Helsley v. State, 63S00-0303-CR-103.

Citation809 N.E.2d 292
Decision Date25 May 2004
Docket NumberNo. 63S00-0303-CR-103.,63S00-0303-CR-103.
PartiesChristopher M. HELSLEY, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
CourtSupreme Court of Indiana

Michael C. Keating, Keating, Bumb, Vowels, Laplante & Kent, P.C., Evansville, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General, Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee. DICKSON, Justice.

The defendant, Christopher M. Helsley, was convicted of two counts of murder for the deaths of Marsha Rainey and Brad Maxwell in Pike County, Indiana, and sentenced to life without parole. In this direct appeal, the defendant claims various errors, which we regroup as follows: (1) admission of evidence from unlawful searches of his vehicle and residence; (2) admission of cumulative and inflammatory photographs; (3) unconstitutional ex post facto application of the penalty statute amendment; and (4) misleading sentence modification instruction. We affirm his convictions and sentence.

1. Automobile and Residence Searches

The defendant first contends that the trial court erred in admitting various items of evidence resulting from unlawful searches of his vehicle and his residence conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by the trial court. He argues that the facts upon which the warrant was issued do not establish probable cause linking him to the commission of the crime. The defendant presented his objections both at trial and in a pre-trial motion to suppress that was denied by the trial court in a comprehensive and thoughtful order.

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States guarantees that a search warrant will not be issued without probable cause.1 This Court recognizes that probable cause to search a premises "is established when a sufficient basis of fact exists to permit a reasonably prudent person to believe that a search of those premises will uncover evidence of a crime." Overstreet v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1140, 1157 (Ind.2003) (quoting Esquerdo v. State, 640 N.E.2d 1023, 1029 (Ind.1994)

). The trial court must make its determination to issue a warrant "based on the facts stated in the affidavit and the rational and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom." Overstreet, 783 N.E.2d at 1157

(quoting Esquerdo, 640 N.E.2d at 1029).

When they sought the search warrant, police presented the following information to the trial judge: (1) about 7 a.m. on April 19, 2001, the bodies of two fellow employees of the defendant were found shot with what appeared to be a .45 caliber handgun in the Pike county EMS ambulance barn; (2) the defendant had ready access to the ambulance barn and had been there until 9:30 or 10:00 p.m. the night before; (3) the defendant had purchased a .45 caliber handgun about one year before the incident and gave conflicting statements regarding its whereabouts (he initially told investigators that he had thrown the gun away two weeks before, but later told them that he had discarded the barrel and that the remainder of the gun was in his car); (4) the defendant had a conflict with one of the victims that could adversely affect the defendant's employment; (5) the defendant's wife had seen the handgun in the defendant's pocket the day before; and (6) after the defendant returned home around midnight, the defendant's wife washed the clothes he was wearing, and the defendant was generally "acting oddly," according to his wife.

Based on these facts presented to the trial court and the rational and reasonable inferences drawn from them, there was a sufficient basis to allow a reasonable person to conclude that a search of the defendant's vehicle and his residence would uncover evidence of a crime. The search warrant was supported by adequate probable cause.2

2. Photographs

The defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence ten photographs of the murder scene and the victims, which were cumulative because a videotape had been shown to the jury depicting the same information. He argues that he did not contest that the victims died from gunshot wounds, but only that he was not the perpetrator, and that any probative value of the photographs of the victims' injuries was greatly outweighed by their prejudicial effect. He also specifically urges that three autopsy photographs depicting a shaved portion of the victims' head wounds constituted altered depictions, making them even more gruesome and prejudicial.

The State responds that the photographs were relevant to the identity of the victims, the cause of death, and the manner in which the crimes were committed. Moreover, it argues that the photographs were not cumulative because they provided detail the video could not. The State also argues that because the jury viewed several photographs depicting the victims from both before and after the autopsy, it was clear in the three post-autopsy photographs with some of the victims' hair shaved (to permit better viewing of the wounds by the pathologist and the jurors) that the shaving was done by the pathologist, not the defendant.

The admission of photographic evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and this Court reviews the admission of photographic evidence only for abuse of discretion. Corbett v. State, 764 N.E.2d 622, 627 (Ind.2002). Photographs, as with all relevant evidence, may only be excluded if their probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Ind. Evidence Rule 403; Corbett, 764 N.E.2d at 627. Admission of cumulative evidence alone is insufficient to warrant a new trial. Kubsch v. State, 784 N.E.2d 905, 923 (Ind.2003). An appellant must establish that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the unfair prejudice flowing from it. Id.

Moreover, "[e]ven gory and revolting photographs may be admissible as long as they are relevant to some material issue or show scenes that a witness could describe orally." Corbett, 764 N.E.2d at 627 (quoting Amburgey v. State, 696 N.E.2d 44, 45 (Ind.1998)

). Gruesome and gory photographs with strong probative value are admissible where they help interpret the facts of the case for the jury. Corbett, 764 N.E.2d at 627. Autopsy photographs frequently pose unique problems where the pathologist has manipulated the corpse during the autopsy. They are generally inadmissible where the body is in an altered condition. Id. Nevertheless, "there are situations where some alteration of the body is necessary to demonstrate the testimony being given." Swingley v. State, 739 N.E.2d 132, 133-34 (Ind. 2000). In Corbett, we held that it was not prejudicial error to admit several autopsy photographs showing the victim's body with the head wounds cleaned and with some hair shaved away. 764 N.E.2d at 627.

Evaluating whether an exhibit's probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice is a discretionary task best performed by the trial court. Dunlap v. State, 761 N.E.2d 837, 842 (Ind.2002). We are not persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the photographs.

3. Amendment to Penalty Statute

The defendant alternatively contends that either (a) the trial court's penalty phase preliminary Instruction No. 8, informing the jury that the judge must follow their recommendation, retroactively applied a statutory amendment contrary to the provisions of the constitutions of the United States and Indiana that prohibit ex post facto laws, or (b) the trial court's subsequent decision to consider the jury recommendation only as advisory, retaining in the trial court the power to make the final sentencing determination, but denying the defense's motion for a continuance, improperly prevented the defendant from presenting mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing before the trial court. The defendant requests a new sentencing hearing.

The defendant was convicted of murders committed on April 18, 2001. The charges were filed on April 20, 2001. The guilt phase of the trial commenced June 14, 2002, resulting in guilty verdicts on June 21, 2002. The penalty phase began and concluded on June 24, 2002, resulting in the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment without parole. On that same day, the trial court ordered the probation department to prepare and file a pre-sentence investigation report by July 12, 2002, and set sentencing for July 19, 2002. Appellant's Appendix at 18-19. At the sentencing hearing, the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.

At the time the offenses were committed, Indiana's statute governing the imposition of life without parole and the death penalty provided that the jury would make a sentencing recommendation, but that the trial court was assigned the responsibility for determining the sentence and it was not bound by the jury's recommendation. Ind.Code § 35-50-2-9 (2001). On March 26, 2002, the legislature amended the statute "[f]or a defendant sentenced after June 30, 2002," and declared: "If the jury reaches a sentencing recommendation, the court shall sentence the defendant accordingly." Ind.Code § 35-50-2-9(e).

Thus the offenses were committed before the legislature passed the amendment and the guilt and penalty phases of the trial occurred after passage but before the effective date of the amendment. At the penalty phase six days before the effective date of the statute, however, both preliminary Instruction No. 8 and final Instruction No. 15 informed the jury that the law requires that the judge follow the jury's sentencing recommendation. Appellant's Appendix at 442, 459. The trial court's sentencing occurred three weeks later, after the effective date of the amendment. At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, the judge announced that due to "some concern about the ex post facto effect" of the statutory amendment, he would be treating the jury recommendation as advisory and that "this is a matter of discretion with me as to...

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