Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC
Decision Date | 05 January 2016 |
Docket Number | No. 15–1275.,15–1275. |
Citation | 809 F.3d 746 |
Parties | CHESAPEAKE APPALACHIA, LLC v. SCOUT PETROLEUM, LLC ; Scout Petroleum II, LP, Appellants. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Michael Coren, Esq., Jacob A. Goldberg, Esq., Alessandra C. Phillips, Esq., Robert L. Pratter, Esq. (Argued), Cohen, Placitella & Roth, Philadelphia, PA, Thomas D. Kitch, Esq., Daniel E. Lawrence, Esq., David G. Seely, Esq., Gregory J. Stucky, Esq., Fleeson, Gooing Coulson & Kitch, Wichita, KS, Counsel for Appellants.
Daniel T. Brier, Esq., Myers, Brier & Kelly, Scranton, PA, Daniel T. Donovan, Esq. (Argued), Ragan Naresh, Esq., Kirkland & Ellis, Washington, DC, Counsel for Appellee.
BEFORE: SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, and COWEN, Circuit Judges.
In Opalinski v. Robert Half International Inc., 761 F.3d 326 (3d Cir.2014), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 1530, 191 L.Ed.2d 558 (2015), we held that the availability of class arbitration constitutes a "question of arbitrability" to be decided by the courts—and not the arbitrators—unless the parties' arbitration agreement "clearly and unmistakably" provides otherwise, id. at 329, 335–36.
Scout Petroleum, LLC and Scout II, LP (collectively, "Scout") appeal from the orders of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granting Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC's ("Chesapeake") motions for summary judgment and for an order vacating a decision by the arbitrators and denying Scout's own motion to dismiss the complaint as well its motion for reconsideration. The oil and gas leases ("Leases") at issue in this appeal state that, in the event of a disagreement between "Lessor" and "Lessee" concerning "this Lease," performance "thereunder," or damages caused by "Lessee's" operations, "all such disputes" shall be resolved by arbitration "in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association." (A247.) Based on the language of the Leases themselves, the nature and contents of the various AAA rules, and the existing case law, we conclude that the Leases do not "clearly and unmistakably" delegate the question of class arbitrability to the arbitrators. Accordingly, we will affirm.
In 2008, Chesapeake entered into various oil and gas leases with landowners in several northeastern Pennsylvania counties. Chesapeake is the "Lessee," and the "Lessor" is (or originally was) the respective landowner, e.g., "[t]his Lease made this 10th day of January, 2008, by and between: William D. Bergey and Joanne M. Bergey, husband and wife ... hereinafter collectively called ‘Lessor’ and CHESAPEAKE APPALACHIA, L.L.C., an Oklahoma limited liability company ... hereinafter called ‘Lessee.’ " (A246.) The Leases indicate that they were "prepared by" Chesapeake. (A248.) In 2013, Scout purchased the right to several Leases, and, since then, it has been receiving royalties from Chesapeake.
The Leases include the following arbitration provision:
Over the years, the AAA has adopted and amended several rules applicable to various kinds of arbitration and mediation proceedings. Active Rules, American Arbitration Association, https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/rules/searchrules/rulesearchresult?x_rule_status=A (last visited Nov. 10, 2015). The AAA website lists more than fifty sets of active rules, including the Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures ("Commercial Rules") as well as the Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations ("Supplementary Rules"). Id.
The AAA's "Commercial Arbitration and Mediation Procedures" publication is nearly fifty pages long and includes fifty-eight different "Commercial Rules." These rules are couched in terms of individual or "bilateral" arbitration proceedings as opposed to proceedings on behalf of a class. They also generally address basic procedural issues. For example, there are rules governing the requirements for filing demands and answers, mediation, the arbitration proceeding's locale, pre-hearing production of information, basic guidelines for how the hearing should be conducted, and the timing, form, and scope of the arbitrator's award. Commercial Rule 1 ("Agreement of Parties") provides in relevant part that:
(a) The parties shall be deemed to have made these rules a part of their arbitration agreement whenever they have provided for arbitration by the American Arbitration Association (hereinafter AAA) under its Commercial Arbitration Rules or for arbitration by the AAA of a domestic commercial dispute without specifying particular rules. These rules and any amendment of them shall apply in the form in effect at the time the administrative requirements are met for a Demand for Arbitration or Submission Agreement received by the AAA. Any disputes regarding which AAA rules shall apply shall be decided by the AAA. The parties, by written agreement, may vary the procedures set forth in these rules. After appointment of the arbitrator, such modifications may be made only with the consent of the arbitrator.
(A93.) Commercial Rule 7 governs the "Jurisdiction" of the arbitrator:
(A96.) Commercial Rule 8 ("Interpretation and Application of Rules") states, inter alia, that the arbitrator "shall interpret and apply these rules insofar as they relate to the arbitrator's powers and duties." (A97.)
The Supplementary Rules governing class arbitration went into effect in 2003. Entitled "Applicability,"
Supplementary Rule 1 states:
(A136.) Supplementary Rule 3 is entitled "Construction of the Arbitration Clause":
(A137.) Under Supplementary Rule 4 ("Class Certification "), the arbitrator, if satisfied that the arbitration clause permits the arbitration to proceed as a class arbitration pursuant to Supplementary Rule 3, determines whether the proceeding should go forward as a class arbitration.
On March 17, 2014, Scout filed an arbitration demand against Chesapeake on behalf of itself and similarly situated lessors, alleging that Chesapeake paid insufficient royalties. In the answering statement it...
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