Espinoza v. Ark. Valley Adventures, LLC
Citation | 809 F.3d 1150 |
Decision Date | 05 January 2016 |
Docket Number | No. 14–1444.,14–1444. |
Parties | Jesus ESPINOZA, Jr., Plaintiff–Appellant, v. ARKANSAS VALLEY ADVENTURES, LLC, Defendant–Appellee. Colorado Trial Lawyers Association, Amicus Curiae. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
William J. Hansen of McDermott & McDermott, LLP, Denver, CO (George E. McLaughlin of Warshauer McLaughlin Law Group, P.C., Denver, CO, with him on the briefs), for Plaintiff–Appellant.
Alan Epstein (Ryan L. Winter and Conor P. Boyle, with him on the brief), of Hall & Evans, L.L.C., Denver, CO, for Defendant–Appellee.
Russell R. Hatten and Evan P. Banker of Chalat Hatten Koupal & Banker PC, Denver, CO, on the brief for amicus curiae Colorado Trial Lawyers Association, in support of Plaintiff–Appellant.
Before KELLY, HARTZ, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
This case arises from a summer rafting trip gone tragically wrong. It began when Sue Ann Apolinar hired a guide for a family adventure in the Colorado Rockies: an overnight rafting and camping excursion on a popular stretch of the Arkansas River running through Brown's Canyon. After she arrived at the outfitter's office, Ms. Apolinar and the other rafters received the usual guidance, made the usual preparations, and signed the usual release before heading down river. The next day, while maneuvering around a rapid known locally as Seidel's Suck Hole, the raft capsized. Everyone else was fished out of the water soon enough. But in a heartbreaking turn of events, the current swept Ms. Apolinar into a logjam where, despite repeated efforts to save her, she drowned. Eventually, Ms. Apolinar's son, Jesus Espinoza, Jr., brought a lawsuit against the rafting company alleging negligence per se and fraud (and other claims no longer in dispute). In reply, the company sought summary judgment, arguing that the release Ms. Apolinar signed shielded it from liability. With this the district court agreed and proceeded to enter judgment for the company. It's the propriety of this ruling that we're asked to assess in this appeal.
No one before us doubts that Ms. Apolinar signed a release. Or that the release purported to absolve the rafting company from any claim of negligence. The only question in this appeal is whether Colorado law permits private parties to enforce a contract like this. Under Colorado common law, it's long settled that courts will not give effect to contracts purporting to release claims for intentional, knowing, or reckless misconduct. See, e.g., Boles v. Sun Ergoline, Inc., 223 P.3d 724, 726 (Colo.2010). But claims of negligence are a different matter. Colorado common law does not categorically prohibit the enforcement of contracts seeking to release claims of negligence. Instead, and at the most general level, the Colorado Supreme Court has instructed courts to weigh four factors when deciding whether to give effect to agreements along these lines: "(1) the existence [or nonexistence] of a duty to the public; (2) the nature of the service performed; (3) whether the contract was fairly entered into; and (4) whether the intention of the parties is expressed in clear and unambiguous language." Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 376 (Colo.1981).
Even more specifically, the Colorado Supreme Court has explained that the first two Jones factors focus on public policy questions—asking whether "[t]he party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical necessity [and] ... [a]s a result of the essential nature of the service ... the party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the public who seeks his services." Id. (quoting Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal.2d 92, 32 Cal.Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d 441, 444 (1963) ). Meanwhile, the latter two factors focus on more party- and contract-specific questions—asking whether the release was fairly obtained and clearly and unambiguously expressed. Id. at 378. If the release satisfies both sets of questions—the more general and the more particular—it may be enforced. (Provided, of course, that it is otherwise a valid contract, involving, for example, mutual assent and consideration, matters not in dispute here).
When it comes to the first two Jones factors, the Colorado Supreme Court has offered even more specific guidance yet. Though some businesses perform essential public services and owe special duties to the public, the court has held that "businesses engaged in recreational activities" generally do not. Chadwick v. Colt Ross Outfitters, Inc., 100 P.3d 465, 467 (Colo.2004) ; see also Boles, 223 P.3d at 726 ( ). So while businesses providing, say, water, electricity, or sanitary services usually may not shield themselves from claims of negligence, recreational service providers often can. Though, of course, they must still face and satisfy the latter two case-specific Jones factors.
This relatively permissive public policy toward recreational releases may not be unique to Colorado common law but it does seem to be one of its distinguishing features. We don't doubt other states may rationally choose to pursue different lines when it comes to recreational releases: certainly the parties before us cite an array of cases from other jurisdictions taking an array of views. But in our federal system, states are usually permitted (and encouraged) to pursue their own paths on policy matters like these. And it's clear enough that Colorado allows private parties to assume some of the risks associated with their recreational pursuits. It's a policy choice that, no doubt, means some losses go uncompensated but one that also promotes the output and diversity of recreational services consumers may enjoy. Of course, the Colorado Supreme Court and the Colorado General Assembly may change their judgment on this score at any time. And maybe someday they will prefer a policy that shifts the burden of loss to the service provider, ensuring compensation in cases like this even if also impairing to some degree individual choice and output. But that decision is their decision to make, not ours, and their current policy is clear. Indeed, following the Colorado Supreme Court's guidance in this area, this court and many Colorado courts have upheld many releases in many recreational activities over many years. Only some examples of which we include in the margin.1
Still, Mr. Espinoza submits, his case is categorically different. Yes, Ms. Apolinar signed a document purporting to release the rafting company from all claims of negligence. Yes, Colorado public policy generally permits the release of claims of negligence in recreational pursuits like the one here. But, Mr. Espinoza argues, the release Ms. Apolinar signed should still be held to violate state public policy—it should still be held to run afoul of the first two Jones factors—because his claim is one for negligence per se rather than common law negligence. He observes that the Colorado River Outfitters Act (CROA) makes it a misdemeanor for rafting companies to operate any raft in a "careless or imprudent manner." Colo.Rev.Stat. § 33–32–107(2)(b). And from this, he reasons, negligence by rafting companies has become a matter of public concern and a public service within the meaning of the first two Jones factors.
We find ourselves unable to agree for a number of related reasons.
First, we think this argument mistakes the nature of the inquiry called for by the first two Jones factors. By their terms, those factors don't ask whether the activity in question is the subject of some sort of state regulation. Instead, they ask whether the service provided is of "great importance to the public," a matter of "practical necessity" as opposed to (among other things) a "recreational" one. 623 P.2d at 376–77. And the distinction the Jones factors draw between essential and recreational services would break down pretty quickly if the presence of some state regulation were enough to convert an otherwise obviously "recreational" service into a "practically necessary" one. After all, state law imposes various rules and regulations on service providers in most every field these days—including on service providers who operate in a variety of clearly recreational fields. See, e.g., Colo.Rev.Stat. § 33–14–116 (snowmobiling); id. § 33–44–104(2) (skiing); id. § 13–21–119(4)(b)(I) (equine activities).
Second, Mr. Espinoza's argument suggests a firmer analytical line can be drawn between claims of negligence and negligence per se than we think the circumstances here will fairly allow. As we've seen, Colorado law has long permitted parties to contract away negligence claims in the recreational context. And negligence per se claims often differ very little from their common law cousins: they usually just substitute a common law duty or standard of care with one prescribed by statute and all other elements remain the same. See Lombard v. Colo. Outdoor Educ. Ctr., Inc., 187 P.3d 565, 573 (Colo.2008). In fact, in the case before us it's not even clear what duty of care CROA adds to the common law. Mr. Espinoza says the rafting company violated the statutory duty to avoid operating a raft in a "careless or imprudent manner." Mr. Espinoza points as well to implementing regulations that suggest a company should offer things like a "basic orientation" for rafters and help when accidents occur. But Mr. Espinoza does not suggest how these provisions create any distinctly new duty of care. Indeed, they appear to be more or less coextensive with the preexisting common law standard of care, which requires parties to act with "reasonable care ... i.e., that which a person of common prudence would use under the...
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