McIsaac v. Didriksen Fishing Corp.

Decision Date13 January 1987
Docket NumberNo. 86-1061,86-1061
PartiesJames R. McISAAC, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. DIDRIKSEN FISHING CORP., et al., Defendants, Appellees. Appeal of The WISE COMPANY, INC., Defendant, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Craig M. Brown, with whom Robert P. Powers and Melick & Porter, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for defendant, appellant.

Ronald B. Horvitz, Gloucester, Mass., for plaintiff, appellee James R. McIsaac.

Before CAMPBELL, Chief Judge, and BOWNES and TORRUELLA, Circuit Judges.

BOWNES, Circuit Judge.

Defendant-appellant Wise Company, Inc., appeals from a jury verdict and judgment against it. Wise manufactured a helmsman's chair used in the pilothouse of a commercial fishing vessel, the SETTLER, which was owned by defendant-appellee Didriksen Fishing Corporation.

The accident giving rise to the law suit happened as follows. On September 25, 1981, plaintiff-appellee James R. McIsaac, 1 a seaman on the vessel, was conducting his wheel watch from the helmsman's chair. The chair was elevated to enable its occupant to look out the window and observe the instrument panel in the wheelhouse. The seat swiveled atop a thirty-inch post by means of an aluminum bracket device, known as a spider, which was connected to the base of the seat and fit over the chair post. While McIsaac sat in the chair, the boat rode up and down long rolling swells. Since the helmsman's chair was not installed with a footrest, he maintained comfort and stability by putting his feet against the companionway bulkhead railing, which was about three feet off the deck. As the SETTLER began to roll down the top of a swell, the spider snapped and broke. McIsaac fell backwards in the seat onto the concrete and steel wheelhouse deck, landing directly on the point of his right elbow. McIsaac was in so much pain that the SETTLER's captain, Arne Olsen, turned the vessel around and headed back to New Bedford. McIsaac's injury was diagnosed as a severely fractured elbow with permanent damage to the joint.

McIsaac brought a complaint against Didriksen alleging negligence under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. Sec. 688 (1985 Supp.), unseaworthiness under general maritime law, and maintenance and cure under maritime law. Along with its answer, Didrisken filed a third-party complaint against Wise seeking indemnification and/or contribution. Didriksen claimed that McIsaac's injury was caused by Wise's negligence and breach of warranty with regard to the manufacture and sale of the helmsman's chair. Subsequently, McIsaac amended his complaint adding counts against Wise for negligent design, manufacture and warning, and breach of warranty.

Following a ten-day trial, the jury found both Didriksen and Wise negligent; Didriksen was held 80% liable and Wise 20% liable. Didriksen also was held liable for the unseaworthiness of the SETTLER. Wise was found not to have breached its warranty of merchantibility. The jury awarded McIsaac $822,000 in damages.

Wise's appeal focuses on three issues: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding of negligence, (2) the consistency of the jury's verdict, and (3) the question of damages.

Wise's Negligence Liability

Wise claims that there is insufficient evidence to support the finding of 20% negligence assessed against it by the jury. Wise asserts that Didriksen was entirely at fault because it negligently installed the helmsman's chair, modified the chair in a manner that rendered it far more dangerous than it was originally, and continued to use the chair after realizing it was unsafe for use aboard the SETTLER.

We must uphold the jury's verdict unless the facts and inferences, viewed in the light most favorable to McIsaac, "point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of" Wise that a reasonable jury could not have found it negligent at all. Chedd-Angier Production v. Omni Publications Int., 756 F.2d 930, 934 (1st Cir.1985); Rios v. Empresas Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 575 F.2d 986, 989-90 (1st Cir.1978).

Wise has not persuaded us that the facts of this case should conclusively bar fair-minded jurors from finding it negligent. There was ample evidence to support either of two alternative theories of liability presented by McIsaac: negligent design and negligent warning. Dr. Robert Greif, an expert witness, presented testimony substantiating the theory that Wise had negligently designed the spider which helped support the helmsman's chair whose collapse caused McIsaac's injury. Greif discussed the results of a series of calculations designed to test the spider's capacity to withstand the types of stresses it would be subject to on an ocean-going commercial fishing vessel. 2 His calculations indicated that the spider was fit for use in a pleasure boat, but he concluded that it was "not suitable" for use aboard a vessel like the SETTLER. On cross-examination by Wise's counsel, Greif affirmed that the spider collapsed "because it was on a commercial fishing vessel and was undergoing the stress and strain of that type of use...." Greif also noted that the spider's capacity to absorb stress would have increased had it been double-gusseted, like other Wise spiders, rather than single-gusseted. In addition, defendant's expert, Dr. Clifford Goudey, concurred with Greif's assessment that the spider was not suitable for use on a commercial fishing vessel. The president of Wise admitted on the stand that the spider had never been tested and was not made to be used on a commercial fishing vessel.

Wise argues that the spider's unsuitability for commercial vessel use cannot be equated with negligent design, since the product was not designed to be used by commercial vessels. The focus in negligent design cases, however, "is not on how the product is meant to function, but on whether the product is designed with reasonable care to eliminate avoidable dangers." Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 376 Mass. 874, 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1191 (1978). A manufacturer must "anticipate the environment in which its product will be used, and ... design against the reasonably foreseeable risks attending the product's use in that setting." Bernier v. Boston Edison Co., 380 Mass. 372, 403 N.E.2d 391, 395 (1980); Back v. Wickes Co., 375 Mass. 633, 378 N.E.2d 964, 969 (1978). Wise made the helmsman's chair and spider in question available to the entire marine market, commercial and noncommercial. It was, therefore, obliged to design its product in a manner which could be used safely by all sectors of that market. The jury was presented with ample evidence showing that the spider was not designed so that it could be safely used in the commercial fishing sector of the marine market. Wise could have cautioned that sector of the marine market against using the spider, but it did not.

Indeed, even if we were to accept Wise's contention that unsuitability for a particular use cannot be equated with negligent design, Wise's knowledge of the spider's inappropriateness for commercial use supports a finding of negligence based on a failure to warn. Wise does not argue that it did not know this particular helmsman's chair was unsuitable for commercial use. Instead, it avers that it had no duty to warn against such a use because it had no way of knowing that the chair and spider were being used on commercial vessels. We reject this argument. A seller or manufacturer of a product must "give adequate warning of unreasonable dangers involved in the use of which he knows or should know." Schaeffer v. General Motors Corp., 372 Mass. 171, 360 N.E.2d 1062 (1977). Wise's president stated that he knew the chair and spider aboard the SETTLER were not made to be used on a commercial fishing vessel. The jury heard evidence that Wise made scant effort to limit the sale of such a chair to the noncommercial sector of the marine market. The 1983 Wise product catalog, issued shortly after McIsaac's injury, contained a warning that the products displayed were not to be used on commercial vessels; previous catalogs, including the one relied on by Didriksen, contained no such admonition. Thus, the jury had evidence regarding both the lack and feasibility of an adequate warning. We reject Wise's argument that the dangers of the spider and chair were so obvious as to eliminate the need for a warning as a matter of law. It was for the jury to determine whether a warning was needed. In short, there was sufficient evidence for fair-minded jurors to conclude that Wise should have exercised reasonable care by warning against the commercial use of the spider and helmsman's chair which caused McIsaac's injury.

Verdict Consistency

Wise argues that the jury's verdict must be reversed because of inconsistency. It avers that the jury's finding of negligence cannot be reconciled with its failure to find that Wise breached its warranty of merchantibility. In Hayes v. Ariens Co., 391 Mass. 407, 462 N.E.2d 273 (1984), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a finding that defendant "did not breach its warranty necessarily imported a finding that the product, including the warning label, was reasonably safe, whereas the negligence finding necessarily imported a finding that it was not." Id. at 275, 391 Mass. 407. The court stated that a "defendant cannot be found to have been negligent without having breached the warranty of merchantibility." Id. Unable to discern the jury's reasoning, the court overturned the judgment and remanded for a new trial. Wise urges such a result is necessary here as well.

We note, initially, our "substantial reluctance to consider inconsistency in civil jury verdicts a basis for new trials." Merchant v. Ruhle, 740 F.2d 86, 91 (1st Cir.1984). A special verdict will be upheld if there is a view of the case which makes the jury's answers consistent. Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 364, 82 S.Ct. 780, 786, 7 L.Ed.2d 798 (1962); Insurance Co. of North...

To continue reading

Request your trial
51 cases
  • Southern Management v. Taha
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • 25 Noviembre 2003
    ...Pac. R.R. Co., 894 F.2d 299, 304-05 (8th Cir.1990); White v. Celotex Corp., 878 F.2d 144, 146 (4th Cir.1989); McIsaac v. Didriksen Fishing Corp., 809 F.2d 129, 134 (1st Cir.1987); Cundiff v. Washburn, 393 F.2d 505, 507 (7th Cir.1968). Cf. Bell v. Mickelsen, 710 F.2d 611, 616 (10th Cir. 1983......
  • Coastal Fuels of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Caribbean Petroleum Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • 6 Noviembre 1995
    ...if he or she failed to object "after the verdict was read and before the jury was discharged." See McIsaac v. Didriksen Fishing Corp., 809 F.2d 129, 134 (1st Cir.1987). This rule is grounded in the realization that "to decide otherwise would countenance 'agreeable acquiescence to perceivabl......
  • Burnett v. Ocean Props., Ltd.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maine
    • 30 Septiembre 2019
    ..." ‘substantial reluctance’ to ordering a new trial based on inconsistent civil jury verdicts," id. (quoting McIsaac v. Didriksen Fishing Corp. , 809 F.2d 129, 133 (1st Cir. 1987)) (citing Merchant v. Ruhle , 740 F.2d 86, 91 (1st Cir. 1984) ), as well as its view that "[a] special verdict wi......
  • Rogers v. Cofield
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • 8 Diciembre 2011
    ...to point out the alleged inconsistency before the jury was discharged, Donnelly waived this argument"); McIsaac v. Didriksen Fishing Corp, 809 F.2d 129, 134 (1st Cir. 1987) (Wise, who raised inconsistency eight days after jury's discharge "would not be entitled to a reversal even if we foun......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Renewed look at the duty to warn and affirmative defenses.
    • United States
    • Defense Counsel Journal Vol. 61 No. 2, April 1994
    • 1 Abril 1994
    ...Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 935 F.2d 1090, 1104 (10th Cir. 1991) (applying Kansas law). (103.) See McIsaac v. Didriksen Fishing Corp., 809 F.2d 129, 732-33 (1st Cir. 1987); Marois v. Paper Converting Mach. Co., 539 A.2d 621, 623-24 (Me. 1988). (104.) See Traylor, 988 F.2d at 735. (105.) Arel......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT