808 F.3d 413 (9th Cir. 2015), 03-71369, Mondaca-Vega v. Lynch
|Citation:||808 F.3d 413|
|Opinion Judge:||Andrew D. Hurwitz , Judge.|
|Party Name:||SALVADOR MONDACA-VEGA, Petitioner, v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent|
|Attorney:||Matt Adams (argued), Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, Seattle, Washington; and Martha H. Rickey, Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, Granger, Washington, for Petitioner. August E. Flentje (argued), Stuart F. Delery, Colin A. Kisor, Elizabeth J. Stevens, Aaron S. Goldsmith, Katherine E.M. Goett...|
|Judge Panel:||Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge and Harry Pregerson, Alex Kozinski, Barry G. Silverman, William A. Fletcher, Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Jay S. Bybee, N. Randy Smith, Mary H. Murguia, Jacqueline H. Nguyen and Andrew D. Hurwitz, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge Hurwitz. Partial Concurrence and Par...|
|Case Date:||December 15, 2015|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit|
Argued En Banc March 17, 2014
Submitted, San Francisco, California February 3, 2015.
As Amended December 21, 2015.
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Agency No. A019-263-384.
The en banc court denied petitioner's petition for review from the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision finding him deportable, based on the en banc court's affirmance of the district court's determination following a bench trial pursuant to this court's transfer under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(B) finding that petitioner is not a United States citizen.
Judge Hurwitz wrote an opinion joined by the full panel as to Parts I-III; by Judges Kozinski, Silverman, Rawlinson, Bybee, Murguia and Nguyen as to Part IV; and by Judges Kozinski, Silverman, Rawlinson and Bybee as to Parts V and VI.
In Parts I-III, Judge Hurwitz wrote that petitioner presented substantial credible evidence that he was a U.S. citizen and that the government satisfied its burden to rebut his claim by clear and convincing evidence.
In Part IV, Judge Hurwitz wrote that the district court determined only a factual question regarding whether petitioner was a U.S. or Mexican citizen, and that independent review was not appropriate.
In Part V, Judge Hurwitz concluded that this court is required under Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a) to review the district court's factual findings, including its ultimate conclusion that petitioner is not a citizen because he was born in Mexico, for clear error. Judge Hurwitz wrote that Lim v. Mitchell, 431 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1970), an alienage-determination case applying independent review to findings of fact, has been overruled.
In Part VI, Judge Hurwitz denied the petition for review.
Judge N.R. Smith wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Chief Judge Thomas and Judges Pregerson and W. Fletcher joined as to Part I, in which Judge N.R. Smith would hold that the government must prove by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that a petitioner claiming to be a U.S. citizen is deportable. Judge N.R. Smith also concurred in Sections I-III and in the result of Section V and VI of the majority decision; writing that although he did not agree with the majority's holding on the burden of proof, he concurred in the judgment to deny the petition.
Judge Murguia wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, which Judge Nguyen joined in full and which Chief Judge Thomas and Judges Pregerson and W. Fletcher joined as to Parts A, B and D. In Parts A, B and D, Judge Murguia would find that whether petitioner procured U.S. citizenship illegally or by fraud is a question of law to be reviewed de novo, and would reverse the district court and grant the petition for review. In Part C, Judge Murguia would hold that Lim, which applied an independent standard of review in an alienage determination case, is sound and should be followed. In Part E, upon independently reviewing the district court's determination that the government met its burden and reviewing for clear error the district court's underlying findings of fact, Judge Murguia would reverse the district court and grant the petition for review.
Our task is to review a district court determination--made after a bench trial--that the petitioner1 was born in Mexico,
not the United States. After finding the petitioner had introduced sufficient evidence that he is a U.S. citizen, the district court shifted the burden to the government to rebut by " clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence, and found that it had done so.
The petitioner claims that the district court erred in concluding that " clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence--a phrase we have used to describe the government's burden in alienage-determination proceedings--is identical to the traditional civil intermediate burden of proof. He argues the proper burden is instead more akin to the " beyond a reasonable doubt" standard that applies in criminal cases. We disagree, and hold that " clear, unequivocal, and convincing" is the familiar intermediate standard used in civil cases when particularly important individual interests are at stake.
Because we find no error in the district court's application of the burden of proof, we also reach the second substantial question presented in this case--the standard of review applicable to the trial court's findings of fact. The petitioner argues we must review the district court's findings de novo. We hold, instead, that the " clear error" standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) applies. Under that standard, the petition for review must be denied.
Although the parties sharply contest whether the petitioner is a U.S. citizen, much of the evidence in this case is a matter of public record and undisputed.
1. Two authentic birth certificates are in the record--one of Salvador Mondaca-Vega, born on June 3, 1931 in Sinaloa, Mexico, the other of Renoldo2 Mondaca Carlon, born on July 17, 1931 in Imperial, California. Although the petitioner concedes he has on multiple occasions identified himself as Salvador Mondaca-Vega, he claims he is really Reynaldo Mondaca Carlon, a U.S. citizen.
2. It is uncontested that regardless of his place of birth, the petitioner grew up in El Fuerte, Sinaloa, Mexico. He came to the United States around 1951, when he was about twenty years old, to look for work. A long series of contacts with law enforcement and immigration authorities ensued.
His rap sheet indicates that in July 1951, the petitioner, identifying himself as Salvador Mondaca, was taken into custody by the Sheriff's Office in Auburn, California and transferred to federal immigration officials. In September 1951, the petitioner accepted voluntary departure under the name Salvador Mondaca-Vega.
3. The record also reflects various actions taken in 1952 and 1953 by individuals identifying themselves by the names on the birth certificates; the parties dispute whether these actions were taken by the petitioner. In September 1952, someone identifying himself as Salvador Mondaca unsuccessfully applied for a social security card, naming his place of birth as Mexico and stating that his date of birth was April 13, 1931. Also in September 1952, someone identifying himself as Reynaldo Mondaca Carlon registered for selective service in Salinas, California; he was later found unacceptable for induction.
In May 1953, a person claiming to be Reynaldo C. Mondaca and identifying his date of birth as July 17, 1931 and his place of birth as Imperial, California, successfully applied for a social security card. Handwriting analysis suggests the signature on this application belongs to the petitioner. Although the district court made no finding as to who made the first social security card application and the selective service registration, the court concluded that the May 1953 application was made by the petitioner.
4. According to the rap sheet, in May 1953 and September 1954, the petitioner, claiming first to be Salvador Mondaca-Vega, then Salvador Mondaca, was transferred to immigration authorities in Washington State and deported to Mexico. A 1994 fingerprint analysis by the Seattle Police Department indicates that fingerprints taken on both occasions were from the same individual, and that they belong to the petitioner.
5. In September 1954, the petitioner, in a sworn interview with an INS official, stated that his name is Salvador Mondaca-Vega, that he was born on April 16, 1931 in Sinaloa, Mexico, and that he is a Mexican citizen. Expert handwriting analysis submitted by both parties suggests the signature on the statement was made by the petitioner.
6. The rap sheet indicates that on at least two occasions after his 1954 deportation, the petitioner received voluntary departure--once in 1956 as Salvador Mondaca-Vega, and once in 1966 under the name Jose Valdez-Vega. The name Salvador Mondaca-Vega...
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