. Ali (argued), R. Trent McCotter, Jenner & Block, L.L.P., Washington, DC, Nicholas Joseph Trenticosta, Esq., Attorney, Herrero & Trenticosta, New Orleans, LA, for Petitioner–Appellee.

Monisa Leola Thompson, Premila Burns, Assistant District Attorney (argued), District Attorney's Office, Baton Rouge, LA, for Respondent–Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana.

Before KING, CLEMENT, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

KING, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner–Appellee Kevan Brumfield was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death in 1995. Following state court proceedings, Brumfield filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court, arguing that he is ineligible for the death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), because he is intellectually disabled. The district court found that the state court erred by not holding an Atkins hearing on whether Brumfield was intellectually disabled. Following a multi-day hearing in 2010, the district court granted Brumfield a writ of habeas corpus, finding that he was intellectually disabled under Louisiana's statutory definition of intellectual disability. Without reaching the merits of Brumfield's claim that he is intellectually disabled, this court reversed the district court's judgment. This court held that because Brumfield had failed to satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the district court should not have reached the merits of his Atkins claim. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Brumfield had indeed satisfied the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and that he was thus entitled to have his claim of intellectual disability under Atkins evaluated on the merits. On remand, we review for clear error the district court's determination that Brumfield is, in fact, intellectually disabled. Because the district court's determination that Brumfield is intellectually disabled is plausible in light of the record as a whole, its determination is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the ruling of the district court.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The facts and procedural history of this case are recounted exhaustively in prior opinions. See Brumfield v. Cain, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2269, 192 L.Ed.2d 356 (2015) [hereinafter Brumfield (S.Ct.) ]; Brumfield v. Cain, 744 F.3d 918 (5th Cir.2014) [hereinafter Brumfield (5th Cir.) ]; Brumfield v. Cain (Brumfield II), 854 F.Supp.2d 366 (M.D.La.2012) ; Brumfield v. Cain (Brumfield I ), No. CIV.A.04–787JJB–CN, 2008 WL 2600140 (M.D.La. June 30, 2008) ; State v. Brumfield, 737 So.2d 660 (La.1998) [hereinafter Brumfield (La.) ]. We recount the facts and procedural history as relevant to the limited question before us today.

A. The Original Crime and State Court Proceedings

On January 7, 1993, Petitioner–Appellee Kevan Brumfield and an accomplice, Henri Broadway, opened fire on a Baton Rouge Police Department vehicle driven by Corporal Betty Smothers. Smothers was escorting Kimen Lee, an assistant manager at the grocery store where Smothers worked part time as a security guard, as Lee made the grocery store's nightly bank deposit. Brumfield fired seven rounds from the left side of the police cruiser, and Broadway fired five rounds from the right side. Lee survived, but Smothers did not. Baton Rouge police officers arrested Brumfield for Smothers' murder on January 11, 1993. When police interrogated Brumfield, he initially denied any involvement in Smothers' murder and claimed that he had been with his brother at the time. After Brumfield's brother denied that claim, Brumfield gave a videotaped statement admitting that he drove the getaway car but denying that he murdered Smothers. Later, Brumfield gave another videotaped statement where he admitted to being in the bank parking lot and firing shots at the police car.

Following a multi-week trial in June and July of 1995, a jury found Brumfield guilty of first degree murder. He was subsequently sentenced to death on July 3, 1995. Brumfield appealed his conviction, but the Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed the state trial court. Brumfield (La.), 737 So.2d at 662, 671. And the Supreme Court of the United States denied his petition for certiorari thereafter. Brumfield v. Louisiana, 526 U.S. 1025, 119 S.Ct. 1267, 143 L.Ed.2d 362 (1999).

In March 2000, Brumfield filed for postconviction relief with a state trial court before the Supreme Court of the United States issued its decision in Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242, prohibiting the execution of intellectually disabled criminals.¹ Brumfield later amended his state petition to assert an Atkins claim and argued that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his intellectual disability claim.² Brumfield requested funds to develop his claim, but the state trial court denied his petition in its entirety on October 23, 2003. Brumfield then filed a writ with the Supreme Court of Louisiana, alleging, inter alia, that the trial court erred by failing to hold an Atkins hearing. That court denied the writ without explanation. Brumfield v. State, 885 So.2d 580, 580 (La.2004).

B. Federal District Court Proceedings

Following the Supreme Court of Louisiana's dismissal of his appeal, Brumfield petitioned the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana for a writ of habeas corpus, asking the court "to declare him [intellectually disabled] and ineligible for the death penalty under Atkins. " Brumfield II, 854 F.Supp.2d at 370. Brumfield filed an amended petition in 2007 re-raising his Atkins claim, supported by expert findings developed with federal funding. A magistrate judge recommended that, although the state court's refusal to grant an Atkins hearing was "reasonable and in accordance with clearly established federal law," the district court should consider the additional evidence Brumfield presented in his amended habeas petition. The magistrate judge explained that Brumfield had demonstrated cause for failing to provide the state court with expert evidence because the state court denied him funding to develop this evidence. The magistrate judge further reviewed the additional evidence submitted by Brumfield and concluded that he had established a prima facie case of intellectual disability and was thus entitled to an Atkins hearing. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation and held an Atkins hearing July 12–16 and August 3–4, 2010, discussed in detail below. Brumfield II, 854 F.Supp.2d at 370.

In its opinion granting Brumfield a writ of habeas corpus, the district court first addressed the legal prerequisites to a federal habeas hearing before addressing the substance of Brumfield's Atkins claim. Brumfield II, 854 F.Supp.2d at 373, 384. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Brumfield could obtain federal habeas relief only if, in rejecting his claim, the state court's decision "was either ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,’ or was ‘based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’ " Brumfield (S.Ct.), 135 S.Ct. at 2275 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2) ). The district court found that denying Brumfield an evidentiary hearing without providing him with the funds to develop his Atkins claim "represented an unreasonable application of then-existing due process law as determined by the Supreme Court" and therefore satisfied § 2254(d)(1). Brumfield II, 854 F.Supp.2d at 383–84. The district court also concluded that the state trial court's denial of an Atkins hearing "suffered from an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented ... in violation of § 2254(d)(2)." Id. at 379.

The district court then analyzed the merits of Brumfield's Atkins claim. In determining whether Brumfield is intellectually disabled—and therefore barred from being sentenced to death under Louisiana law, La.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 905.5.1(A) —the district court relied heavily on the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities' (AAIDD's)³ Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Support (10th ed.2002) [hereinafter Red Book ], which "contains the current, consensus definition of [intellectual disability]," as "Louisiana law tracks the clinical definition provided by the [Red Book ]." Brumfield II, 854 F.Supp.2d at 385–86. To establish an intellectual disability, the district court explained, "Brumfield bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he meets the statutory definition." Id. at 385 (citing La.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 905.5.1(C)(1) ).

All of the experts who testified in this case agreed on the relevant criteria for diagnosing intellectual disability.⁴ Consistent with the guidance from the United States Supreme Court and the Louisiana Supreme Court and La.Code Crim. Proc. Art. 905.5.1, the experts agreed that an intellectual disability diagnosis requires satisfying a three part test: "(1) subaverage intelligence, as measured by objective standardized IQ tests; (2) significant impairment in several areas of adaptive skills; and (3) manifestations of this neuropsychological disorder in the developmental stage." Brumfield (S.Ct.), 135 S.Ct. at 2274 (quoting State v. Williams, 831 So.2d 835, 854 (La.2002) ). Each expert also agreed that the diagnosis of intellectual disability is guided by the same relevant psychological and medical texts authored by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) and AAIDD. See generally AAIDD, Intellectual...